From: Rodolfo Giometti <giometti@enneenne.com>
To: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>,
Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>,
keyrings@vger.kernel.org
Cc: "Herbert Xu" <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>,
"David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>,
"Jens Wiklander" <jenswi@kernel.org>,
"Sumit Garg" <sumit.garg@kernel.org>,
op-tee@lists.trustedfirmware.org,
"Horia Geantă" <horia.geanta@nxp.com>,
"Pankaj Gupta" <pankaj.gupta@nxp.com>,
"Sahil Malhotra" <sahil.malhotra@nxp.com>,
"Ahmad Fatoum" <a.fatoum@pengutronix.de>,
"Richard Weinberger" <richard@nod.at>,
"Christophe Leroy (CS GROUP)" <chleroy@kernel.org>,
"Eric Biggers" <ebiggers@kernel.org>,
"Demi Marie Obenour" <demiobenour@gmail.com>,
"Arnd Bergmann" <arnd@arndb.de>,
"Paul Moore" <paul@paul-moore.com>,
"James Morris" <jmorris@namei.org>,
"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>,
"Jonathan Corbet" <corbet@lwn.net>,
"Shuah Khan" <skhan@linuxfoundation.org>,
"Randy Dunlap" <rdunlap@infradead.org>,
linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org,
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linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
"Rodolfo Giometti" <giometti@enneenne.com>
Subject: [RFC PATCH 7/9] crypto: caam - add an internal cbc(paes) taking the blob's key modifier
Date: Wed, 18 Nov 2026 15:10:47 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20261118141047.616989-1-giometti@enneenne.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20261118140421.584086-1-giometti@enneenne.com>
cbc(paes) decapsulates every blob with the fixed key modifier
"SECURE_KEY", the one trusted keys use for their "pk" keys, and is
reachable from AF_ALG: a blob made for either can be used through the
other by whoever holds CAP_NET_ADMIN or CAP_SYS_ADMIN (with AF_ALG's
default restriction), for whatever operation they choose. A kernel
user that wants its blobs bound to something of its own, such as the
metadata of the key they protect, has no way to say so.
Add a second cbc(paes), cbc-paes-km-caam, flagged CRYPTO_ALG_INTERNAL
so that only kernel code asking for that flag can allocate it, as the
DCP's paes is, which trusted keys allocate by driver name with that
flag; its key names the key modifier to decapsulate with.
caam_encap_blob() already takes a caller's key modifier, so a kernel
user can now bind its blobs to a value of its own.
Its only user is the keycrypt CAAM backend, which is a proposal, and
so is this.
Signed-off-by: Rodolfo Giometti <giometti@enneenne.com>
---
drivers/crypto/caam/caamalg.c | 89 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++----
drivers/crypto/caam/caamalg_desc.c | 3 +-
drivers/crypto/caam/caamalg_desc.h | 1 +
include/soc/fsl/caam-blob.h | 8 +++
4 files changed, 89 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/caam/caamalg.c b/drivers/crypto/caam/caamalg.c
index d00caa9cdf8e..f34717f312b8 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/caam/caamalg.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/caam/caamalg.c
@@ -125,6 +125,8 @@ struct caam_ctx {
dma_addr_t key_dma;
u8 protected_key[CAAM_MAX_KEY_SIZE];
dma_addr_t protected_key_dma;
+ u8 key_mod[CAAM_BLOB_KEYMOD_LENGTH];
+ unsigned int key_mod_len;
enum dma_data_direction dir;
struct device *jrdev;
struct alginfo adata;
@@ -784,18 +786,19 @@ static int skcipher_setkey(struct crypto_skcipher *skcipher, const u8 *key,
return 0;
}
-static int paes_skcipher_setkey(struct crypto_skcipher *skcipher,
- const u8 *key,
- unsigned int keylen)
+static int paes_set_blob(struct crypto_skcipher *skcipher,
+ const struct caam_pkey_info *pkey_info,
+ const u8 *blob, unsigned int keylen,
+ const u8 *key_mod, unsigned int key_mod_len)
