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From: Simon THOBY <git@nightmared.fr>
To: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Simon THOBY <git@nightmared.fr>,
	linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [RFC PATCH 5/9] Loadpol LSM: add a sysctl to lock the policy
Date: Wed, 21 May 2025 16:01:09 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20250521140121.591482-6-git@nightmared.fr> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20250521140121.591482-1-git@nightmared.fr>

Once the policy is properly configurd, users may want to lock that
policy to ensure no future change can be applied to it.

Add a sysctl that can be toggled to lock the policy.

Signed-off-by: Simon THOBY <git@nightmared.fr>
---
 security/loadpol/loadpol_fs.c | 31 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 31 insertions(+)

diff --git a/security/loadpol/loadpol_fs.c b/security/loadpol/loadpol_fs.c
index 9134d11718a0..1fec94de9f40 100644
--- a/security/loadpol/loadpol_fs.c
+++ b/security/loadpol/loadpol_fs.c
@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
 // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
 
 #include "linux/array_size.h"
+#include <linux/sysctl.h>
 #include <linux/security.h>
 
 #include "loadpol.h"
@@ -8,8 +9,22 @@
 static struct dentry *securityfs_dir;
 static struct dentry *securityfs_policy;
 
+static bool policy_locked;
 static DEFINE_MUTEX(policy_write_mutex);
 
+static const struct ctl_table sysctls[] = {
+	{
+		.procname	= "locked",
+		.data		= &policy_locked,
+		.maxlen		= sizeof(int),
+		.mode		= 0644,
+		/* only allow a transition from 0 (not locked) to 1 (locked) */
+		.proc_handler	= proc_dointvec_minmax,
+		.extra1		= SYSCTL_ONE,
+		.extra2		= SYSCTL_ONE,
+	},
+};
+
 static const struct seq_operations loadpol_policy_seqops = {
 	.start = loadpol_policy_start,
 	.next = loadpol_policy_next,
@@ -33,6 +48,13 @@ static ssize_t loadpol_write_policy(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
 	char *data;
 	ssize_t ret;
 
+	/* Once the policy is locked, modifications are blocked */
+	if (policy_locked) {
+		pr_warn("Loadpol is locked, the policy cannot be modified");
+		ret = -EPERM;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
 	/*
 	 * arbitrary size limit (to prevent a DoS but still allow loading a policy with a few
 	 * thousands of entries)
@@ -81,8 +103,15 @@ static const struct file_operations loadpol_policy_ops = {
 
 static int __init loadpol_init_fs(void)
 {
+	struct ctl_table_header *sysctl_hdr = NULL;
 	int ret;
 
+	sysctl_hdr = register_sysctl_sz("security/" LOADPOL_NAME, sysctls, ARRAY_SIZE(sysctls));
+	if (IS_ERR(sysctl_hdr)) {
+		ret = PTR_ERR(sysctl_hdr);
+		goto err;
+	}
+
 	securityfs_dir = securityfs_create_dir(LOADPOL_NAME, NULL);
 	if (IS_ERR(securityfs_dir)) {
 		ret = PTR_ERR(securityfs_dir);
@@ -99,6 +128,8 @@ static int __init loadpol_init_fs(void)
 
 	return 0;
 err:
+	if (!IS_ERR(sysctl_hdr))
+		unregister_sysctl_table(sysctl_hdr);
 	securityfs_remove(securityfs_policy);
 	securityfs_remove(securityfs_dir);
 	return ret;
-- 
2.49.0


  parent reply	other threads:[~2025-05-21 14:01 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 22+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2025-05-21 14:01 [RFC PATCH 0/9] Introducing the Loadpol LSM Simon THOBY
2025-05-21 14:01 ` [RFC PATCH 1/9] LSM: Introduce a new hook: security_kernel_module_load Simon THOBY
2025-05-21 22:03   ` Serge E. Hallyn
2025-05-22  8:57     ` Simon Thoby
2025-05-21 14:01 ` [RFC PATCH 2/9] Introduce a new LSM: loadpol Simon THOBY
2025-05-21 14:01 ` [RFC PATCH 3/9] Loadpol LSM: filter kernel module request according to the policy Simon THOBY
2025-05-21 15:47   ` Casey Schaufler
2025-05-21 16:21     ` Randy Dunlap
2025-05-21 16:26     ` Simon Thoby
2025-05-21 14:01 ` [RFC PATCH 4/9] Loadpol LSM: add a file in securityfs to read/modify " Simon THOBY
2025-05-21 14:01 ` Simon THOBY [this message]
2025-05-21 14:01 ` [RFC PATCH 6/9] Loadpol LSM: emit an audit log Simon THOBY
2025-05-21 14:01 ` [RFC PATCH 7/9] module: expose the list of blacklisted modules Simon THOBY
2025-05-21 14:01 ` [RFC PATCH 8/9] Loadpol LSM: include the blacklisted kernel modules in the policy Simon THOBY
2025-05-21 14:01 ` [RFC PATCH 9/9] Loadpol LSM: add a minimal documentation Simon THOBY
2025-05-21 16:26   ` Randy Dunlap
2025-05-21 16:29     ` Simon Thoby
2025-05-21 21:31   ` Paul Moore
2025-05-22  9:23     ` Simon Thoby
2025-05-29 23:49       ` Paul Moore
2025-05-30  7:03         ` Simon Thoby
2025-05-30 14:59           ` Paul Moore

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