From: Blaise Boscaccy <bboscaccy@linux.microsoft.com>
To: Alexei Starovoitov <alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com>
Cc: "Jonathan Corbet" <corbet@lwn.net>,
"David Howells" <dhowells@redhat.com>,
"Herbert Xu" <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>,
"David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>,
"Paul Moore" <paul@paul-moore.com>,
"James Morris" <jmorris@namei.org>,
"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>,
"Masahiro Yamada" <masahiroy@kernel.org>,
"Nathan Chancellor" <nathan@kernel.org>,
"Nicolas Schier" <nicolas@fjasle.eu>,
"Shuah Khan" <shuah@kernel.org>,
"Mickaël Salaün" <mic@digikod.net>,
"Günther Noack" <gnoack@google.com>,
"Nick Desaulniers" <nick.desaulniers+lkml@gmail.com>,
"Bill Wendling" <morbo@google.com>,
"Justin Stitt" <justinstitt@google.com>,
"Jarkko Sakkinen" <jarkko@kernel.org>,
"Jan Stancek" <jstancek@redhat.com>,
"Neal Gompa" <neal@gompa.dev>,
"open list:DOCUMENTATION" <linux-doc@vger.kernel.org>,
LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
keyrings@vger.kernel.org,
"Linux Crypto Mailing List" <linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org>,
"LSM List" <linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>,
"Linux Kbuild mailing list" <linux-kbuild@vger.kernel.org>,
"open list:KERNEL SELFTEST FRAMEWORK"
<linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org>, bpf <bpf@vger.kernel.org>,
clang-built-linux <llvm@lists.linux.dev>,
nkapron@google.com, "Matteo Croce" <teknoraver@meta.com>,
"Roberto Sassu" <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>,
"Cong Wang" <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 security-next 1/4] security: Hornet LSM
Date: Wed, 16 Apr 2025 10:31:18 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <87y0w0hv2x.fsf@microsoft.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAADnVQ+LMAnyT4yV5iuJ=vswgtUu97cHKnvysipc6o7HZfEbUA@mail.gmail.com>
Alexei Starovoitov <alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com> writes:
> History repeats itself.
> 1. the problem is hard.
> 2. you're only interested in addressing your own use case.
> There is no end-to-end design here and no attempt to
> think it through how it will work for others.
>
Well, I suppose anything worth doing is going to be hard :)
The end-to-end design for this is the same end-to-end design that exists
for signing kernel modules today. We envisioned it working for others
the same way module signing works for others.
> Hacking into bpf internal objects like maps is not acceptable.
We've heard your concerns about kern_sys_bpf and we agree that the LSM
should not be calling it. The proposal in this email should meet both of
our needs
https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/874iypjl8t.fsf@microsoft.com/
-blaise
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2025-04-16 17:31 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 38+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2025-04-04 21:54 [PATCH v2 security-next 0/4] Introducing Hornet LSM Blaise Boscaccy
2025-04-04 21:54 ` [PATCH v2 security-next 1/4] security: " Blaise Boscaccy
2025-04-06 4:27 ` kernel test robot
2025-04-06 20:42 ` kernel test robot
2025-04-11 19:09 ` Tyler Hicks
2025-04-14 20:11 ` Blaise Boscaccy
2025-04-11 23:16 ` [PATCH v2 " Paul Moore
2025-04-14 20:46 ` Blaise Boscaccy
2025-04-15 1:37 ` Paul Moore
2025-04-12 0:09 ` [PATCH v2 security-next " Alexei Starovoitov
2025-04-12 0:29 ` Matteo Croce
2025-04-12 0:57 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2025-04-12 14:11 ` Blaise Boscaccy
2025-04-12 13:57 ` Blaise Boscaccy
2025-04-14 16:08 ` Paul Moore
2025-04-14 20:56 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2025-04-15 0:32 ` Blaise Boscaccy
2025-04-15 1:38 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2025-04-15 15:45 ` Blaise Boscaccy
2025-04-15 19:08 ` Blaise Boscaccy
2025-04-19 16:21 ` Paul Moore
2025-04-15 21:48 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2025-04-16 17:31 ` Blaise Boscaccy [this message]
2025-04-21 20:12 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2025-04-21 22:03 ` Paul Moore
2025-04-21 23:48 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2025-04-22 2:38 ` Paul Moore
2025-04-23 14:12 ` James Bottomley
2025-04-23 15:10 ` Paul Moore
2025-04-24 23:41 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2025-04-25 14:06 ` James Bottomley
2025-04-25 21:44 ` Blaise Boscaccy
2025-04-19 18:43 ` James Bottomley
2025-04-21 18:52 ` Paul Moore
2025-04-21 19:03 ` James Bottomley
2025-04-04 21:54 ` [PATCH v2 security-next 2/4] hornet: Introduce sign-ebpf Blaise Boscaccy
2025-04-04 21:54 ` [PATCH v2 security-next 3/4] hornet: Add a light skeleton data extractor script Blaise Boscaccy
2025-04-04 21:54 ` [PATCH v2 security-next 4/4] selftests/hornet: Add a selftest for the Hornet LSM Blaise Boscaccy
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