From: "Adrian Ratiu" <adrian.ratiu@collabora.com>
To: "Kees Cook" <kees@kernel.org>
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org,
linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, kernel@collabora.com, gbiv@google.com,
ryanbeltran@google.com, inglorion@google.com,
ajordanr@google.com, jorgelo@chromium.org,
"Guenter Roeck" <groeck@chromium.org>,
"Doug Anderson" <dianders@chromium.org>,
"Jann Horn" <jannh@google.com>,
"Andrew Morton" <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
"Randy Dunlap" <rdunlap@infradead.org>,
"Christian Brauner" <brauner@kernel.org>,
"Jeff Xu" <jeffxu@google.com>,
"Mike Frysinger" <vapier@chromium.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v5 2/2] proc: restrict /proc/pid/mem
Date: Fri, 07 Jun 2024 11:38:12 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <2724ac-6662e300-3-2336898@243510220> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <202406060917.8DEE8E3@keescook>
On Thursday, June 06, 2024 20:45 EEST, Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org> wrote:
> On Wed, Jun 05, 2024 at 07:49:31PM +0300, Adrian Ratiu wrote:
> > + proc_mem.restrict_foll_force= [KNL]
> > + Format: {all | ptracer}
> > + Restricts the use of the FOLL_FORCE flag for /proc/*/mem access.
> > + If restricted, the FOLL_FORCE flag will not be added to vm accesses.
> > + Can be one of:
> > + - 'all' restricts all access unconditionally.
> > + - 'ptracer' allows access only for ptracer processes.
> > + If not specified, FOLL_FORCE is always used.
>
> It dawns on me that we likely need an "off" setting for these in case it
> was CONFIG-enabled...
Indeed, having CONFIG-enabled and disabling entirely via kernel
params is a valid usecase (eg for debug images with no restriction).
Will do in v6.
>
> > +static int __init early_proc_mem_restrict_##name(char *buf) \
> > +{ \
> > + if (!buf) \
> > + return -EINVAL; \
> > + \
> > + if (strcmp(buf, "all") == 0) \
> > + static_key_slow_inc(&proc_mem_restrict_##name##_all.key); \
> > + else if (strcmp(buf, "ptracer") == 0) \
> > + static_key_slow_inc(&proc_mem_restrict_##name##_ptracer.key); \
> > + return 0; \
> > +} \
> > +early_param("proc_mem.restrict_" #name, early_proc_mem_restrict_##name)
>
> Why slow_inc here instead of the normal static_key_enable/disable?
No real reason, my mind was just more attuned to the inc/dec
semantics, however in this case we can just use enable/disable,
especially if they're faster.
I'll do this in v6.
>
> And we should report misparsing too, so perhaps:
Ack
> > +static int __mem_open_access_permitted(struct file *file, struct task_struct *task)
> > +{
> > + bool is_ptracer;
> > +
> > + rcu_read_lock();
> > + is_ptracer = current == ptrace_parent(task);
> > + rcu_read_unlock();
> > +
> > + if (file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE) {
> > + /* Deny if writes are unconditionally disabled via param */
> > + if (static_branch_maybe(CONFIG_PROC_MEM_RESTRICT_OPEN_WRITE_DEFAULT,
> > + &proc_mem_restrict_open_write_all))
> > + return -EACCES;
> > +
> > + /* Deny if writes are allowed only for ptracers via param */
> > + if (static_branch_maybe(CONFIG_PROC_MEM_RESTRICT_OPEN_WRITE_PTRACE_DEFAULT,
> > + &proc_mem_restrict_open_write_ptracer) &&
> > + !is_ptracer)
> > + return -EACCES;
> > + }
> > +
> > + if (file->f_mode & FMODE_READ) {
> > + /* Deny if reads are unconditionally disabled via param */
> > + if (static_branch_maybe(CONFIG_PROC_MEM_RESTRICT_OPEN_READ_DEFAULT,
> > + &proc_mem_restrict_open_read_all))
> > + return -EACCES;
> > +
> > + /* Deny if reads are allowed only for ptracers via param */
> > + if (static_branch_maybe(CONFIG_PROC_MEM_RESTRICT_OPEN_READ_PTRACE_DEFAULT,
> > + &proc_mem_restrict_open_read_ptracer) &&
> > + !is_ptracer)
> > + return -EACCES;
> > + }
> > +
> > + return 0; /* R/W are not restricted */
> > +}
>
> Given how deeply some of these behaviors may be in userspace, it might
> be more friendly to report the new restrictions with a pr_notice() so
> problems can be more easily tracked down. For example:
>
> static void report_mem_rw_rejection(const char *action, struct task_struct *task)
> {
> pr_warn_ratelimited("Denied %s of /proc/%d/mem (%s) by pid %d (%s)\n",
> action, task_pid_nr(task), task->comm,
> task_pid_nr(current), current->comm);
> }
>
> ...
>
> if (file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE) {
> /* Deny if writes are unconditionally disabled via param */
> if (static_branch_maybe(CONFIG_PROC_MEM_RESTRICT_OPEN_WRITE_DEFAULT,
> &proc_mem_restrict_open_write_all)) {
> report_mem_rw_reject("all open-for-write");
> return -EACCES;
> }
>
> /* Deny if writes are allowed only for ptracers via param */
> if (static_branch_maybe(CONFIG_PROC_MEM_RESTRICT_OPEN_WRITE_PTRACE_DEFAULT,
> &proc_mem_restrict_open_write_ptracer) &&
> !is_ptracer)
> report_mem_rw_reject("non-ptracer open-for-write");
> return -EACCES;
> }
>
> etc
Yes, will do in v6.
> Can we adjust the Kconfigs to match the bootparam arguments? i.e.
> instead of two for each mode, how about one with 3 settings ("all",
> "ptrace", or "off")
Sure. Thank you for all the code! All your help designing this
and code contributions are very much appreciated!
Do you want to be listed as co-author in v6?
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2024-06-07 10:38 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 6+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2024-06-05 16:49 [PATCH v5 1/2] proc: pass file instead of inode to proc_mem_open Adrian Ratiu
2024-06-05 16:49 ` [PATCH v5 2/2] proc: restrict /proc/pid/mem Adrian Ratiu
2024-06-06 17:45 ` Kees Cook
2024-06-07 10:38 ` Adrian Ratiu [this message]
2024-06-12 18:13 ` Adrian Ratiu
2024-06-12 18:23 ` Kees Cook
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