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From: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
To: "Albert Esteve" <aesteve@redhat.com>, "Tejun Heo" <tj@kernel.org>,
	"Johannes Weiner" <hannes@cmpxchg.org>,
	"Michal Koutný" <mkoutny@suse.com>,
	"Jonathan Corbet" <corbet@lwn.net>,
	"Shuah Khan" <skhan@linuxfoundation.org>,
	"Sumit Semwal" <sumit.semwal@linaro.org>,
	"Christian König" <christian.koenig@amd.com>,
	"Michal Hocko" <mhocko@kernel.org>,
	"Roman Gushchin" <roman.gushchin@linux.dev>,
	"Shakeel Butt" <shakeel.butt@linux.dev>,
	"Muchun Song" <muchun.song@linux.dev>,
	"Andrew Morton" <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	"Benjamin Gaignard" <benjamin.gaignard@collabora.com>,
	"Brian Starkey" <Brian.Starkey@arm.com>,
	"John Stultz" <jstultz@google.com>,
	"T.J. Mercier" <tjmercier@google.com>,
	"Christian Brauner" <brauner@kernel.org>,
	"James Morris" <jmorris@namei.org>,
	"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>,
	"Stephen Smalley" <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>,
	"Shuah Khan" <shuah@kernel.org>,
	"Randy Dunlap" <rdunlap@infradead.org>,
	"Ondrej Mosnáček" <omosnacek@gmail.com>,
	"Jens Wiklander" <jenswi@kernel.org>,
	"Sumit Garg" <sumit.garg@kernel.org>,
	"Philipp Stanner" <phasta@kernel.org>
Cc: airlied@gmail.com, cgroups@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-media@vger.kernel.org, dri-devel@lists.freedesktop.org,
	linaro-mm-sig@lists.linaro.org, linux-mm@kvack.org,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, selinux@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org,
	op-tee@lists.trustedfirmware.org,
	Albert Esteve <aesteve@redhat.com>,
	echanude@redhat.com, mripard@kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v5 4/8] lsm: Add memcg_charge_task LSM hook
Date: Tue, 17 Nov 2026 17:54:48 -0500	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <44c0c45c0e2f47ed77bc45be47ebb3fb@paul-moore.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20261117-v2_20230123_tjmercier_google_com-v5-4-1ce975f2a9ad@redhat.com>

On Nov 17, 2026 Albert Esteve <aesteve@redhat.com> wrote:
> 
> Both DMA_HEAP_IOCTL_ALLOC and the new DMA_BUF_IOCTL_XFER_CHARGE ioctl
> accept a charge_fd field that, when set, causes the allocation to be
> charged to an arbitrary process's cgroup rather than the caller's.
> 
> Charging is currently limited to the caller's own memcg subtree unless
> the caller holds CAP_SYS_RESOURCE. But the capability is all-or-nothing.
> A process holding it, along with a dma-heap device node or a dma-buf
> fd can charge unlimited memory to any other process's cgroup, potentially
> exhausting that cgroup's limit and triggering OOM kills independent of
> the victim's own activity or privileges.
> 
> Add security_memcg_charge_task(), called in get_obj_cgroup_from_fd()
> when charge_fd refers to another process. The hook receives
> the credentials of the allocating process (from) and the credentials
> of the process whose cgroup will be charged (to), giving security
> modules a controlled enforcement point for cross-cgroup objcg
> attribution policy.
> 
> When CONFIG_SECURITY is not set the hook compiles to an inline
> returning 0, adding no overhead to the fast path.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Albert Esteve <aesteve@redhat.com>
> ---
>  include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h |  1 +
>  include/linux/security.h      |  7 +++++++
>  mm/memcontrol.c               | 11 +++++++++++
>  security/security.c           | 15 +++++++++++++++
>  4 files changed, 34 insertions(+)

...

> diff --git a/mm/memcontrol.c b/mm/memcontrol.c
> index 03cd90d5e623..2e6fcbe14d43 100644
> --- a/mm/memcontrol.c
> +++ b/mm/memcontrol.c
> @@ -60,6 +60,7 @@
>  #include <linux/lockdep.h>
>  #include <linux/resume_user_mode.h>
>  #include <linux/psi.h>
> +#include <linux/security.h>
>  #include <linux/seq_buf.h>
>  #include <linux/sched/isolation.h>
>  #include <linux/kmemleak.h>
> @@ -3198,10 +3199,12 @@ static bool mem_cgroup_may_charge(struct mem_cgroup *memcg)
>  struct obj_cgroup *get_obj_cgroup_from_fd(int fd)
>  {
>  	struct cgroup_subsys_state *css;
> +	const struct cred *tcred;
>  	struct obj_cgroup *objcg;
>  	struct mem_cgroup *memcg;
>  	struct task_struct *task;
>  	unsigned int pidfd_flags;
> +	int ret;
>  
>  	if (mem_cgroup_disabled())
>  		return ERR_PTR(-EOPNOTSUPP);
> @@ -3226,6 +3229,14 @@ struct obj_cgroup *get_obj_cgroup_from_fd(int fd)
>  		if (IS_ERR(task))
>  			return ERR_CAST(task);
>  
> +		tcred = get_task_cred(task);
> +		ret = security_memcg_charge_task(current_cred(), tcred);

Do you ever envision this "from" cred being something other than
current_cred()?  If the answer is "no", we might want to consider changing
the LSM hook slightly to help prevent misuse in the future:

  int security_current_memcg_charge_task(const struct cred *tcred);

> +		put_cred(tcred);
> +		if (ret) {
> +			put_task_struct(task);
> +			return ERR_PTR(ret);
> +		}
> +
>  		rcu_read_lock();
>  		css = task_css(task, memory_cgrp_id);
>  		put_task_struct(task);

--
paul-moore.com

  reply	other threads:[~2026-11-17 22:54 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 11+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-11-17  8:39 [PATCH v5 0/8] memcg: dma-buf cgroup accounting and charge transfer Albert Esteve
2026-11-17  8:39 ` [PATCH v5 1/8] memcg: Add MEMCG_DMABUF accounting infrastructure Albert Esteve
2026-11-17  8:39 ` [PATCH v5 2/8] dma-heap: charge dma-buf memory via explicit memcg Albert Esteve
2026-11-17  8:39 ` [PATCH v5 3/8] dma-buf: transfer objcg charges via DMA_BUF_IOCTL_XFER_CHARGE Albert Esteve
2026-11-17  8:39 ` [PATCH v5 4/8] lsm: Add memcg_charge_task LSM hook Albert Esteve
2026-11-17 22:54   ` Paul Moore [this message]
2026-11-17  8:39 ` [PATCH v5 5/8] lsm: Add memcg_charge_cgroup " Albert Esteve
2026-11-17  8:39 ` [PATCH v5 6/8] selinux: Restrict cross-cgroup memcg charging Albert Esteve
2026-11-17  8:39 ` [PATCH v5 7/8] selinux: Restrict memcg charging to a cgroupfd target Albert Esteve
2026-11-17  8:39 ` [PATCH v5 8/8] selftests/dmabuf-heaps: Add dma-buf memcg accounting tests Albert Esteve
2026-11-17 22:54 ` [PATCH v5 0/8] memcg: dma-buf cgroup accounting and charge transfer Paul Moore

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