Linux Documentation
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
To: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>,
	bpf@vger.kernel.org, containers@lists.linux.dev,
	linux-api@vger.kernel.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
	Aleksa Sarai <aleksa@amutable.com>,
	Alexander Mikhalitsyn <alex@amutable.com>,
	Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>,
	Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>,
	Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>,
	David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>,
	Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>,
	Giuseppe Scrivano <giuseppe@scrivano.org>,
	Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>, Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>,
	Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>,
	Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>,
	Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>, Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org>,
	KP Singh <kpsingh@kernel.org>,
	Lennart Poettering <lennart@poettering.net>,
	Neal Gompa <neal@gompa.dev>, Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>,
	Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>,
	Pavel Tikhomirov <ptikhomirov@virtuozzo.com>,
	Serge Hallyn <sergeh@kernel.org>,
	Shuah Khan <skhan@linuxfoundation.org>,
	Zygmunt Krynicki <zygmunt.krynicki@canonical.com>
Subject: [RFC PATCH v7 21/26] security: Add userland LSM hooks
Date: Sun, 22 Nov 2026 21:35:34 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20261122193539.3334213-22-jarkko@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20261122193539.3334213-1-jarkko@kernel.org>

Security modules need visibility into userland creation, teardown,
namespace sharing, process entry, and userland-wide signal delivery so
policies can attach per-userland security state and mediate operations
on userland file descriptors.

Add lbs_userland and userland->security blob management alongside
security_userland_alloc(), security_userland_free(),
security_userland_share(), security_userland_clone(), and
security_userland_kill().

Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
---
 include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h |  8 ++++
 include/linux/lsm_hooks.h     |  3 ++
 include/linux/security.h      | 37 ++++++++++++++++++
 include/linux/userland.h      |  3 ++
 kernel/userland.c             | 43 ++++++++++++++++-----
 security/lsm_init.c           |  6 +++
 security/security.c           | 72 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 7 files changed, 163 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)

diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
index 87d9d06710cb..be858bfdc534 100644
--- a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
+++ b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
@@ -480,3 +480,11 @@ LSM_HOOK(int, 0, bdev_alloc_security, struct block_device *bdev)
 LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, bdev_free_security, struct block_device *bdev)
 LSM_HOOK(int, 0, bdev_setintegrity, struct block_device *bdev,
 	 enum lsm_integrity_type type, const void *value, size_t size)
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_USERLAND
+LSM_HOOK(int, 0, userland_alloc, struct userland *userland, unsigned int flags)
+LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, userland_free, struct userland *userland)
+LSM_HOOK(int, 0, userland_share, struct userland *userland, struct ns_common *ns)
+LSM_HOOK(int, 0, userland_clone, struct userland *userland)
+LSM_HOOK(int, 0, userland_kill, struct userland *userland, int sig)
+#endif /* CONFIG_USERLAND */
diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
index 13621e9e233e..7c18370ac427 100644
--- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
+++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
@@ -121,6 +121,9 @@ struct lsm_blob_sizes {
 	unsigned int lbs_bpf_map;
 	unsigned int lbs_bpf_prog;
 	unsigned int lbs_bpf_token;
+#ifdef CONFIG_USERLAND
+	unsigned int lbs_userland;
+#endif
 };
 
 /*
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index 40831fab5470..2638ee1aa397 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -84,6 +84,7 @@ struct audit_krule;
 struct ns_common;
 struct user_namespace;
 struct timezone;
+struct userland;
 
 enum lsm_event {
 	LSM_POLICY_CHANGE,
@@ -2469,4 +2470,40 @@ static inline void security_initramfs_populated(void)
 }
 #endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY */
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_USERLAND
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY
+int security_userland_alloc(struct userland *userland, unsigned int flags);
+void security_userland_free(struct userland *userland);
+int security_userland_share(struct userland *userland, struct ns_common *ns);
+int security_userland_clone(struct userland *userland);
+int security_userland_kill(struct userland *userland, int sig);
+#else
+static inline int security_userland_alloc(struct userland *userland,
+					  unsigned int flags)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static inline void security_userland_free(struct userland *userland)
+{
+}
+
+static inline int security_userland_share(struct userland *userland,
+					  struct ns_common *ns)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static inline int security_userland_clone(struct userland *userland)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static inline int security_userland_kill(struct userland *userland, int sig)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
+#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY */
+#endif /* CONFIG_USERLAND */
+
 #endif /* ! __LINUX_SECURITY_H */
diff --git a/include/linux/userland.h b/include/linux/userland.h
index a9b99642c46e..eecee199fad7 100644
--- a/include/linux/userland.h
+++ b/include/linux/userland.h
@@ -61,6 +61,9 @@ enum userland_state {
 struct userland {
 	refcount_t		usage;
 	int			exit_code;
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY
+	void			*security;
+#endif
 	struct user_namespace	*user_ns;
 	struct nsproxy		*ns;
 	struct pid		*init_pid;
diff --git a/kernel/userland.c b/kernel/userland.c
index 2375442733b6..0a6c6179f629 100644
--- a/kernel/userland.c
+++ b/kernel/userland.c
@@ -40,15 +40,13 @@
 #include <linux/uts_namespace.h>
 #include <net/net_namespace.h>
 #include <linux/idr.h>
+#include <linux/security.h>
 #include <uapi/linux/userland.h>
 
