Re: [PATCH v10 01/15] x86/cpu: Enumerate the LASS feature bits

["Edgecombe, Rick P" <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>]

On Mon, 2025-10-06 at 23:51 -0700, Sohil Mehta wrote:
> Linear Address Space Separation (LASS) is a security feature that
> intends to prevent malicious virtual address space accesses across
> user/kernel mode.
> 
> Such mode based access protection already exists today with paging and
> features such as SMEP and SMAP. However, to enforce these protections,
> the processor must traverse the paging structures in memory. An attacker
> can use timing information resulting from this traversal to determine
> details about the paging structures, and to determine the layout of the
> kernel memory.
> 
> LASS provides the same mode-based protections as paging but without
> traversing the paging structures. Because the protections are enforced
> pre-paging, an attacker will not be able to derive paging-based timing

Nit: pre-page walk maybe? Otherwise it could sound like before paging is enabled
during boot.

> information from the various caching structures such as the TLBs,
> mid-level caches, page walker, data caches, etc.
> 
> LASS enforcement relies on the kernel implementation to divide the
> 64-bit virtual address space into two halves:
>   Addr[63]=0 -> User address space
>   Addr[63]=1 -> Kernel address space
> 
> Any data access or code execution across address spaces typically
> results in a #GP fault. The LASS enforcement for kernel data accesses is
> dependent on CR4.SMAP being set. The enforcement can be disabled by
> toggling the RFLAGS.AC bit similar to SMAP.
> 
> Define the CPU feature bits to enumerate LASS and add a dependency on
> SMAP.
> 
> LASS mitigates a class of side-channel speculative attacks, such as
> Spectre LAM [1]. Add the "lass" flag to /proc/cpuinfo to indicate that
> the feature is supported by hardware and enabled by the kernel.  This
> allows userspace to determine if the system is secure against such
> attacks.
> 
> Link: https://download.vusec.net/papers/slam_sp24.pdf [1]
> Signed-off-by: Sohil Mehta <sohil.mehta@intel.com>
> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
> Reviewed-by: Xin Li (Intel) <xin@zytor.com>
> ---
> v10:
>  - Do not modify tools/**/cpufeatures.h as those are synced separately.
> ---
>  arch/x86/Kconfig.cpufeatures                | 4 ++++
>  arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h          | 1 +
>  arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/processor-flags.h | 2 ++
>  arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cpuid-deps.c            | 1 +
>  4 files changed, 8 insertions(+)
> 
> diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig.cpufeatures b/arch/x86/Kconfig.cpufeatures
> index 250c10627ab3..733d5aff2456 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/Kconfig.cpufeatures
> +++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig.cpufeatures
> @@ -124,6 +124,10 @@ config X86_DISABLED_FEATURE_PCID
>  	def_bool y
>  	depends on !X86_64
>  
> +config X86_DISABLED_FEATURE_LASS
> +	def_bool y
> +	depends on X86_32
> +

All the other ones in the file are !X86_64. Why do this one X86_32?

>  config X86_DISABLED_FEATURE_PKU
>  	def_bool y
>  	depends on !X86_INTEL_MEMORY_PROTECTION_KEYS
> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
> index b2a562217d3f..1283f3bdda0d 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
> @@ -314,6 +314,7 @@
>  #define X86_FEATURE_SM4			(12*32+ 2) /* SM4 instructions */
>  #define X86_FEATURE_AVX_VNNI		(12*32+ 4) /* "avx_vnni" AVX VNNI instructions */
>  #define X86_FEATURE_AVX512_BF16		(12*32+ 5) /* "avx512_bf16" AVX512 BFLOAT16 instructions */
> +#define X86_FEATURE_LASS		(12*32+ 6) /* "lass" Linear Address Space Separation */
>  #define X86_FEATURE_CMPCCXADD           (12*32+ 7) /* CMPccXADD instructions */
>  #define X86_FEATURE_ARCH_PERFMON_EXT	(12*32+ 8) /* Intel Architectural PerfMon Extension */
>  #define X86_FEATURE_FZRM		(12*32+10) /* Fast zero-length REP MOVSB */
> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/processor-flags.h b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/processor-flags.h
> index f1a4adc78272..81d0c8bf1137 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/processor-flags.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/processor-flags.h
> @@ -136,6 +136,8 @@
>  #define X86_CR4_PKE		_BITUL(X86_CR4_PKE_BIT)
>  #define X86_CR4_CET_BIT		23 /* enable Control-flow Enforcement Technology */
>  #define X86_CR4_CET		_BITUL(X86_CR4_CET_BIT)
> +#define X86_CR4_LASS_BIT	27 /* enable Linear Address Space Separation support */
> +#define X86_CR4_LASS		_BITUL(X86_CR4_LASS_BIT)
>  #define X86_CR4_LAM_SUP_BIT	28 /* LAM for supervisor pointers */
>  #define X86_CR4_LAM_SUP		_BITUL(X86_CR4_LAM_SUP_BIT)
>  
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cpuid-deps.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cpuid-deps.c
> index 46efcbd6afa4..98d0cdd82574 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cpuid-deps.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cpuid-deps.c
> @@ -89,6 +89,7 @@ static const struct cpuid_dep cpuid_deps[] = {
>  	{ X86_FEATURE_SHSTK,			X86_FEATURE_XSAVES    },
>  	{ X86_FEATURE_FRED,			X86_FEATURE_LKGS      },
>  	{ X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL_SSBD,		X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL },
> +	{ X86_FEATURE_LASS,			X86_FEATURE_SMAP      },

Aha! So SMAP is required for LASS. This makes the stac/clac patch make more
sense. Please those comments less seriously. Although I think a comment is still
not unwarranted.

>  	{}
>  };
>