From: Binbin Wu <binbin.wu@linux.intel.com>
To: "Xin Li (Intel)" <xin@zytor.com>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org,
linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, pbonzini@redhat.com,
seanjc@google.com, corbet@lwn.net, tglx@linutronix.de,
mingo@redhat.com, bp@alien8.de, dave.hansen@linux.intel.com,
x86@kernel.org, hpa@zytor.com, luto@kernel.org,
peterz@infradead.org, andrew.cooper3@citrix.com,
chao.gao@intel.com, hch@infradead.org, sohil.mehta@intel.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v9 02/22] KVM: VMX: Initialize VM entry/exit FRED controls in vmcs_config
Date: Tue, 20 Jan 2026 17:24:54 +0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <81bb8149-45c7-472a-a240-46d43bd33b5d@linux.intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20251026201911.505204-3-xin@zytor.com>
On 10/27/2025 4:18 AM, Xin Li (Intel) wrote:
> From: Xin Li <xin3.li@intel.com>
>
> Setup VM entry/exit FRED controls in the global vmcs_config for proper
> FRED VMCS fields management:
> 1) load guest FRED state upon VM entry.
> 2) save guest FRED state during VM exit.
> 3) load host FRED state during VM exit.
>
Nit:
I think it's worth noting that IA32_FRED_RSP0 and IA32_FRED_SSP0 are treated
differently. The change log might need more context on which MSRs are
atomically switched in order to describe that though.
> Also add FRED control consistency checks to the existing VM entry/exit
> consistency check framework.
Reviewed-by: Binbin Wu <binbin.wu@linux.intel.com>
>
> Signed-off-by: Xin Li <xin3.li@intel.com>
> Signed-off-by: Xin Li (Intel) <xin@zytor.com>
> Tested-by: Shan Kang <shan.kang@intel.com>
> Tested-by: Xuelian Guo <xuelian.guo@intel.com>
> Reviewed-by: Chao Gao <chao.gao@intel.com>
> ---
>
> Change in v5:
> * Remove the pair VM_ENTRY_LOAD_IA32_FRED/VM_EXIT_ACTIVATE_SECONDARY_CONTROLS,
> since the secondary VM exit controls are unconditionally enabled anyway, and
> there are features other than FRED needing it (Chao Gao).
> * Add TB from Xuelian Guo.
>
> Change in v4:
> * Do VM exit/entry consistency checks using the new macro from Sean
> Christopherson.
>
> Changes in v3:
> * Add FRED control consistency checks to the existing VM entry/exit
> consistency check framework (Sean Christopherson).
> * Just do the unnecessary FRED state load/store on every VM entry/exit
> (Sean Christopherson).
> ---
> arch/x86/include/asm/vmx.h | 4 ++++
> arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c | 2 ++
> arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h | 7 +++++--
> 3 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/vmx.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/vmx.h
> index 1f60c04d11fb..dd79d027ea70 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/vmx.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/vmx.h
> @@ -109,6 +109,9 @@
> #define VM_EXIT_LOAD_CET_STATE 0x10000000
> #define VM_EXIT_ACTIVATE_SECONDARY_CONTROLS 0x80000000
>
> +#define SECONDARY_VM_EXIT_SAVE_IA32_FRED BIT_ULL(0)
> +#define SECONDARY_VM_EXIT_LOAD_IA32_FRED BIT_ULL(1)
> +
> #define VM_EXIT_ALWAYSON_WITHOUT_TRUE_MSR 0x00036dff
>
> #define VM_ENTRY_LOAD_DEBUG_CONTROLS 0x00000004
> @@ -122,6 +125,7 @@
> #define VM_ENTRY_PT_CONCEAL_PIP 0x00020000
> #define VM_ENTRY_LOAD_IA32_RTIT_CTL 0x00040000