{
- struct caam_pkey_info *pkey_info = (struct caam_pkey_info *)key;
struct caam_ctx *ctx = crypto_skcipher_ctx_dma(skcipher);
struct device *jrdev = ctx->jrdev;
int err;
- ctx->cdata.key_inline = false;
+ if (WARN_ON(key_mod_len > CAAM_BLOB_KEYMOD_LENGTH))
+ return -EINVAL;
- keylen = keylen - CAAM_PKEY_HEADER;
+ ctx->cdata.key_inline = false;
if (pkey_info->is_pkey != 1) {
dev_dbg(jrdev, "not a protected key\n");
@@ -842,19 +845,52 @@ static int paes_skcipher_setkey(struct crypto_skcipher *skcipher,
/* Retrieve the length of blob*/
ctx->cdata.keylen = keylen;
- /* Retrieve the address of the blob */
- ctx->cdata.key_virt = pkey_info->key_buf;
-
/* set command option */
ctx->cdata.key_cmd_opt = KEY_ENC;
- memcpy(ctx->key, ctx->cdata.key_virt, keylen);
+ /* The key modifier the blob is decapsulated with, at every job */
+ memcpy(ctx->key_mod, key_mod, key_mod_len);
+ ctx->key_mod_len = key_mod_len;
+
+ /* Retrieve the address of the blob */
+ memcpy(ctx->key, blob, keylen);
+ ctx->cdata.key_virt = ctx->key;
dma_sync_single_for_device(jrdev, ctx->key_dma, keylen, DMA_TO_DEVICE);
ctx->cdata.key_dma = ctx->key_dma;
return 0;
}
+static int paes_skcipher_setkey(struct crypto_skcipher *skcipher,
+ const u8 *key,
+ unsigned int keylen)
+{
+ const struct caam_pkey_info *pkey_info =
+ (const struct caam_pkey_info *)key;
+
+ return paes_set_blob(skcipher, pkey_info, pkey_info->key_buf,
+ keylen - CAAM_PKEY_HEADER, KEYMOD,
+ sizeof(KEYMOD) - 1);
+}
+
+/*
+ * The internal cbc(paes): the blob comes with the key modifier it was
+ * encapsulated with, which only kernel code can choose; a caller that
+ * picks a modifier of its own keeps its blobs apart from those of
+ * cbc(paes) and of trusted "pk" keys
+ */
+static int paes_km_skcipher_setkey(struct crypto_skcipher *skcipher,
+ const u8 *key,
+ unsigned int keylen)
+{
+ const struct caam_pkey_info *pkey_info =
+ (const struct caam_pkey_info *)key;
+
+ return paes_set_blob(skcipher, pkey_info, key + CAAM_PKEY_KM_HEADER,
+ keylen - CAAM_PKEY_KM_HEADER,
+ key + CAAM_PKEY_HEADER, CAAM_BLOB_KEYMOD_LENGTH);
+}
+
static int aes_skcipher_setkey(struct crypto_skcipher *skcipher,
const u8 *key, unsigned int keylen)
{
@@ -1398,7 +1434,9 @@ static int init_skcipher_job(struct skcipher_request *req,
edesc->desc_dma = desc_dma;
edesc->desc_dma_bytes = desc_bytes(desc);
- cnstr_desc_protected_blob_decap(edesc->hw_desc, &ctx->cdata, desc_dma);
+ cnstr_desc_protected_blob_decap(edesc->hw_desc, &ctx->cdata,
+ ctx->key_mod, ctx->key_mod_len,
+ desc_dma);
} else {
sh_desc = encrypt ? ctx->sh_desc_enc : ctx->sh_desc_dec;
ptr = encrypt ? ctx->sh_desc_enc_dma : ctx->sh_desc_dec_dma;
@@ -2031,6 +2069,30 @@ static struct caam_skcipher_alg driver_algs[] = {
.caam.class1_alg_type = OP_ALG_ALGSEL_AES | OP_ALG_AAI_CBC,
.caam.is_paes = true,
},
+ {
+ .skcipher.base = {
+ .base = {
+ .cra_name = "cbc(paes)",
+ .cra_driver_name = "cbc-paes-km-caam",
+ .cra_blocksize = AES_BLOCK_SIZE,
+ /* kernel users only: never from AF_ALG */
+ .cra_flags = CRYPTO_ALG_INTERNAL,
+ },
+ .setkey = paes_km_skcipher_setkey,
+ .encrypt = skcipher_encrypt,
+ .decrypt = skcipher_decrypt,
+ .min_keysize = AES_MIN_KEY_SIZE + CAAM_BLOB_OVERHEAD +
+ CAAM_PKEY_KM_HEADER,
+ .max_keysize = AES_MAX_KEY_SIZE + CAAM_BLOB_OVERHEAD +
+ CAAM_PKEY_KM_HEADER,
+ .ivsize = AES_BLOCK_SIZE,
+ },
+ .skcipher.op = {
+ .do_one_request = skcipher_do_one_req,
+ },
+ .caam.class1_alg_type = OP_ALG_ALGSEL_AES | OP_ALG_AAI_CBC,
+ .caam.is_paes = true,
+ },
{
.skcipher.base = {
.base = {
@@ -3812,6 +3874,11 @@ static int caam_cra_init(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm)
* AF_ALG refuses ALG_SET_KEY once an op socket exists, so
* concurrent jobs all decapsulate the same blob into the same
* black key.
