From: Sohil Mehta <sohil.mehta@intel.com>
To: kvm@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>,
Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>,
Shuah Khan <skhan@linuxfoundation.org>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@kernel.org>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
"H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>, Xin Li <xin@zytor.com>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>,
Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
Nikunj A Dadhania <nikunj@amd.com>,
Shivansh Dhiman <shivansh.dhiman@amd.com>,
David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>,
Chao Gao <chao.gao@intel.com>,
Binbin Wu <binbin.wu@linux.intel.com>,
Sohil Mehta <sohil.mehta@intel.com>,
Zhao Liu <zhao1.liu@intel.com>, Yosry Ahmed <yosry@kernel.org>,
David Matlack <dmatlack@google.com>,
linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH v10 05/28] x86/cea: Use array indexing to simplify exception stack access
Date: Fri, 11 Sep 2026 14:36:35 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260911213659.2025974-6-sohil.mehta@intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260911213659.2025974-1-sohil.mehta@intel.com>
From: "Xin Li (Intel)" <xin@zytor.com>
Refactor struct cea_exception_stacks to leverage array indexing for
exception stack access, improving code clarity and eliminating the
need for the ESTACKS_MEMBERS() macro.
Convert __this_cpu_ist_{bottom,top}_va() from macros to functions,
allowing removal of the now-obsolete CEA_ESTACK_BOT and CEA_ESTACK_TOP
macros.
Also drop CEA_ESTACK_SIZE, which just duplicated EXCEPTION_STKSZ.
Signed-off-by: Xin Li (Intel) <xin@zytor.com>
Signed-off-by: Sohil Mehta <sohil.mehta@intel.com>
Acked-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
---
v10:
- Check if the stack argument is within the array bounds of
event_stacks (Boris).
v9:
- Refactor first and then export in a separate patch (Dave Hansen).
---
arch/x86/include/asm/cpu_entry_area.h | 52 ++++++++++++---------------
arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack_64.c | 4 +--
arch/x86/mm/cpu_entry_area.c | 22 +++++++++++-
3 files changed, 45 insertions(+), 33 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpu_entry_area.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpu_entry_area.h
index d0f884c28178..509e52fc3a0f 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpu_entry_area.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpu_entry_area.h
@@ -16,6 +16,19 @@
#define VC_EXCEPTION_STKSZ 0
#endif
+/*
+ * The exception stack ordering in [cea_]exception_stacks
+ */
+enum exception_stack_ordering {
+ ESTACK_DF,
+ ESTACK_NMI,
+ ESTACK_DB,
+ ESTACK_MCE,
+ ESTACK_VC,
+ ESTACK_VC2,
+ N_EXCEPTION_STACKS
+};
+
/* Macro to enforce the same ordering and stack sizes */
#define ESTACKS_MEMBERS(guardsize, optional_stack_size) \
char ESTACK_DF_stack_guard[guardsize]; \
@@ -39,37 +52,22 @@ struct exception_stacks {
/* The effective cpu entry area mapping with guard pages. */
struct cea_exception_stacks {
- ESTACKS_MEMBERS(PAGE_SIZE, EXCEPTION_STKSZ)
+ struct {
+ char stack_guard[PAGE_SIZE];
+ char stack[EXCEPTION_STKSZ];
+ } event_stacks[N_EXCEPTION_STACKS];
+ char IST_top_guard[PAGE_SIZE];
};
-/*
