Re: [PATCH 3/3] [RFC V3] KVM: X86: Adding skeleton for Memory ROE

[Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>]

On 07/19/2018 02:38 PM, Ahmed Abd El Mawgood wrote:
> This patch introduces a hypercall implemented for X86 that can assist
> against subset of kernel rootkits, it works by place readonly protection in
> shadow PTE. The end result protection is also kept in a bitmap for each
> kvm_memory_slot and is used as reference when updating SPTEs. The whole
> goal is to protect the guest kernel static data from modification if
> attacker is running from guest ring 0, for this reason there is no
> hypercall to revert effect of Memory ROE hypercall. This patch doesn't
> implement integrity check on guest TLB so obvious attack on the current
> implementation will involve guest virtual address -> guest physical
> address remapping, but there are plans to fix that.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Ahmed Abd El Mawgood <ahmedsoliman0x666@gmail.com>
> ---

> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/Kconfig b/arch/x86/kvm/Kconfig
> index 92fd433c50b9..8ae822a8dc7a 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/Kconfig
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/Kconfig
> @@ -96,6 +96,13 @@ config KVM_MMU_AUDIT
>  	 This option adds a R/W kVM module parameter 'mmu_audit', which allows
>  	 auditing of KVM MMU events at runtime.
>  
> +config KVM_MROE
> +	bool "Hypercall Memory Read-Only Enforcement"
> +	depends on KVM && X86
> +	help
> +	This option add KVM_HC_HMROE hypercall to kvm which as hardening

	            adds                       to kvm as a hardening   (???)


> +	mechanism to protect memory pages from being edited.
> +
>  # OK, it's a little counter-intuitive to do this, but it puts it neatly under
>  # the virtualization menu.
>  source drivers/vhost/Kconfig


-- 
~Randy
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