> #define VM_ENTRY_LOAD_CET_STATE 0x00100000
> +#define VM_ENTRY_LOAD_IA32_FRED 0x00800000
>
> #define VM_ENTRY_ALWAYSON_WITHOUT_TRUE_MSR 0x000011ff
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
> index 8de841c9c905..be48ba2d70e1 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
> @@ -2622,6 +2622,8 @@ static int setup_vmcs_config(struct vmcs_config *vmcs_conf,
> u32 entry_control;
> u64 exit_control;
> } const vmcs_entry_exit2_pairs[] = {
> + { VM_ENTRY_LOAD_IA32_FRED,
> + SECONDARY_VM_EXIT_SAVE_IA32_FRED | SECONDARY_VM_EXIT_LOAD_IA32_FRED },
> };
>
> memset(vmcs_conf, 0, sizeof(*vmcs_conf));
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h
> index 349d96e68f96..645b0343e88c 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h
> @@ -487,7 +487,8 @@ static inline u8 vmx_get_rvi(void)
> VM_ENTRY_LOAD_BNDCFGS | \
> VM_ENTRY_PT_CONCEAL_PIP | \
> VM_ENTRY_LOAD_IA32_RTIT_CTL | \
> - VM_ENTRY_LOAD_CET_STATE)
> + VM_ENTRY_LOAD_CET_STATE | \
> + VM_ENTRY_LOAD_IA32_FRED)
>
> #define __KVM_REQUIRED_VMX_VM_EXIT_CONTROLS \
> (VM_EXIT_SAVE_DEBUG_CONTROLS | \
> @@ -514,7 +515,9 @@ static inline u8 vmx_get_rvi(void)
> VM_EXIT_ACTIVATE_SECONDARY_CONTROLS)
>
> #define KVM_REQUIRED_VMX_SECONDARY_VM_EXIT_CONTROLS (0)
> -#define KVM_OPTIONAL_VMX_SECONDARY_VM_EXIT_CONTROLS (0)
> +#define KVM_OPTIONAL_VMX_SECONDARY_VM_EXIT_CONTROLS \
> + (SECONDARY_VM_EXIT_SAVE_IA32_FRED | \
> + SECONDARY_VM_EXIT_LOAD_IA32_FRED)
>
> #define KVM_REQUIRED_VMX_PIN_BASED_VM_EXEC_CONTROL \
> (PIN_BASED_EXT_INTR_MASK | \
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-01-20 9:25 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 106+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2025-10-26 20:18 [PATCH v9 00/22] Enable FRED with KVM VMX Xin Li (Intel)
2025-10-26 20:18 ` [PATCH v9 01/22] KVM: VMX: Enable support for secondary VM exit controls Xin Li (Intel)
2025-10-26 20:18 ` [PATCH v9 02/22] KVM: VMX: Initialize VM entry/exit FRED controls in vmcs_config Xin Li (Intel)
2026-01-20 9:24 ` Binbin Wu [this message]
2026-01-22 17:57 ` Xin Li
2025-10-26 20:18 ` [PATCH v9 03/22] KVM: VMX: Disable FRED if FRED consistency checks fail Xin Li (Intel)
2026-03-05 0:25 ` Sean Christopherson
2025-10-26 20:18 ` [PATCH v9 04/22] x86/cea: Prefix event stack names with ESTACK_ Xin Li (Intel)
2025-10-26 20:18 ` [PATCH v9 05/22] x86/cea: Use array indexing to simplify exception stack access Xin Li (Intel)
2025-10-27 15:49 ` Dave Hansen
2025-10-28 2:31 ` Xin Li
2026-01-30 13:42 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-10-26 20:18 ` [PATCH v9 06/22] x86/cea: Export __this_cpu_ist_top_va() to KVM Xin Li (Intel)
2025-10-27 15:50 ` Dave Hansen
2026-01-30 13:46 ` Borislav Petkov
2026-01-30 16:35 ` Xin Li
2026-01-30 17:56 ` Borislav Petkov
2026-03-07 7:38 ` Xin Li
2026-03-09 15:24 ` Sean Christopherson
2026-03-09 22:57 ` Xin Li
2025-10-26 20:18 ` [PATCH v9 07/22] KVM: VMX: Initialize VMCS FRED fields Xin Li (Intel)
2025-11-19 2:44 ` Chao Gao
2026-01-21 6:44 ` Binbin Wu
2026-01-21 18:14 ` Xin Li
2026-01-22 0:45 ` Xin Li
2026-01-22 1:56 ` Binbin Wu
2026-01-22 17:22 ` Xin Li
2026-03-04 16:23 ` Sean Christopherson
2026-03-05 5:27 ` Xin Li
2026-03-05 15:21 ` Sean Christopherson
2026-03-05 17:25 ` Xin Li
2025-10-26 20:18 ` [PATCH v9 08/22] KVM: VMX: Set FRED MSR intercepts Xin Li (Intel)