+ * In-kernel users of the internal cbc(paes) set the key once,
+ * before any request, as well. It also relies on the black
+ * key being decapsulated identically by every job, which ECB
+ * black keys are; CCM ones, with their random nonce, would
+ * need a buffer per request.
*/
ctx->protected_key_dma = dma_map_single(ctx->jrdev,
ctx->protected_key,
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/caam/caamalg_desc.c b/drivers/crypto/caam/caamalg_desc.c
index 04c1105eb1f5..db3bbba67c8b 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/caam/caamalg_desc.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/caam/caamalg_desc.c
@@ -1410,6 +1410,7 @@ void cnstr_desc_skcipher_enc_dec(u32 * const desc, struct alginfo *cdata,
EXPORT_SYMBOL(cnstr_desc_skcipher_enc_dec);
void cnstr_desc_protected_blob_decap(u32 * const desc, struct alginfo *cdata,
+ const u8 *key_mod, unsigned int key_mod_len,
dma_addr_t next_desc_addr)
{
u32 protected_store;
@@ -1417,7 +1418,7 @@ void cnstr_desc_protected_blob_decap(u32 * const desc, struct alginfo *cdata,
init_job_desc(desc, 0);
/* Load key modifier */
- append_load_as_imm(desc, KEYMOD, sizeof(KEYMOD) - 1,
+ append_load_as_imm(desc, key_mod, key_mod_len,
LDST_CLASS_2_CCB | LDST_SRCDST_BYTE_KEY);
append_seq_in_ptr_intlen(desc, cdata->key_dma,
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/caam/caamalg_desc.h b/drivers/crypto/caam/caamalg_desc.h
index 323490a4a756..ae673b596a6d 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/caam/caamalg_desc.h
+++ b/drivers/crypto/caam/caamalg_desc.h
@@ -117,6 +117,7 @@ void cnstr_shdsc_xts_skcipher_encap(u32 * const desc, struct alginfo *cdata);
void cnstr_shdsc_xts_skcipher_decap(u32 * const desc, struct alginfo *cdata);
void cnstr_desc_protected_blob_decap(u32 * const desc, struct alginfo *cdata,
+ const u8 *key_mod, unsigned int key_mod_len,
dma_addr_t next_desc);
void cnstr_desc_skcipher_enc_dec(u32 * const desc, struct alginfo *cdata,
diff --git a/include/soc/fsl/caam-blob.h b/include/soc/fsl/caam-blob.h
index 922f7ec3e231..13c21c7e4c2e 100644
--- a/include/soc/fsl/caam-blob.h
+++ b/include/soc/fsl/caam-blob.h
@@ -38,6 +38,14 @@ struct caam_pkey_info {
/* sizeof struct caam_pkey_info */
#define CAAM_PKEY_HEADER 4
+/*
+ * A key of the CAAM's internal cbc(paes): struct caam_pkey_info, the
+ * CAAM_BLOB_KEYMOD_LENGTH-byte key modifier the blob was encapsulated
+ * with, then the blob
+ */
+#define CAAM_PKEY_KM_HEADER (CAAM_PKEY_HEADER + \
+ CAAM_BLOB_KEYMOD_LENGTH)
+
/**
* struct caam_blob_info - information for CAAM blobbing
* @pkey_info: pointer to keep protected key information
--
2.43.0
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-11-18 14:11 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 12+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-11-18 14:04 [RFC PATCH 0/9] KEYS: keycrypt: keys that user space can use but never read Rodolfo Giometti
2026-11-18 14:04 ` [RFC PATCH 1/9] KEYS: keycrypt: Add a key type for keys user space never reads Rodolfo Giometti
2026-11-18 14:04 ` [RFC PATCH 2/9] KEYS: keycrypt: Add the sw backend Rodolfo Giometti
2026-11-18 14:04 ` [RFC PATCH 3/9] KEYS: keycrypt: Add the OP-TEE backend Rodolfo Giometti
2026-11-18 14:07 ` [RFC PATCH 4/9] docs: keycrypt: document keycrypt keys Rodolfo Giometti
2026-11-18 14:08 ` [RFC PATCH 5/9] MAINTAINERS: add KEYS-KEYCRYPT Rodolfo Giometti
2026-11-18 14:09 ` [RFC PATCH 6/9] KEYS: keycrypt: Add the engine tier Rodolfo Giometti
2026-11-18 14:10 ` Rodolfo Giometti [this message]
2026-11-18 14:11 ` [RFC PATCH 8/9] KEYS: keycrypt: Add the CAAM backend Rodolfo Giometti
2026-11-18 14:12 ` [RFC PATCH 9/9] KEYS: keycrypt: Add the aes256-gcm-stream algorithm Rodolfo Giometti
2026-11-18 14:31 ` [RFC PATCH 0/9] KEYS: keycrypt: keys that user space can use but never read Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-18 14:39 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
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