- * The exception stack ordering in [cea_]exception_stacks
- */
-enum exception_stack_ordering {
- ESTACK_DF,
- ESTACK_NMI,
- ESTACK_DB,
- ESTACK_MCE,
- ESTACK_VC,
- ESTACK_VC2,
- N_EXCEPTION_STACKS
-};
-
-#define CEA_ESTACK_SIZE(st) \
- sizeof(((struct cea_exception_stacks *)0)->st## _stack)
-
-#define CEA_ESTACK_BOT(ceastp, st) \
- ((unsigned long)&(ceastp)->st## _stack)
-
-#define CEA_ESTACK_TOP(ceastp, st) \
- (CEA_ESTACK_BOT(ceastp, st) + CEA_ESTACK_SIZE(st))
-
#define CEA_ESTACK_OFFS(st) \
- offsetof(struct cea_exception_stacks, st## _stack)
+ offsetof(struct cea_exception_stacks, event_stacks[st].stack)
#define CEA_ESTACK_PAGES \
(sizeof(struct cea_exception_stacks) / PAGE_SIZE)
+extern unsigned long __this_cpu_ist_top_va(enum exception_stack_ordering stack);
+extern unsigned long __this_cpu_ist_bottom_va(enum exception_stack_ordering stack);
+
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
@@ -144,10 +142,4 @@ static __always_inline struct entry_stack *cpu_entry_stack(int cpu)
return &get_cpu_entry_area(cpu)->entry_stack_page.stack;
}
-#define __this_cpu_ist_top_va(name) \
- CEA_ESTACK_TOP(__this_cpu_read(cea_exception_stacks), name)
-
-#define __this_cpu_ist_bottom_va(name) \
- CEA_ESTACK_BOT(__this_cpu_read(cea_exception_stacks), name)
-
#endif
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack_64.c b/arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack_64.c
index 40f51e278171..93b10b264e53 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack_64.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack_64.c
@@ -70,9 +70,9 @@ struct estack_pages {
#define EPAGERANGE(st) \
[PFN_DOWN(CEA_ESTACK_OFFS(st)) ... \
- PFN_DOWN(CEA_ESTACK_OFFS(st) + CEA_ESTACK_SIZE(st) - 1)] = { \
+ PFN_DOWN(CEA_ESTACK_OFFS(st) + EXCEPTION_STKSZ - 1)] = { \
.offs = CEA_ESTACK_OFFS(st), \
- .size = CEA_ESTACK_SIZE(st), \
+ .size = EXCEPTION_STKSZ, \
.type = STACK_TYPE_EXCEPTION + st, }
/*
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/cpu_entry_area.c b/arch/x86/mm/cpu_entry_area.c
index 9fa371af8abc..a47dfd686bd3 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/cpu_entry_area.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/cpu_entry_area.c
@@ -18,6 +18,26 @@ static DEFINE_PER_CPU_PAGE_ALIGNED(struct entry_stack_page, entry_stack_storage)
static DEFINE_PER_CPU_PAGE_ALIGNED(struct exception_stacks, exception_stacks);
DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct cea_exception_stacks*, cea_exception_stacks);
+/*
+ * Typically invoked by entry code, so must be noinstr.
+ */
+noinstr unsigned long __this_cpu_ist_bottom_va(enum exception_stack_ordering stack)
+{
+ struct cea_exception_stacks *s;
+
+ BUILD_BUG_ON(ESTACK_DF != 0);
+ BUG_ON(stack >= N_EXCEPTION_STACKS);
+
+ s = __this_cpu_read(cea_exception_stacks);
+
+ return (unsigned long)&s->event_stacks[stack].stack;
+}
+
+noinstr unsigned long __this_cpu_ist_top_va(enum exception_stack_ordering stack)
+{
+ return __this_cpu_ist_bottom_va(stack) + EXCEPTION_STKSZ;
+}
+
static DEFINE_PER_CPU_READ_MOSTLY(unsigned long, _cea_offset);
static __always_inline unsigned int cea_offset(unsigned int cpu)
@@ -132,7 +152,7 @@ static void __init percpu_setup_debug_store(unsigned int cpu)
#define cea_map_stack(name) do { \
