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From: Daniel Sneddon <daniel.sneddon@linux.intel.com>
To: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
	x86@kernel.org
Cc: hpa@zytor.com, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com
Subject: [PATCH 3/6] x86/bugs: Remove TAA kernel parameter.
Date: Tue, 24 Sep 2024 15:31:37 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20240924223140.1054918-4-daniel.sneddon@linux.intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20240924223140.1054918-1-daniel.sneddon@linux.intel.com>

Remove tsx_async_abort kernel parameter since it can be set with the common
clar_cpu_buffers parameter.

Signed-off-by: Daniel Sneddon <daniel.sneddon@linux.intel.com>
---
 .../admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt         | 41 -------------------
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c                    | 21 ----------
 2 files changed, 62 deletions(-)

diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
index 2753a1e51da5..961e637b8126 100644
--- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
+++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
@@ -6883,47 +6883,6 @@
 			See Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/tsx_async_abort.rst
 			for more details.
 
-	tsx_async_abort= [X86,INTEL,EARLY] Control mitigation for the TSX Async
-			Abort (TAA) vulnerability.
-
-			Similar to Micro-architectural Data Sampling (MDS)
-			certain CPUs that support Transactional
-			Synchronization Extensions (TSX) are vulnerable to an
-			exploit against CPU internal buffers which can forward
-			information to a disclosure gadget under certain
-			conditions.
-
-			In vulnerable processors, the speculatively forwarded
-			data can be used in a cache side channel attack, to
-			access data to which the attacker does not have direct
-			access.
-
-			This parameter controls the TAA mitigation.  The
-			options are:
-
-			full       - Enable TAA mitigation on vulnerable CPUs
-				     if TSX is enabled.
-
-			full,nosmt - Enable TAA mitigation and disable SMT on
-				     vulnerable CPUs. If TSX is disabled, SMT
-				     is not disabled because CPU is not
-				     vulnerable to cross-thread TAA attacks.
-			off        - Unconditionally disable TAA mitigation
-
-			On MDS-affected machines, tsx_async_abort=off can be
-			prevented by an active MDS mitigation as both vulnerabilities
-			are mitigated with the same mechanism so in order to disable
-			this mitigation, you need to specify mds=off too.
-
-			Not specifying this option is equivalent to
-			tsx_async_abort=full.  On CPUs which are MDS affected
-			and deploy MDS mitigation, TAA mitigation is not
-			required and doesn't provide any additional
-			mitigation.
-
-			For details see:
-			Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/tsx_async_abort.rst
-
 	turbografx.map[2|3]=	[HW,JOY]
 			TurboGraFX parallel port interface
 			Format:
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
index ed5524bc3ee4..0a09f0d1a343 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -339,27 +339,6 @@ static void __init taa_select_mitigation(void)
 		cpu_smt_disable(false);
 }
 
-static int __init tsx_async_abort_parse_cmdline(char *str)
-{
-	if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_TAA))
-		return 0;
-
-	if (!str)
-		return -EINVAL;
-
-	if (!strcmp(str, "off")) {
-		taa_mitigation = TAA_MITIGATION_OFF;
-	} else if (!strcmp(str, "full")) {
-		taa_mitigation = TAA_MITIGATION_VERW;
-	} else if (!strcmp(str, "full,nosmt")) {
-		taa_mitigation = TAA_MITIGATION_VERW;
-		taa_nosmt = true;
-	}
-
-	return 0;
-}
-early_param("tsx_async_abort", tsx_async_abort_parse_cmdline);
-
 #undef pr_fmt
 #define pr_fmt(fmt)	"MMIO Stale Data: " fmt
 
-- 
2.25.1


  parent reply	other threads:[~2024-09-24 22:32 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 26+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2024-09-24 22:31 [PATCH 0/6] VERW based clean-up Daniel Sneddon
2024-09-24 22:31 ` [PATCH 1/6] x86/bugs: Create single parameter for VERW based mitigations Daniel Sneddon
2024-10-08 19:24   ` Kaplan, David
2024-10-09 16:17     ` Daniel Sneddon
2024-10-09 16:36       ` Kaplan, David
2024-10-09 16:39         ` Daniel Sneddon
2024-10-09 19:44           ` Daniel Sneddon
2024-10-09 20:02             ` Kaplan, David
2024-10-09 20:34               ` Daniel Sneddon
2024-10-10  4:52     ` Josh Poimboeuf
2024-10-10 14:57       ` Borislav Petkov
2024-10-14 15:42         ` Daniel Sneddon
2024-10-15 13:52           ` Borislav Petkov
2024-10-15 14:05             ` Daniel Sneddon
2024-09-24 22:31 ` [PATCH 2/6] x86/bugs: Remove MDS command line Daniel Sneddon
2024-09-24 22:34   ` Dave Hansen
2024-09-24 22:41     ` Daniel Sneddon
2024-09-24 22:31 ` Daniel Sneddon [this message]
2024-09-24 22:31 ` [PATCH 4/6] x86/bugs: Remove MMIO kernel parameter Daniel Sneddon
2024-09-24 22:31 ` [PATCH 5/6] x86/bugs: Remove RFDS " Daniel Sneddon
2024-09-24 22:31 ` [PATCH 6/6] x86/bugs: Clean-up verw mitigations Daniel Sneddon
2024-10-02 14:20   ` Nikolay Borisov
2024-10-02 14:46     ` Daniel Sneddon
2024-10-02 14:54       ` Nikolay Borisov
2024-10-07 19:37   ` Josh Poimboeuf
2024-10-08 16:17     ` Daniel Sneddon

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