 #include "exit.h"
 
-void userland_put(struct userland *c)
+static void userland_free(struct userland *c)
 {
-	if (!c || !refcount_dec_and_test(&c->usage))
-		return;
-
 	if (c->ns)
 		put_nsproxy(c->ns);
 	if (c->init_pid)
@@ -60,6 +58,15 @@ void userland_put(struct userland *c)
 	kfree(c);
 }
 
+void userland_put(struct userland *c)
+{
+	if (!c || !refcount_dec_and_test(&c->usage))
+		return;
+
+	security_userland_free(c);
+	userland_free(c);
+}
+
 static __poll_t userland_poll(struct file *file, poll_table *wait)
 {
 	struct userland *userland = file->private_data;
@@ -136,6 +143,7 @@ static long userland_share_nsfd(struct userland *c, unsigned long arg)
 	struct ns_common *old_time_children = NULL;
 	struct ns_common *old_ns = NULL;
 	struct ns_common *ns;
+	int ret;
 
 	if (arg > INT_MAX)
 		return -EBADF;
@@ -167,6 +175,10 @@ static long userland_share_nsfd(struct userland *c, unsigned long arg)
 	    !ns_capable(ns->ops->owner(ns), CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
 		return -EPERM;
 
+	ret = security_userland_share(c, ns);
+	if (ret)
+		return ret;
+
 	scoped_guard(spinlock, &c->lock) {
 		if (c->state != USERLAND_INIT)
 			return -EBUSY;
@@ -315,6 +327,7 @@ int userland_send_signal(struct file *file, int sig,
 	bool any_perm = false;
 	int other_err = 0;
 	struct pid *pid;
+	int ret;
 	int nr;
 
 	if (info || flags || sig < 0 || !valid_signal(sig))
@@ -324,6 +337,10 @@ int userland_send_signal(struct file *file, int sig,
 	if (READ_ONCE(userland->state) != USERLAND_RUNNING)
 		return -ESRCH;
 
+	ret = security_userland_kill(userland, sig);
+	if (ret)
+		return ret;
+
 	scoped_guard(rcu) {
 		read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
 		idr_for_each_entry(&pid_ns->idr, pid, nr) {
@@ -489,20 +506,20 @@ static struct userland *userland_create(unsigned int flags)
 	user_ns = userland_create_user_ns();
 	if (IS_ERR(user_ns)) {
 		ret = PTR_ERR(user_ns);
-		goto err_put;
+		goto err_free;
 	}
 	c->user_ns = user_ns;
 	ns_ref_active_get(user_ns);
 
 	if (!ns_capable(user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) {
 		ret = -EPERM;
-		goto err_put;
+		goto err_free;
 	}
 
 	ns = create_new_namespaces(clone_flags, current, user_ns, NULL);
 	if (IS_ERR(ns)) {
 		ret = PTR_ERR(ns);
-		goto err_put;
+		goto err_free;
 	}
 
 	if (ns->time_ns != ns->time_ns_for_children) {
@@ -513,10 +530,14 @@ static struct userland *userland_create(unsigned int flags)
 	c->ns = ns;
 	nsproxy_ns_active_get(ns);
 
+	ret = security_userland_alloc(c, flags);
+	if (ret < 0)
+		goto err_free;
+
 	return c;
 
-err_put:
-	userland_put(c);
+err_free:
+	userland_free(c);
 	return ERR_PTR(ret);
 }
 
