linux-doc.vger.kernel.org archive mirror
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Ross Philipson <ross.philipson@oracle.com>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org,
	linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, kexec@lists.infradead.org,
	linux-efi@vger.kernel.org, iommu@lists.linux.dev
Cc: ross.philipson@oracle.com, dpsmith@apertussolutions.com,
	tglx@linutronix.de, mingo@redhat.com, bp@alien8.de,
	hpa@zytor.com, dave.hansen@linux.intel.com, ardb@kernel.org,
	mjg59@srcf.ucam.org, James.Bottomley@hansenpartnership.com,
	peterhuewe@gmx.de, jarkko@kernel.org, jgg@ziepe.ca,
	luto@amacapital.net, nivedita@alum.mit.edu,
	herbert@gondor.apana.org.au, davem@davemloft.net, corbet@lwn.net,
	ebiederm@xmission.com, dwmw2@infradead.org,
	baolu.lu@linux.intel.com, kanth.ghatraju@oracle.com,
	andrew.cooper3@citrix.com, trenchboot-devel@googlegroups.com
Subject: [PATCH v14 08/19] x86/boot: Place TXT MLE header in the kernel_info section
Date: Mon, 21 Apr 2025 09:27:01 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20250421162712.77452-9-ross.philipson@oracle.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20250421162712.77452-1-ross.philipson@oracle.com>

The Measured Launch Environment (MLE) header must be locatable by the
boot loader and Intel TXT must be setup to do a launch with this header's
location. While the offset to the kernel_info structure does not need
to be at a fixed offset, the offsets in the header must be relative
offsets from the start of the setup kernel. Note that from the viewpoint
of the prelaunch phase and TXT, the setup kernel image as loaded into
memory is the MLE image.

The changes to the linker file achieve this by making available the
offset values which are updated in the MLE header structure. The following
are the needed offsets from the beginning of the setup kernel image:

- kernel_info_offset: Offset of the main kernel_info structure.
- mle_header_offset: Offset of the MLE header structure.
- sl_stub_entry_offset: Offset of the Secure Launch initial entry point.
- _edata_offset: Offset of the _edata label used as the end of the MLE image.

Signed-off-by: Ross Philipson <ross.philipson@oracle.com>
Suggested-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
---
 arch/x86/boot/compressed/kernel_info.S | 50 +++++++++++++++++++++++---
 arch/x86/boot/compressed/vmlinux.lds.S |  7 ++++
 2 files changed, 53 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/kernel_info.S b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/kernel_info.S
index f818ee8fba38..2765b1786368 100644
--- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/kernel_info.S
+++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/kernel_info.S
@@ -1,12 +1,20 @@
 /* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
 
+#include <linux/linkage.h>
 #include <asm/bootparam.h>
 
-	.section ".rodata.kernel_info", "a"
+/*
+ * The kernel_info structure is not placed at a fixed offest in the
+ * kernel image. So this macro and the support in the linker file
+ * allow the relative offsets for the MLE header within the kernel
+ * image to be configured at build time.
+ */
+#define roffset(X) ((X) - kernel_info)
 
-	.global kernel_info
+	.section ".rodata.kernel_info", "a"
 
-kernel_info:
+	.balign	16
+SYM_DATA_START(kernel_info)
 	/* Header, Linux top (structure). */
 	.ascii	"LToP"
 	/* Size. */
@@ -17,6 +25,40 @@ kernel_info:
 	/* Maximal allowed type for setup_data and setup_indirect structs. */
 	.long	SETUP_TYPE_MAX
 