npages = sizeof(estacks->name## _stack) / PAGE_SIZE; \
- cea_map_percpu_pages(cea->estacks.name## _stack, \
+ cea_map_percpu_pages(cea->estacks.event_stacks[name].stack, \
estacks->name## _stack, npages, PAGE_KERNEL); \
} while (0)
--
2.43.0
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-09-11 21:40 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 29+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-09-11 21:36 [PATCH v10 00/28] KVM: Enable FRED support with KVM VMX Sohil Mehta
2026-09-11 21:36 ` [PATCH v10 01/28] KVM: VMX: Enable support for secondary VM exit controls Sohil Mehta
2026-09-11 21:36 ` [PATCH v10 02/28] KVM: VMX: Initialize VM entry/exit FRED controls in vmcs_config Sohil Mehta
2026-09-11 21:36 ` [PATCH v10 03/28] KVM: VMX: Disable FRED if FRED consistency checks fail Sohil Mehta
2026-09-11 21:36 ` [PATCH v10 04/28] x86/cea: Prefix event stack names with ESTACK_ Sohil Mehta
2026-09-11 21:36 ` Sohil Mehta [this message]
2026-09-11 21:36 ` [PATCH v10 06/28] x86/fred: Export this_cpu_fred_rsp() for KVM usage Sohil Mehta
2026-09-11 21:36 ` [PATCH v10 07/28] KVM: VMX: Initialize VMCS FRED fields Sohil Mehta
2026-09-11 21:36 ` [PATCH v10 08/28] KVM: VMX: Set FRED MSR intercepts Sohil Mehta
2026-09-11 21:36 ` [PATCH v10 09/28] KVM: VMX: Save/restore guest FRED RSP0 Sohil Mehta
2026-09-11 21:36 ` [PATCH v10 10/28] KVM: VMX: Add support for saving and restoring FRED MSRs Sohil Mehta
2026-09-11 21:36 ` [PATCH v10 11/28] KVM: x86: Add a helper to detect if FRED is enabled for a vCPU Sohil Mehta
2026-09-11 21:36 ` [PATCH v10 12/28] KVM: x86: Add a new save/restore flag for FRED metadata Sohil Mehta
2026-09-11 21:36 ` [PATCH v10 13/28] KVM: VMX: Virtualize FRED nested exception tracking Sohil Mehta
2026-09-11 21:36 ` [PATCH v10 14/28] KVM: VMX: Virtualize FRED event_data Sohil Mehta
2026-09-11 21:36 ` [PATCH v10 15/28] KVM: x86: Include CR4.FRED in the emulator CR4 write mask Sohil Mehta
2026-09-11 21:36 ` [PATCH v10 16/28] KVM: x86: Mark CR4.FRED as not reserved Sohil Mehta
2026-09-11 21:36 ` [PATCH v10 17/28] KVM: x86: Handle CR4.FRED when emulating RSM Sohil Mehta
2026-09-11 21:36 ` [PATCH v10 18/28] KVM: VMX: Dump FRED context in dump_vmcs() Sohil Mehta
2026-09-11 21:36 ` [PATCH v10 19/28] KVM: x86: Advertise support for FRED Sohil Mehta
2026-09-11 21:36 ` [PATCH v10 20/28] KVM: nVMX: Enable support for secondary VM exit controls Sohil Mehta
2026-09-11 21:36 ` [PATCH v10 21/28] KVM: nVMX: Handle FRED VMCS fields in nested VMX context Sohil Mehta
2026-09-11 21:36 ` [PATCH v10 22/28] KVM: nVMX: Restrict event data VMCS fields to FRED-supported hosts Sohil Mehta
2026-09-11 21:36 ` [PATCH v10 23/28] KVM: nVMX: Shadow ORIGINAL_EVENT_DATA and INJECTED_EVENT_DATA fields Sohil Mehta
2026-09-11 21:36 ` [PATCH v10 24/28] KVM: nVMX: Validate FRED-related VMCS fields Sohil Mehta
2026-09-11 21:36 ` [PATCH v10 25/28] KVM: nVMX: Enable VMX FRED controls Sohil Mehta
2026-09-11 21:36 ` [PATCH v10 26/28] KVM: selftests: Add FRED MSRs to msrs_test Sohil Mehta
2026-09-11 21:36 ` [PATCH v10 27/28] KVM: selftests: Add a new VM guest mode to run user level code Sohil Mehta
2026-09-11 21:36 ` [PATCH v10 28/28] KVM: selftests: Add fred exception tests Sohil Mehta
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