From: Sohil Mehta <sohil.mehta@intel.com>
To: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: <x86@kernel.org>, Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
"Thomas Gleixner" <tglx@linutronix.de>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
"Jonathan Corbet" <corbet@lwn.net>,
"H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>,
"Kirill A . Shutemov" <kas@kernel.org>, Xin Li <xin@zytor.com>,
David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>,
Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>,
Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>,
Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com>,
Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>,
David Laight <david.laight.linux@gmail.com>,
Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>,
"Geert Uytterhoeven" <geert@linux-m68k.org>,
Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org>, Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>,
Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>,
<linux-doc@vger.kernel.org>, <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
<linux-efi@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v10 03/15] x86/alternatives: Disable LASS when patching kernel alternatives
Date: Wed, 22 Oct 2025 12:49:42 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <34d91e30-9a94-4bbb-9a57-3679afbede2e@intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20251022095657.GBaPiqaYxPMonQWLtw@fat_crate.local>
On 10/22/2025 2:56 AM, Borislav Petkov wrote:
> On Tue, Oct 21, 2025 at 01:55:51PM -0700, Sohil Mehta wrote:
>> In the series, we directly write to the CR4 bits, so they don't have any
>> wrappers. But in the future, lass_enable()/lass_disable() could be
>> confusing if wrappers were added for the CR4 toggling.
>
> Are you envisioning to export the CR4.LASS toggling to users like those two or
> is former going to be done only at those two places?
>
> Because CR4 toggling is expensive so you probably don't want to do that very
> often.
>
I agree. My expectation is that those won't grow much beyond the
existing ones.
My understanding from your discussion with PeterZ is that we would use
lass_enable()/_disable() with the LASS alternatives but leave the
existing stac()/clac() as-is.
Below is the updated patch with the rename and the text to clarify usages.
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/smap.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/smap.h
index 4f84d421d1cf..4f4a4e0efff5 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/smap.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/smap.h
@@ -23,18 +23,52 @@
#else /* __ASSEMBLER__ */
+/*
+ * The CLAC/STAC instructions toggle the enforcement of
+ * X86_FEATURE_SMAP along with X86_FEATURE_LASS.
+ *
+ * SMAP enforcement is based on the _PAGE_BIT_USER bit in the page
+ * tables. The kernel is not allowed to touch pages with the bit set
+ * unless the AC bit is set.
+ *
+ * Use stac()/clac() when accessing userspace (_PAGE_USER) mappings,
+ * regardless of location.
+ *
+ * Note: a barrier is implicit in alternative().
+ */
+
static __always_inline void clac(void)
{
- /* Note: a barrier is implicit in alternative() */
alternative("", "clac", X86_FEATURE_SMAP);
}
static __always_inline void stac(void)
{
- /* Note: a barrier is implicit in alternative() */
alternative("", "stac", X86_FEATURE_SMAP);
}
+/*
+ * LASS enforcement is based on bit 63 of the virtual address. The
+ * kernel is not allowed to touch memory in the lower half of the
+ * virtual address space unless the AC bit is set.
+ *
+ * Use lass_disable()/lass_enable() when accessing kernel (!_PAGE_USER)
+ * mappings in the lower half of the address space that are blocked by
+ * LASS, but not by SMAP.
+ *
+ * Note: a barrier is implicit in alternative().
+ */
+
+static __always_inline void lass_enable(void)
+{
+ alternative("", "clac", X86_FEATURE_LASS);
+}
+
+static __always_inline void lass_disable(void)
+{
+ alternative("", "stac", X86_FEATURE_LASS);
+}
+
static __always_inline unsigned long smap_save(void)
{
unsigned long flags;
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c b/arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c
index 8ee5ff547357..b38dbf08d5cd 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c
@@ -2469,16 +2469,30 @@ void __init_or_module text_poke_early(void
*addr, const void *opcode,
__ro_after_init struct mm_struct *text_poke_mm;
__ro_after_init unsigned long text_poke_mm_addr;
+/*
+ * Text poking creates and uses a mapping in the lower half of the
+ * address space. Relax LASS enforcement when accessing the poking
+ * address.
+ *
+ * objtool enforces a strict policy of "no function calls within AC=1
+ * regions". Adhere to the policy by using inline versions of
+ * memcpy()/memset() that will never result in a function call.
+ */
+
static void text_poke_memcpy(void *dst, const void *src, size_t len)
{
- memcpy(dst, src, len);
+ lass_disable();
+ __inline_memcpy(dst, src, len);
+ lass_enable();
}
static void text_poke_memset(void *dst, const void *src, size_t len)
{
int c = *(const int *)src;
- memset(dst, c, len);
+ lass_disable();
+ __inline_memset(dst, c, len);
+ lass_enable();
}
typedef void text_poke_f(void *dst, const void *src, size_t len);
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2025-10-22 19:49 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 74+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2025-10-07 6:51 [PATCH v10 00/15] x86: Enable Linear Address Space Separation support Sohil Mehta
2025-10-07 6:51 ` [PATCH v10 01/15] x86/cpu: Enumerate the LASS feature bits Sohil Mehta
2025-10-07 18:19 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2025-10-07 18:28 ` Dave Hansen
2025-10-07 20:20 ` Sohil Mehta
2025-10-07 20:38 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2025-10-07 20:53 ` Sohil Mehta
2025-10-16 3:10 ` H. Peter Anvin
2025-10-07 20:49 ` Sohil Mehta
2025-10-07 23:16 ` Xin Li
2025-10-08 16:00 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2025-10-16 15:35 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-10-21 18:03 ` Sohil Mehta
2025-10-07 6:51 ` [PATCH v10 02/15] x86/asm: Introduce inline memcpy and memset Sohil Mehta
2025-10-21 12:47 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-10-21 13:48 ` David Laight
2025-10-21 18:06 ` Sohil Mehta
2025-10-07 6:51 ` [PATCH v10 03/15] x86/alternatives: Disable LASS when patching kernel alternatives Sohil Mehta
2025-10-07 16:55 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2025-10-07 22:28 ` Sohil Mehta
2025-10-08 16:22 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2025-10-10 17:10 ` Sohil Mehta
2025-10-21 20:03 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-10-21 20:55 ` Sohil Mehta
2025-10-22 9:56 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-10-22 19:49 ` Sohil Mehta [this message]
2025-10-22 20:03 ` Luck, Tony
2025-10-22 8:25 ` Peter Zijlstra
2025-10-22 9:40 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-10-22 10:22 ` Peter Zijlstra
2025-10-22 10:52 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-10-07 6:51 ` [PATCH v10 04/15] x86/cpu: Set LASS CR4 bit as pinning sensitive Sohil Mehta
2025-10-07 18:24 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2025-10-07 23:11 ` Sohil Mehta
2025-10-08 16:52 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2025-10-10 19:03 ` Sohil Mehta
2025-10-07 6:51 ` [PATCH v10 05/15] x86/cpu: Defer CR pinning enforcement until late_initcall() Sohil Mehta
2025-10-07 17:23 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2025-10-07 23:05 ` Sohil Mehta
2025-10-08 17:36 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2025-10-10 20:45 ` Sohil Mehta
2025-10-15 21:17 ` Sohil Mehta
2025-10-17 19:28 ` Sohil Mehta
2025-10-07 6:51 ` [PATCH v10 06/15] x86/efi: Disable LASS while mapping the EFI runtime services Sohil Mehta
2025-10-07 6:51 ` [PATCH v10 07/15] x86/kexec: Disable LASS during relocate kernel Sohil Mehta
2025-10-07 17:43 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2025-10-07 22:33 ` Sohil Mehta
2025-10-07 6:51 ` [PATCH v10 08/15] x86/vsyscall: Reorganize the page fault emulation code Sohil Mehta
2025-10-07 18:37 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2025-10-07 18:48 ` Dave Hansen
2025-10-07 19:53 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2025-10-07 22:52 ` Sohil Mehta
2025-10-08 17:42 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2025-10-30 16:58 ` Andy Lutomirski
2025-10-30 17:22 ` H. Peter Anvin
2025-10-30 17:35 ` Andy Lutomirski
2025-10-30 19:28 ` Sohil Mehta
2025-10-30 21:37 ` David Laight
2025-10-07 6:51 ` [PATCH v10 09/15] x86/traps: Consolidate user fixups in exc_general_protection() Sohil Mehta
2025-10-07 17:46 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2025-10-07 22:41 ` Sohil Mehta
2025-10-08 17:43 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2025-10-07 6:51 ` [PATCH v10 10/15] x86/vsyscall: Add vsyscall emulation for #GP Sohil Mehta
2025-10-07 6:51 ` [PATCH v10 11/15] x86/vsyscall: Disable LASS if vsyscall mode is set to EMULATE Sohil Mehta
2025-10-07 18:43 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2025-10-07 6:51 ` [PATCH v10 12/15] x86/traps: Communicate a LASS violation in #GP message Sohil Mehta
2025-10-07 18:07 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2025-10-07 6:51 ` [PATCH v10 13/15] x86/traps: Generalize #GP address decode and hint code Sohil Mehta
2025-10-07 18:43 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2025-10-07 6:51 ` [PATCH v10 14/15] x86/traps: Provide additional hints for a kernel stack segment fault Sohil Mehta
2025-10-07 6:51 ` [PATCH v10 15/15] x86/cpu: Enable LASS by default during CPU initialization Sohil Mehta
2025-10-07 18:42 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2025-10-07 16:23 ` [PATCH v10 00/15] x86: Enable Linear Address Space Separation support Edgecombe, Rick P
2025-10-17 19:52 ` Sohil Mehta
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