2025-11-12 5:49 ` Chao Gao
2026-03-05 0:48 ` Sean Christopherson
2026-03-05 5:56 ` Xin Li
2026-03-06 2:30 ` Chao Gao
2026-03-06 15:54 ` Sean Christopherson
2026-01-16 19:49 ` Dave Hansen
2026-01-17 0:43 ` H. Peter Anvin
2025-10-26 20:18 ` [PATCH v9 09/22] KVM: VMX: Save/restore guest FRED RSP0 Xin Li (Intel)
2025-11-12 5:59 ` Chao Gao
2026-01-21 7:23 ` Binbin Wu
2025-10-26 20:18 ` [PATCH v9 10/22] KVM: VMX: Add support for saving and restoring FRED MSRs Xin Li (Intel)
2025-11-12 6:16 ` Chao Gao
2025-12-01 6:20 ` Xin Li
2025-10-26 20:18 ` [PATCH v9 11/22] KVM: x86: Add a helper to detect if FRED is enabled for a vCPU Xin Li (Intel)
2025-11-12 6:19 ` Chao Gao
2026-01-21 8:05 ` Binbin Wu
2026-01-21 16:46 ` Xin Li
2026-01-21 20:24 ` Sean Christopherson
2026-01-21 22:38 ` Xin Li
2025-10-26 20:19 ` [PATCH v9 12/22] KVM: VMX: Virtualize FRED event_data Xin Li (Intel)
2025-11-19 3:24 ` Chao Gao
2026-01-29 17:12 ` Xin Li
2026-01-29 17:21 ` H. Peter Anvin
2026-01-29 22:50 ` Xin Li
2026-03-04 16:42 ` Sean Christopherson
2025-10-26 20:19 ` [PATCH v9 13/22] KVM: VMX: Virtualize FRED nested exception tracking Xin Li (Intel)
2025-11-19 6:54 ` Chao Gao
2026-03-07 2:07 ` Sean Christopherson
2026-03-07 3:05 ` Xin Li
2025-10-26 20:19 ` [PATCH v9 14/22] KVM: x86: Save/restore the nested flag of an exception Xin Li (Intel)
2025-11-19 6:13 ` Chao Gao
2025-10-26 20:19 ` [PATCH v9 15/22] KVM: x86: Mark CR4.FRED as not reserved Xin Li (Intel)
2025-11-19 7:26 ` Chao Gao
2026-03-05 0:58 ` Sean Christopherson
2026-03-05 7:20 ` Xin Li
2026-03-05 15:35 ` Sean Christopherson
2026-03-05 17:09 ` Xin Li
2026-03-05 17:46 ` Xin Li
2026-03-06 5:33 ` Chao Gao
2025-10-26 20:19 ` [PATCH v9 16/22] KVM: VMX: Dump FRED context in dump_vmcs() Xin Li (Intel)
2025-11-19 7:40 ` Chao Gao
2025-11-30 18:42 ` Xin Li
2025-10-26 20:19 ` [PATCH v9 17/22] KVM: x86: Advertise support for FRED Xin Li (Intel)
2025-11-12 7:30 ` Chao Gao
2026-01-20 6:56 ` Xin Li
2026-01-20 8:07 ` Chao Gao
2026-01-20 9:09 ` Xin Li
2026-01-20 9:46 ` Binbin Wu
2026-01-20 15:25 ` Sean Christopherson
2026-01-20 18:04 ` Xin Li
2026-01-20 17:58 ` Xin Li
2025-10-26 20:19 ` [PATCH v9 18/22] KVM: nVMX: Enable support for secondary VM exit controls Xin Li (Intel)
2025-11-12 13:42 ` Chao Gao
2025-10-26 20:19 ` [PATCH v9 19/22] KVM: nVMX: Handle FRED VMCS fields in nested VMX context Xin Li (Intel)
2025-12-02 6:32 ` Chao Gao
2026-01-20 6:30 ` Xin Li
2026-01-20 16:07 ` Dave Hansen
2026-01-20 18:10 ` Xin Li
2026-01-21 0:44 ` Chao Gao
2026-01-22 16:52 ` Xin Li
2025-12-08 22:37 ` Sean Christopherson
2025-10-26 20:19 ` [PATCH v9 20/22] KVM: nVMX: Validate FRED-related VMCS fields Xin Li (Intel)
2025-11-13 3:00 ` Chao Gao
2026-01-20 9:19 ` Xin Li
2026-01-21 2:33 ` Chao Gao
2025-10-26 20:19 ` [PATCH v9 21/22] KVM: nVMX: Guard SHADOW_FIELD_R[OW] macros with VMX feature checks Xin Li (Intel)
2025-12-02 6:35 ` Chao Gao
2025-12-08 22:49 ` Sean Christopherson
2025-10-26 20:19 ` [PATCH v9 22/22] KVM: nVMX: Enable VMX FRED controls Xin Li (Intel)
2025-11-13 3:20 ` Chao Gao
2025-11-06 17:35 ` [PATCH v9 00/22] Enable FRED with KVM VMX Xin Li
2025-11-13 22:20 ` Sean Christopherson
2025-12-08 22:51 ` Sean Christopherson
2025-12-09 17:08 ` Xin Li
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