@@ -610,6 +631,10 @@ int userland_prepare_fork(struct kernel_clone_args *args)
 	if (!pidns_is_ancestor(pid_ns, task_active_pid_ns(current)))
 		return -EXDEV;
 
+	ret = security_userland_clone(userland);
+	if (ret)
+		return ret;
+
 	ret = mnt_ns_get_root(userland->ns->mnt_ns, &root);
 	if (ret)
 		return ret;
diff --git a/security/lsm_init.c b/security/lsm_init.c
index 8d5ecea99c46..b1af1d922c58 100644
--- a/security/lsm_init.c
+++ b/security/lsm_init.c
@@ -316,6 +316,9 @@ static void __init lsm_prepare(struct lsm_info *lsm)
 	lsm_blob_size_update(&blobs->lbs_bpf_map, &blob_sizes.lbs_bpf_map);
 	lsm_blob_size_update(&blobs->lbs_bpf_prog, &blob_sizes.lbs_bpf_prog);
 	lsm_blob_size_update(&blobs->lbs_bpf_token, &blob_sizes.lbs_bpf_token);
+#ifdef CONFIG_USERLAND
+	lsm_blob_size_update(&blobs->lbs_userland, &blob_sizes.lbs_userland);
+#endif
 }
 
 /**
@@ -460,6 +463,9 @@ int __init security_init(void)
 		lsm_pr("blob(bpf_map) size %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_bpf_map);
 		lsm_pr("blob(bpf_prog) size %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_bpf_prog);
 		lsm_pr("blob(bpf_token) size %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_bpf_token);
+#ifdef CONFIG_USERLAND
+		lsm_pr("blob(userland) size %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_userland);
+#endif
 	}
 
 	if (blob_sizes.lbs_file)
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 4727b8347fc4..8c3a5df21938 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -30,6 +30,7 @@
 #include <linux/overflow.h>
 #include <linux/perf_event.h>
 #include <linux/fs.h>
+#include <linux/userland.h>
 #include <net/flow.h>
 #include <net/sock.h>
 
@@ -5795,3 +5796,74 @@ void security_initramfs_populated(void)
 {
 	call_void_hook(initramfs_populated);
 }
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_USERLAND
+/**
+ * security_userland_alloc() - Allocate LSM blob and check userland creation
+ * @userland: the new userland
+ * @flags: creation flags passed to userland_open()
+ *
+ * Return: 0 on success, negative error code on failure.
+ */
+int security_userland_alloc(struct userland *userland, unsigned int flags)
+{
+	int rc;
+
+	rc = lsm_blob_alloc(&userland->security, blob_sizes.lbs_userland,
+			    GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (unlikely(rc))
+		return rc;
+
+	rc = call_int_hook(userland_alloc, userland, flags);
+	if (unlikely(rc))
+		security_userland_free(userland);
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_userland_free() - Release LSM blob from @userland
+ * @userland: the userland being freed
+ */
+void security_userland_free(struct userland *userland)
+{
+	call_void_hook(userland_free, userland);
+	kfree(userland->security);
+	userland->security = NULL;
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_userland_share() - Check permission to share @ns into @userland
+ * @userland: the target userland
+ * @ns: the namespace being shared
+ *
+ * Return: 0 if permission is granted, negative error code on failure.
+ */
+int security_userland_share(struct userland *userland, struct ns_common *ns)
+{
+	return call_int_hook(userland_share, userland, ns);
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_userland_clone() - Check permission to spawn into @userland
+ * @userland: the target userland
+ *
+ * Return: 0 if permission is granted, negative error code on failure.
+ */
+int security_userland_clone(struct userland *userland)
+{
+	return call_int_hook(userland_clone, userland);
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_userland_kill() - Check permission to signal @userland
+ * @userland: the target userland
+ * @sig: signal number (or 0 for permission probe)
+ *
+ * Return: 0 if permission is granted, negative error code on failure.
+ */
+int security_userland_kill(struct userland *userland, int sig)
+{
+	return call_int_hook(userland_kill, userland, sig);
+}
+#endif /* CONFIG_USERLAND */
-- 
2.47.3