+	/* Offset to the MLE header structure */
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURE_LAUNCH)
+	.long	roffset(mle_header_offset)
+#else
+	.long	0
+#endif
+
 kernel_info_var_len_data:
 	/* Empty for time being... */
-kernel_info_end:
+SYM_DATA_END_LABEL(kernel_info, SYM_L_LOCAL, kernel_info_end)
+
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURE_LAUNCH)
+	/*
+	 * The MLE Header per the TXT Specification, section 2.1
+	 * MLE capabilities, see table 4. Capabilities set:
+	 * bit 0: Support for GETSEC[WAKEUP] for RLP wakeup
+	 * bit 1: Support for RLP wakeup using MONITOR address
+	 * bit 2: The ECX register will contain the pointer to the MLE page table
+	 * bit 5: TPM 1.2 family: Details/authorities PCR usage support
+	 * bit 9: Supported format of TPM 2.0 event log - TCG compliant
+	 */
+SYM_DATA_START(mle_header)
+	.long	0x9082ac5a			/* UUID0 */
+	.long	0x74a7476f			/* UUID1 */
+	.long	0xa2555c0f			/* UUID2 */
+	.long	0x42b651cb			/* UUID3 */
+	.long	0x00000034			/* MLE header size */
+	.long	0x00020002			/* MLE version 2.2 */
+	.long	roffset(sl_stub_entry_offset)	/* Linear entry point of MLE (virt. address) */
+	.long	0x00000000			/* First valid page of MLE */
+	.long	0x00000000			/* Offset within binary of first byte of MLE */
+	.long	roffset(_edata_offset)		/* Offset within binary of last byte + 1 of MLE */
+	.long	0x00000227			/* Bit vector of MLE-supported capabilities */
+	.long	0x00000000			/* Starting linear address of command line (unused) */
+	.long	0x00000000			/* Ending linear address of command line (unused) */
+SYM_DATA_END(mle_header)
+#endif
diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/vmlinux.lds.S b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/vmlinux.lds.S
index 3b2bc61c9408..eae9745f5a0b 100644
--- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/vmlinux.lds.S
+++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/vmlinux.lds.S
@@ -118,3 +118,10 @@ SECTIONS
 	}
 	ASSERT(SIZEOF(.rela.dyn) == 0, "Unexpected run-time relocations (.rela) detected!")
 }
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURE_LAUNCH
+PROVIDE(kernel_info_offset      = ABSOLUTE(kernel_info - startup_32));
+PROVIDE(mle_header_offset       = kernel_info_offset + ABSOLUTE(mle_header - startup_32));
+PROVIDE(sl_stub_entry_offset    = kernel_info_offset + ABSOLUTE(sl_stub_entry - startup_32));
+PROVIDE(_edata_offset           = kernel_info_offset + ABSOLUTE(_edata - startup_32));
+#endif
-- 
2.39.3


