Linux Documentation
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
To: Eric Curtin <ericcurtin17@gmail.com>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
	 Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>, Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>,
	 Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>,
	Shuah Khan <skhan@linuxfoundation.org>,
	 Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>,
	"Theodore Y . Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>,
	 Gao Xiang <xiang@kernel.org>, Chao Yu <chao@kernel.org>,
	 fsverity@lists.linux.dev, linux-erofs@lists.ozlabs.org,
	 linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org,
	 linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v2 0/4] init: boot image-based systems without an initramfs (rootimage=)
Date: Thu, 30 Jul 2026 12:58:09 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260730-bachbett-erwarben-harmonie-e6b8ebf05969@brauner> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260727104845.2607444-1-ericcurtin17@gmail.com>

On 2026-07-27 11:48 +0100, Eric Curtin wrote:
> Changes since v1 (https://lore.kernel.org/all/20260718191551.1703670-1-ericcurtin17@gmail.com/),
> following Christian Brauner's review
> (https://lore.kernel.org/all/20260727-gepaukt-eislauf-waran-7c03f0e47609@brauner/):
> 
> The goal is unchanged: A/B image updates from a single partition,
> without paying for a second userspace spin-up at boot. What changed is
> how rootimage=/rootimageverity= get from "here is a path" to "here is
> the verified, mounted root", which is what most of the v1 review was
> about.
> 
>  - Patches 1-2 are new: they add generic, reusable VFS infrastructure
>    (struct fs_context::source_file, path_mount_file()/
>    init_mount_file(), vfs_parse_fs_param_file()) that lets an in-kernel
>    caller hand a filesystem an already-open struct file as its mount
>    source instead of a path, and convert erofs's existing file-backed
>    mount support to use it when given. This is the "new infrastructure
>    available to any fs" asked for, so that init/do_mounts.c never has
>    to independently re-resolve a path that something else already
>    opened and validated.
> 
>  - Patch 3 (rootimage=) now opens the image file exactly once and
>    mounts that same struct file via the above, instead of opening it,
>    doing nothing with the open, and separately handing erofs a path
>    that it re-resolved on its own with no guaranteed relationship to
>    what was checked - which is what v1 did, and which is where most of
>    the "second lookup" / "weak assumptions" findings came from. There
>    is no fd-vs-path race left because there is no second lookup left.
> 
>    rootimagesrcdir= is now mandatory (rootimagesrcdir=none opts out
>    explicitly) instead of silently detaching the carrier by default,
>    so there's no more zombie superblock/dangling mountpoint by
>    default; you have to ask for that outcome by name.
> 
>  - Patch 4 (rootimageverity=) is mostly unchanged in what it checks,
>    but now runs on the exact file patch 3 mounts, so the digest check
>    and the mount are guaranteed to agree on what "the image" is. It
>    also now refuses rootimageverity= together with rootimageflags=
>    containing device= (multi-device erofs images), since the digest
>    only ever covers the primary image file and silently ignoring the
>    rest would be a false sense of integrity.
> 
> Not changed / not attempting to fix in this version, per the v1
> discussion:
> 
>  - The carrier filesystem itself is still fully parsed (superblock,
>    directory entries, extents) before rootimageverity= gets to check
>    anything, since reaching the image file at all requires that. This
>    is structural to a file-backed image sitting on a general-purpose
>    writable filesystem, the same way a dm-verity root still needs a
>    trusted block layer under it; rootimage=/rootimageverity= are meant

dm-verity reads opaque sectors whereas this runs
superblock/extent/directory parsers running on attacker-writable data.

The mitigation mentioned below kinda defeats the feature... The
filesystem that contains the image files is writable and the whole
rootimagesrcdir= exists to keep it reachable. If you could dm-verity is
as stated below, you would just dm-verity the root and used
dm-mod.create=

All of the other issues:

* init suddenly becomes deployment policy
* things shipped as modules
* composefs can't use this
* the alternative to achieve the same thing via CONFIG_INITRAMFS_SOURCE
  / UKI signed initrd completely ignored

/me walks away from this LLM hell.


  reply	other threads:[~2026-07-30 10:58 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 13+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-07-18 19:15 [RFC PATCH 0/2] init: boot image-based systems without an initramfs (rootimage=) Eric Curtin
2026-07-18 19:15 ` [RFC PATCH 1/2] init: support mounting the root filesystem from an image file Eric Curtin
2026-07-18 19:15 ` [RFC PATCH 2/2] init: support pinning the root image's fsverity digest Eric Curtin
2026-07-27  8:55 ` [RFC PATCH 0/2] init: boot image-based systems without an initramfs (rootimage=) Christian Brauner
2026-07-27 10:31   ` Eric Curtin
2026-07-30 10:52     ` Christian Brauner
2026-07-27 10:48   ` [RFC PATCH v2 0/4] " Eric Curtin
2026-07-30 10:58     ` Christian Brauner [this message]
2026-07-27 10:48   ` [RFC PATCH v2 1/4] fs: allow in-kernel mounters to hand filesystems an already-open source file Eric Curtin
2026-07-27 10:48   ` [RFC PATCH v2 2/4] erofs: use fs_context source_file for file-backed mounts when given Eric Curtin
2026-07-27 10:48   ` [RFC PATCH v2 3/4] init: support mounting the root filesystem from an image file Eric Curtin
2026-07-27 10:48   ` [RFC PATCH v2 4/4] init: support pinning the root image's fsverity digest Eric Curtin
2026-07-30 12:49 ` [RFC PATCH 0/2] init: boot image-based systems without an initramfs (rootimage=) Colin Walters

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=20260730-bachbett-erwarben-harmonie-e6b8ebf05969@brauner \
    --to=brauner@kernel.org \
    --cc=chao@kernel.org \
    --cc=corbet@lwn.net \
    --cc=ebiggers@kernel.org \
    --cc=ericcurtin17@gmail.com \
    --cc=fsverity@lists.linux.dev \
    --cc=jack@suse.cz \
    --cc=linux-doc@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-erofs@lists.ozlabs.org \
    --cc=linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=skhan@linuxfoundation.org \
    --cc=tytso@mit.edu \
    --cc=viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk \
    --cc=xiang@kernel.org \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox