From: "Xin Li (Intel)" <xin@zytor.com>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org,
linux-doc@vger.kernel.org
Cc: pbonzini@redhat.com, seanjc@google.com, corbet@lwn.net,
tglx@linutronix.de, mingo@redhat.com, bp@alien8.de,
dave.hansen@linux.intel.com, x86@kernel.org, hpa@zytor.com,
xin@zytor.com, luto@kernel.org, peterz@infradead.org,
andrew.cooper3@citrix.com, chao.gao@intel.com, hch@infradead.org,
sohil.mehta@intel.com
Subject: [PATCH v9 00/22] Enable FRED with KVM VMX
Date: Sun, 26 Oct 2025 13:18:48 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20251026201911.505204-1-xin@zytor.com> (raw)
This patch set enables the Intel flexible return and event delivery
(FRED) architecture with KVM VMX to allow guests to utilize FRED.
The FRED architecture defines simple new transitions that change
privilege level (ring transitions). The FRED architecture was
designed with the following goals:
1) Improve overall performance and response time by replacing event
delivery through the interrupt descriptor table (IDT event
delivery) and event return by the IRET instruction with lower
latency transitions.
2) Improve software robustness by ensuring that event delivery
establishes the full supervisor context and that event return
establishes the full user context.
The new transitions defined by the FRED architecture are FRED event
delivery and, for returning from events, two FRED return instructions.
FRED event delivery can effect a transition from ring 3 to ring 0, but
it is used also to deliver events incident to ring 0. One FRED
instruction (ERETU) effects a return from ring 0 to ring 3, while the
other (ERETS) returns while remaining in ring 0. Collectively, FRED
event delivery and the FRED return instructions are FRED transitions.
Intel VMX architecture is extended to run FRED guests, and the major
changes are:
1) New VMCS fields for FRED context management, which includes two new
event data VMCS fields, eight new guest FRED context VMCS fields and
eight new host FRED context VMCS fields.
2) VMX nested-exception support for proper virtualization of stack
levels introduced with FRED architecture.
Search for the latest FRED spec in most search engines with this search
pattern:
site:intel.com FRED (flexible return and event delivery) specification
Although FRED and CET supervisor shadow stacks are independent CPU
features, FRED unconditionally includes FRED shadow stack pointer
MSRs IA32_FRED_SSP[0123], and IA32_FRED_SSP0 is just an alias of the
CET MSR IA32_PL0_SSP. IOW, the state management of MSR IA32_PL0_SSP
becomes an overlap area, and Sean requested that FRED virtualization
to land after CET virtualization [1].
With CET virtualization now merged in v6.18, the path is clear to submit
the FRED virtualization patch series :).
Changes in v9:
* Rebased to the latest kvm-x86/next branch, tag kvm-x86-next-2025.10.20-2.
* Guard FRED state save/restore with guest_cpu_cap_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_FRED)
in patch 19 (syzbot & Chao).
* Use array indexing for exception stack access, eliminating the need for
the ESTACKS_MEMBERS() macro in struct cea_exception_stacks, and then
exported __this_cpu_ist_top_va() in a subsequent patch (Dave Hansen).
* Rewrote some of the change logs.
Following is the link to v8 of this patch set:
https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20251014010950.1568389-1-xin@zytor.com/
[1]: https://lore.kernel.org/kvm/ZvQaNRhrsSJTYji3@google.com/
Xin Li (18):
KVM: VMX: Enable support for secondary VM exit controls
KVM: VMX: Initialize VM entry/exit FRED controls in vmcs_config
KVM: VMX: Disable FRED if FRED consistency checks fail
KVM: VMX: Initialize VMCS FRED fields
KVM: VMX: Set FRED MSR intercepts
KVM: VMX: Save/restore guest FRED RSP0
KVM: VMX: Add support for saving and restoring FRED MSRs
KVM: x86: Add a helper to detect if FRED is enabled for a vCPU
KVM: VMX: Virtualize FRED event_data
KVM: VMX: Virtualize FRED nested exception tracking
KVM: x86: Mark CR4.FRED as not reserved
KVM: VMX: Dump FRED context in dump_vmcs()
KVM: x86: Advertise support for FRED
KVM: nVMX: Enable support for secondary VM exit controls
KVM: nVMX: Handle FRED VMCS fields in nested VMX context
KVM: nVMX: Validate FRED-related VMCS fields
KVM: nVMX: Guard SHADOW_FIELD_R[OW] macros with VMX feature checks
KVM: nVMX: Enable VMX FRED controls
Xin Li (Intel) (4):
x86/cea: Prefix event stack names with ESTACK_
x86/cea: Use array indexing to simplify exception stack access
x86/cea: Export __this_cpu_ist_top_va() to KVM
KVM: x86: Save/restore the nested flag of an exception
Documentation/virt/kvm/api.rst | 21 +-
arch/x86/coco/sev/noinstr.c | 4 +-
arch/x86/coco/sev/vc-handle.c | 2 +-
arch/x86/include/asm/cpu_entry_area.h | 70 +++---
arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 13 +-
arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h | 1 +
arch/x86/include/asm/vmx.h | 48 +++-
arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h | 4 +-
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c | 10 +-
arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack_64.c | 18 +-
arch/x86/kernel/fred.c | 6 +-
arch/x86/kernel/traps.c | 2 +-
arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c | 1 +
arch/x86/kvm/kvm_cache_regs.h | 15 ++
arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c | 2 +-
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/capabilities.h | 25 +-
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c | 343 +++++++++++++++++++++++---
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.h | 22 ++
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmcs.h | 1 +
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmcs12.c | 19 ++
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmcs12.h | 40 ++-
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmcs_shadow_fields.h | 37 ++-
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c | 247 +++++++++++++++++--
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h | 54 +++-
arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 131 +++++++++-
arch/x86/kvm/x86.h | 8 +-
arch/x86/mm/cpu_entry_area.c | 39 ++-
arch/x86/mm/fault.c | 2 +-
include/uapi/linux/kvm.h | 1 +
29 files changed, 1038 insertions(+), 148 deletions(-)
base-commit: 4cc167c50eb19d44ac7e204938724e685e3d8057
--
2.51.0
next reply other threads:[~2025-10-26 20:20 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 50+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2025-10-26 20:18 Xin Li (Intel) [this message]
2025-10-26 20:18 ` [PATCH v9 01/22] KVM: VMX: Enable support for secondary VM exit controls Xin Li (Intel)
2025-10-26 20:18 ` [PATCH v9 02/22] KVM: VMX: Initialize VM entry/exit FRED controls in vmcs_config Xin Li (Intel)
2025-10-26 20:18 ` [PATCH v9 03/22] KVM: VMX: Disable FRED if FRED consistency checks fail Xin Li (Intel)
2025-10-26 20:18 ` [PATCH v9 04/22] x86/cea: Prefix event stack names with ESTACK_ Xin Li (Intel)
2025-10-26 20:18 ` [PATCH v9 05/22] x86/cea: Use array indexing to simplify exception stack access Xin Li (Intel)
2025-10-27 15:49 ` Dave Hansen
2025-10-28 2:31 ` Xin Li
2025-10-26 20:18 ` [PATCH v9 06/22] x86/cea: Export __this_cpu_ist_top_va() to KVM Xin Li (Intel)
2025-10-27 15:50 ` Dave Hansen
2025-10-26 20:18 ` [PATCH v9 07/22] KVM: VMX: Initialize VMCS FRED fields Xin Li (Intel)
2025-11-19 2:44 ` Chao Gao
2025-10-26 20:18 ` [PATCH v9 08/22] KVM: VMX: Set FRED MSR intercepts Xin Li (Intel)
2025-11-12 5:49 ` Chao Gao
2025-10-26 20:18 ` [PATCH v9 09/22] KVM: VMX: Save/restore guest FRED RSP0 Xin Li (Intel)
2025-11-12 5:59 ` Chao Gao
2025-10-26 20:18 ` [PATCH v9 10/22] KVM: VMX: Add support for saving and restoring FRED MSRs Xin Li (Intel)
2025-11-12 6:16 ` Chao Gao
2025-12-01 6:20 ` Xin Li
2025-10-26 20:18 ` [PATCH v9 11/22] KVM: x86: Add a helper to detect if FRED is enabled for a vCPU Xin Li (Intel)
2025-11-12 6:19 ` Chao Gao
2025-10-26 20:19 ` [PATCH v9 12/22] KVM: VMX: Virtualize FRED event_data Xin Li (Intel)
2025-11-19 3:24 ` Chao Gao
2025-10-26 20:19 ` [PATCH v9 13/22] KVM: VMX: Virtualize FRED nested exception tracking Xin Li (Intel)
2025-11-19 6:54 ` Chao Gao
2025-10-26 20:19 ` [PATCH v9 14/22] KVM: x86: Save/restore the nested flag of an exception Xin Li (Intel)
2025-11-19 6:13 ` Chao Gao
2025-10-26 20:19 ` [PATCH v9 15/22] KVM: x86: Mark CR4.FRED as not reserved Xin Li (Intel)
2025-11-19 7:26 ` Chao Gao
2025-10-26 20:19 ` [PATCH v9 16/22] KVM: VMX: Dump FRED context in dump_vmcs() Xin Li (Intel)
2025-11-19 7:40 ` Chao Gao
2025-11-30 18:42 ` Xin Li
2025-10-26 20:19 ` [PATCH v9 17/22] KVM: x86: Advertise support for FRED Xin Li (Intel)
2025-11-12 7:30 ` Chao Gao
2025-10-26 20:19 ` [PATCH v9 18/22] KVM: nVMX: Enable support for secondary VM exit controls Xin Li (Intel)
2025-11-12 13:42 ` Chao Gao
2025-10-26 20:19 ` [PATCH v9 19/22] KVM: nVMX: Handle FRED VMCS fields in nested VMX context Xin Li (Intel)
2025-12-02 6:32 ` Chao Gao
2025-12-08 22:37 ` Sean Christopherson
2025-10-26 20:19 ` [PATCH v9 20/22] KVM: nVMX: Validate FRED-related VMCS fields Xin Li (Intel)
2025-11-13 3:00 ` Chao Gao
2025-10-26 20:19 ` [PATCH v9 21/22] KVM: nVMX: Guard SHADOW_FIELD_R[OW] macros with VMX feature checks Xin Li (Intel)
2025-12-02 6:35 ` Chao Gao
2025-12-08 22:49 ` Sean Christopherson
2025-10-26 20:19 ` [PATCH v9 22/22] KVM: nVMX: Enable VMX FRED controls Xin Li (Intel)
2025-11-13 3:20 ` Chao Gao
2025-11-06 17:35 ` [PATCH v9 00/22] Enable FRED with KVM VMX Xin Li
2025-11-13 22:20 ` Sean Christopherson
2025-12-08 22:51 ` Sean Christopherson
2025-12-09 17:08 ` Xin Li
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