From: Sohil Mehta <sohil.mehta@intel.com>
To: x86@kernel.org, Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>,
"H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>,
"Kirill A . Shutemov" <kas@kernel.org>,
Sohil Mehta <sohil.mehta@intel.com>, Xin Li <xin@zytor.com>,
David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>,
Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>,
Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>,
Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com>,
Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>,
Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>,
Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>,
Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org>, Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>,
Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>,
linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
linux-efi@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH v11 2/9] x86/cpu: Add an LASS dependency on SMAP
Date: Wed, 29 Oct 2025 14:03:03 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20251029210310.1155449-3-sohil.mehta@intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20251029210310.1155449-1-sohil.mehta@intel.com>
With LASS enabled, any kernel data access to userspace typically results
in a #GP, or a #SS in some stack-related cases. When the kernel needs to
access user memory, it can suspend LASS enforcement by toggling the
RFLAGS.AC bit. Most of these cases are already covered by the
stac()/clac() pairs used to avoid SMAP violations.
Even though LASS could potentially be enabled independently, it would be
very painful without SMAP and the related stac()/clac() calls. There is
no reason to support such a configuration because all future hardware
with LASS is expected to have SMAP as well. Also, the STAC/CLAC
instructions are architected to:
#UD - If CPUID.(EAX=07H, ECX=0H):EBX.SMAP[bit 20] = 0.
So, make LASS depend on SMAP to conveniently reuse the existing AC bit
toggling already in place.
Note: Additional STAC/CLAC would still be needed for accesses such as
text poking which are not flagged by SMAP. This is because such mappings
are in the lower half but do not have the _PAGE_USER bit set which SMAP
uses for enforcement.
Signed-off-by: Sohil Mehta <sohil.mehta@intel.com>
---
v11:
- New patch (split from patch 1).
---
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cpuid-deps.c | 1 +
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cpuid-deps.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cpuid-deps.c
index 46efcbd6afa4..98d0cdd82574 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cpuid-deps.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cpuid-deps.c
@@ -89,6 +89,7 @@ static const struct cpuid_dep cpuid_deps[] = {
{ X86_FEATURE_SHSTK, X86_FEATURE_XSAVES },
{ X86_FEATURE_FRED, X86_FEATURE_LKGS },
{ X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL_SSBD, X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL },
+ { X86_FEATURE_LASS, X86_FEATURE_SMAP },
{}
};
--
2.43.0
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2025-10-29 21:06 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 67+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2025-10-29 21:03 [PATCH v11 0/9] x86: Enable Linear Address Space Separation support Sohil Mehta
2025-10-29 21:03 ` [PATCH v11 1/9] x86/cpufeatures: Enumerate the LASS feature bits Sohil Mehta
2025-10-31 17:03 ` Dave Hansen
2025-10-29 21:03 ` Sohil Mehta [this message]
2025-10-31 17:04 ` [PATCH v11 2/9] x86/cpu: Add an LASS dependency on SMAP Dave Hansen
2025-10-29 21:03 ` [PATCH v11 3/9] x86/asm: Introduce inline memcpy and memset Sohil Mehta
2025-10-31 17:06 ` Dave Hansen
2025-10-29 21:03 ` [PATCH v11 4/9] x86/alternatives: Disable LASS when patching kernel code Sohil Mehta
2025-10-31 17:10 ` Dave Hansen
2025-11-10 18:15 ` Sohil Mehta
2025-11-10 19:09 ` H. Peter Anvin
2025-11-10 19:24 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-11-12 13:56 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2025-11-12 14:51 ` Dave Hansen
2025-11-12 14:57 ` H. Peter Anvin
2025-11-12 15:18 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2025-11-12 15:23 ` H. Peter Anvin
2025-11-12 15:28 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2025-11-12 15:47 ` H. Peter Anvin
2025-11-12 16:18 ` Sohil Mehta
2025-11-12 16:26 ` H. Peter Anvin
2025-11-12 16:29 ` H. Peter Anvin
2025-10-29 21:03 ` [PATCH v11 5/9] x86/efi: Disable LASS while mapping the EFI runtime services Sohil Mehta
2025-10-31 17:11 ` Dave Hansen
2025-10-31 17:38 ` Andy Lutomirski
2025-10-31 17:41 ` Dave Hansen
2025-10-31 18:03 ` Sohil Mehta
2025-10-31 18:12 ` Dave Hansen
2025-11-07 9:04 ` Peter Zijlstra
2025-11-07 9:22 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2025-11-07 9:27 ` H. Peter Anvin
2025-11-07 9:35 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2025-11-07 9:40 ` Peter Zijlstra
2025-11-07 10:09 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2025-11-07 10:27 ` Peter Zijlstra
2025-11-08 0:48 ` Andy Lutomirski
2025-11-08 16:18 ` H. Peter Anvin
2025-11-08 22:50 ` H. Peter Anvin
2025-11-07 10:10 ` Peter Zijlstra
2025-11-07 10:17 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2025-10-31 19:04 ` Sohil Mehta
2025-11-07 7:36 ` Sohil Mehta
2025-10-31 18:32 ` Sohil Mehta
2025-10-29 21:03 ` [PATCH v11 6/9] x86/kexec: Disable LASS during relocate kernel Sohil Mehta
2025-10-31 17:14 ` Dave Hansen
2025-10-29 21:03 ` [PATCH v11 7/9] x86/traps: Communicate a LASS violation in #GP message Sohil Mehta
2025-10-31 17:16 ` Dave Hansen
2025-10-31 19:59 ` Sohil Mehta
2025-10-31 20:03 ` Andy Lutomirski
2025-10-31 20:56 ` Dave Hansen
2025-10-29 21:03 ` [PATCH v11 8/9] selftests/x86: Update the negative vsyscall tests to expect a #GP Sohil Mehta
2025-10-31 17:20 ` Dave Hansen
2025-10-29 21:03 ` [PATCH v11 9/9] x86/cpu: Enable LASS by default during CPU initialization Sohil Mehta
2025-10-30 8:40 ` H. Peter Anvin
2025-10-30 15:45 ` Andy Lutomirski
2025-10-30 16:44 ` Sohil Mehta
2025-10-30 16:53 ` Andy Lutomirski
2025-10-30 17:24 ` Sohil Mehta
2025-10-30 17:31 ` Andy Lutomirski
2025-10-30 21:13 ` David Laight
2025-10-31 6:41 ` H. Peter Anvin
2025-10-31 16:55 ` Dave Hansen
2025-10-30 16:27 ` Dave Hansen
2025-11-07 8:01 ` H. Peter Anvin
2025-11-07 20:08 ` Sohil Mehta
2025-10-31 17:21 ` Dave Hansen
2025-10-31 20:04 ` Sohil Mehta
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