  parent reply	other threads:[~2025-04-21 16:35 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 57+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2025-04-21 16:26 [PATCH v14 00/19] x86: Trenchboot secure dynamic launch Linux kernel support Ross Philipson
2025-04-21 16:26 ` [PATCH v14 01/19] Documentation/x86: Secure Launch kernel documentation Ross Philipson
2025-06-18  8:33   ` Mowka, Mateusz
2025-06-18 15:02     ` Dave Hansen
2025-04-21 16:26 ` [PATCH v14 02/19] x86: Secure Launch Kconfig Ross Philipson
2025-04-21 17:41   ` Randy Dunlap
2025-04-22 19:32     ` ross.philipson
2025-06-18  8:32   ` Mowka, Mateusz
2025-04-21 16:26 ` [PATCH v14 03/19] x86: Secure Launch Resource Table header file Ross Philipson
2025-04-21 19:18   ` ALOK TIWARI
2025-04-22 19:33     ` ross.philipson
2025-04-23 18:23   ` ALOK TIWARI
2025-04-23 20:04     ` ross.philipson
2025-04-24 12:36   ` Huang, Kai
2025-04-24 19:19     ` ross.philipson
2025-04-21 16:26 ` [PATCH v14 04/19] x86: Secure Launch main " Ross Philipson
2025-04-24 12:29   ` Huang, Kai
2025-04-24 18:56     ` ross.philipson
2025-06-23 11:44   ` Camacho Romero, Michal
2025-06-23 21:29     ` ross.philipson
2025-06-27  9:15       ` Camacho Romero, Michal
2025-04-21 16:26 ` [PATCH v14 05/19] x86: Add early SHA-1 support for Secure Launch early measurements Ross Philipson
2025-04-21 16:26 ` [PATCH v14 06/19] x86: Add early SHA-256 " Ross Philipson
2025-04-21 16:27 ` [PATCH v14 07/19] x86/msr: Add variable MTRR base/mask and x2apic ID registers Ross Philipson
2025-04-21 16:27 ` Ross Philipson [this message]
2025-04-23 20:54   ` [PATCH v14 08/19] x86/boot: Place TXT MLE header in the kernel_info section ALOK TIWARI
2025-04-21 16:27 ` [PATCH v14 09/19] x86: Secure Launch kernel early boot stub Ross Philipson
2025-04-22  1:18   ` Dave Hansen
2025-04-22 19:38     ` ross.philipson
2025-04-23 20:38   ` ALOK TIWARI
2025-04-23 21:07     ` ross.philipson
2025-04-21 16:27 ` [PATCH v14 10/19] x86: Secure Launch kernel late " Ross Philipson
2025-04-21 16:27 ` [PATCH v14 11/19] x86: Secure Launch SMP bringup support Ross Philipson
2025-04-21 16:27 ` [PATCH v14 12/19] kexec: Secure Launch kexec SEXIT support Ross Philipson
2025-04-23 19:58   ` ALOK TIWARI
2025-04-23 20:07     ` ross.philipson
2025-04-21 16:27 ` [PATCH v14 13/19] x86/reboot: Secure Launch SEXIT support on reboot paths Ross Philipson
2025-04-21 22:57   ` Dave Hansen
2025-04-22 19:31     ` ross.philipson
2025-04-21 16:27 ` [PATCH v14 14/19] tpm, tpm_tis: Close all localities Ross Philipson
2025-04-21 16:27 ` [PATCH v14 15/19] tpm, tpm_tis: Address positive localities in tpm_tis_request_locality() Ross Philipson
2025-04-21 16:27 ` [PATCH v14 16/19] tpm, tpm_tis: Allow locality to be set to a different value Ross Philipson
2025-04-22 10:20   ` Stefano Garzarella
2025-04-23 19:38     ` Daniel P. Smith
2025-04-21 16:27 ` [PATCH v14 17/19] tpm, sysfs: Show locality used by kernel Ross Philipson
2025-04-21 16:27 ` [PATCH v14 18/19] x86: Secure Launch late initcall platform module Ross Philipson
2025-04-28 17:38   ` Andy Lutomirski
2025-04-30  1:40     ` Daniel P. Smith
2025-04-30 18:51       ` Andy Lutomirski
2025-04-21 16:27 ` [PATCH v14 19/19] x86/efi: EFI stub DRTM launch support for Secure Launch Ross Philipson
2025-04-21 20:52 ` [PATCH v14 00/19] x86: Trenchboot secure dynamic launch Linux kernel support Dave Hansen
2025-04-21 21:00   ` Andrew Cooper
2025-04-22 18:17   ` Andrew Cooper
2025-04-22 19:16     ` Dave Hansen
2025-04-22 21:26     ` Ard Biesheuvel
2025-04-22 23:21       ` Dave Hansen
2025-04-24 18:45 ` Dave Hansen

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=20250421162712.77452-9-ross.philipson@oracle.com \
    --to=ross.philipson@oracle.com \
    --cc=James.Bottomley@hansenpartnership.com \
    --cc=andrew.cooper3@citrix.com \
    --cc=ardb@kernel.org \
    --cc=baolu.lu@linux.intel.com \
    --cc=bp@alien8.de \
    --cc=corbet@lwn.net \
    --cc=dave.hansen@linux.intel.com \
    --cc=davem@davemloft.net \
    --cc=dpsmith@apertussolutions.com \
    --cc=dwmw2@infradead.org \
    --cc=ebiederm@xmission.com \
    --cc=herbert@gondor.apana.org.au \
    --cc=hpa@zytor.com \
    --cc=iommu@lists.linux.dev \
    --cc=jarkko@kernel.org \
    --cc=jgg@ziepe.ca \
    --cc=kanth.ghatraju@oracle.com \
    --cc=kexec@lists.infradead.org \
    --cc=linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-doc@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-efi@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=luto@amacapital.net \
    --cc=mingo@redhat.com \
    --cc=mjg59@srcf.ucam.org \
    --cc=nivedita@alum.mit.edu \
    --cc=peterhuewe@gmx.de \
    --cc=tglx@linutronix.de \
    --cc=trenchboot-devel@googlegroups.com \
    --cc=x86@kernel.org \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox;
as well as URLs for NNTP newsgroup(s).