  parent reply	other threads:[~2026-11-22 19:37 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 34+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-11-22 19:35 [RFC PATCH v7 00/26] userland: Userland containers Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-22 19:35 ` [RFC PATCH v7 01/26] userns: Factor out idmap validation and commit helpers Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-22 19:35 ` [RFC PATCH v7 02/26] userns: Add userns_set_idmap() system call Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-22 19:35 ` [RFC PATCH v7 03/26] arch: Wire up " Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-22 19:35 ` [RFC PATCH v7 04/26] mount: Add mnt_ns_get_root() Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-22 19:35 ` [RFC PATCH v7 05/26] mount: Enforce mount_too_revealing() for foreign mntns Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-22 19:35 ` [RFC PATCH v7 06/26] mount: Support MOVE_MOUNT_T_MNTNS in move_mount() Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-22 19:35 ` [RFC PATCH v7 07/26] mount: Support MOVE_MOUNT_CLONE with MOVE_MOUNT_T_MNTNS Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-22 20:28   ` bot+bpf-ci
2026-11-22 19:35 ` [RFC PATCH v7 08/26] userns: Factor out install_user_ns_cred() Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-22 19:35 ` [RFC PATCH v7 09/26] nsproxy: Expose create_new_namespaces() Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-22 19:35 ` [RFC PATCH v7 10/26] userland: Add core infrastructure Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-22 20:28   ` bot+bpf-ci
2026-11-22 19:35 ` [RFC PATCH v7 11/26] userland: Track init lifecycle via copy_process() and pid_namespace Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-22 20:09   ` bot+bpf-ci
2026-11-22 19:35 ` [RFC PATCH v7 12/26] userland: Add userland_open() system call Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-22 19:35 ` [RFC PATCH v7 13/26] userland: Add USERLAND_GET_NSFD ioctl Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-22 19:35 ` [RFC PATCH v7 14/26] userland: Add USERLAND_SHARE_NSFD ioctl Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-22 19:35 ` [RFC PATCH v7 15/26] exit: Support P_USERLAND in waitid() Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-22 19:35 ` [RFC PATCH v7 16/26] signal: Support userland fds in pidfd_send_signal() Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-22 19:35 ` [RFC PATCH v7 17/26] fork: Support CLONE_INTO_USERLAND in clone3() Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-22 20:28   ` bot+bpf-ci
2026-11-22 19:35 ` [RFC PATCH v7 18/26] fs: Support FSCONFIG_SET_USERLAND in fsconfig() Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-22 20:28   ` bot+bpf-ci
2026-11-22 19:35 ` [RFC PATCH v7 19/26] proc: Implement ->set_userland() fs_context operation Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-22 19:35 ` [RFC PATCH v7 20/26] ipc/mqueue: " Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-22 19:35 ` Jarkko Sakkinen [this message]
2026-11-22 19:35 ` [RFC PATCH v7 22/26] bpf: Register userland LSM hooks Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-22 19:35 ` [RFC PATCH v7 23/26] arch: Wire up userland_open() system call Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-22 19:35 ` [RFC PATCH v7 24/26] docs: Document userland uAPI Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-22 20:09   ` bot+bpf-ci
2026-11-22 19:35 ` [RFC PATCH v7 25/26] selftests/userland: Add userland test suite Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-22 20:28   ` bot+bpf-ci
2026-11-22 19:35 ` [RFC PATCH v7 26/26] MAINTAINERS: Add entry for USERLAND Jarkko Sakkinen

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=20261122193539.3334213-22-jarkko@kernel.org \
    --to=jarkko@kernel.org \
    --cc=aleksa@amutable.com \
    --cc=alex@amutable.com \
    --cc=arnd@arndb.de \
    --cc=bpf@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=brauner@kernel.org \
    --cc=containers@lists.linux.dev \
    --cc=corbet@lwn.net \
    --cc=dhowells@redhat.com \
    --cc=ebiggers@kernel.org \
    --cc=giuseppe@scrivano.org \
    --cc=hughd@google.com \
    --cc=jack@suse.cz \
    --cc=jlayton@kernel.org \
    --cc=josef@toxicpanda.com \
    --cc=kees@kernel.org \
    --cc=kpsingh@kernel.org \
    --cc=lennart@poettering.net \
    --cc=linux-api@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-arch@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-doc@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-mm@kvack.org \
    --cc=linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=luto@amacapital.net \
    --cc=neal@gompa.dev \
    --cc=oleg@redhat.com \
    --cc=paul@paul-moore.com \
    --cc=ptikhomirov@virtuozzo.com \
    --cc=sergeh@kernel.org \
    --cc=skhan@linuxfoundation.org \
    --cc=viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk \
    --cc=zygmunt.krynicki@canonical.com \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox