[PATCH v5 07/23] KVM: VMX: Set FRED MSR intercepts

["Xin Li (Intel)" <xin@zytor.com>]

From: Xin Li <xin3.li@intel.com>

On a userspace MSR filter change, set FRED MSR intercepts.

8 FRED MSRs, i.e., MSR_IA32_FRED_RSP[123], MSR_IA32_FRED_STKLVLS,
MSR_IA32_FRED_SSP[123] and MSR_IA32_FRED_CONFIG, are all safe to
be passthrough, because they all have a pair of corresponding host
and guest VMCS fields.

Both MSR_IA32_FRED_RSP0 and MSR_IA32_FRED_SSP0 are dedicated for
userspace event delivery only, IOW they are NOT used in any kernel
event delivery and the execution of ERETS.  Thus KVM can run safely
with guest values in the two MSRs.  As a result, save and restore of
their guest values are deferred until vCPU context switch and their
host values are restored upon host returning to userspace.

Signed-off-by: Xin Li <xin3.li@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Xin Li (Intel) <xin@zytor.com>
Tested-by: Shan Kang <shan.kang@intel.com>
Tested-by: Xuelian Guo <xuelian.guo@intel.com>
---

Changes in v5:
* Skip execution of vmx_set_intercept_for_fred_msr() if FRED is
  not available or enabled (Sean).
* Use 'set' instead of 'flag' as the variable name to indicate
  whether MSR interception should be enabled (Sean).
* Add TB from Xuelian Guo.
---
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c | 33 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 33 insertions(+)

diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
index 58017bdf2ff0..4cdc2a0c1465 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
@@ -4096,6 +4096,37 @@ void pt_update_intercept_for_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 	}
 }
 
+static void vmx_set_intercept_for_fred_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	bool set = !guest_cpu_cap_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_FRED);
+
+	if (!kvm_cpu_cap_has(X86_FEATURE_FRED))
+		return;
+
+	vmx_set_intercept_for_msr(vcpu, MSR_IA32_FRED_RSP1, MSR_TYPE_RW, set);
+	vmx_set_intercept_for_msr(vcpu, MSR_IA32_FRED_RSP2, MSR_TYPE_RW, set);
+	vmx_set_intercept_for_msr(vcpu, MSR_IA32_FRED_RSP3, MSR_TYPE_RW, set);
+	vmx_set_intercept_for_msr(vcpu, MSR_IA32_FRED_STKLVLS, MSR_TYPE_RW, set);
+	vmx_set_intercept_for_msr(vcpu, MSR_IA32_FRED_SSP1, MSR_TYPE_RW, set);
+	vmx_set_intercept_for_msr(vcpu, MSR_IA32_FRED_SSP2, MSR_TYPE_RW, set);
+	vmx_set_intercept_for_msr(vcpu, MSR_IA32_FRED_SSP3, MSR_TYPE_RW, set);
+	vmx_set_intercept_for_msr(vcpu, MSR_IA32_FRED_CONFIG, MSR_TYPE_RW, set);
+
+	/*
+	 * IA32_FRED_RSP0 and IA32_PL0_SSP (a.k.a. IA32_FRED_SSP0) are only used
+	 * for delivering events when running userspace, while KVM always runs in
+	 * kernel mode (the CPL is always 0 after any VM exit), thus KVM can run
+	 * safely with guest IA32_FRED_RSP0 and IA32_PL0_SSP.
+	 *
+	 * As a result, no need to intercept IA32_FRED_RSP0 and IA32_PL0_SSP.
+	 *
+	 * Note, save and restore of IA32_PL0_SSP belong to CET supervisor context
+	 * management no matter whether FRED is enabled or not.  So leave its
+	 * state management to CET code.
+	 */
+	vmx_set_intercept_for_msr(vcpu, MSR_IA32_FRED_RSP0, MSR_TYPE_RW, set);
+}
+
 void vmx_recalc_msr_intercepts(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 {
 	if (!cpu_has_vmx_msr_bitmap())
@@ -4143,6 +4174,8 @@ void vmx_recalc_msr_intercepts(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 		vmx_set_intercept_for_msr(vcpu, MSR_IA32_FLUSH_CMD, MSR_TYPE_W,
 					  !guest_cpu_cap_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_FLUSH_L1D));
 
+	vmx_set_intercept_for_fred_msr(vcpu);
+
 	/*
 	 * x2APIC and LBR MSR intercepts are modified on-demand and cannot be
 	 * filtered by userspace.
-- 
2.50.1