linux-doc.vger.kernel.org archive mirror
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Aaron Lewis <aaronlewis@google.com>
To: Alexander Graf <graf@amazon.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
	Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>,
	Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>,
	Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>,
	Wanpeng Li <wanpengli@tencent.com>,
	Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>, Joerg Roedel <joro@8bytes.org>,
	KarimAllah Raslan <karahmed@amazon.de>,
	Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>,
	kvm list <kvm@vger.kernel.org>,
	linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v6 1/7] KVM: x86: Deflect unknown MSR accesses to user space
Date: Thu, 3 Sep 2020 12:27:13 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAAAPnDFGD8+5KBCLKERrH0hajHEwU9UdEEGqp3RZu3Lws+5rmw@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20200902125935.20646-2-graf@amazon.com>

> +::
> +
> +               /* KVM_EXIT_X86_RDMSR / KVM_EXIT_X86_WRMSR */
> +               struct {
> +                       __u8 error; /* user -> kernel */
> +                       __u8 pad[3];
> +                       __u32 reason; /* kernel -> user */
> +                       __u32 index; /* kernel -> user */
> +                       __u64 data; /* kernel <-> user */
> +               } msr;
> +
> +Used on x86 systems. When the VM capability KVM_CAP_X86_USER_SPACE_MSR is
> +enabled, MSR accesses to registers that would invoke a #GP by KVM kernel code
> +will instead trigger a KVM_EXIT_X86_RDMSR exit for reads and KVM_EXIT_X86_WRMSR
> +exit for writes.
> +
> +The "reason" field specifies why the MSR trap occurred. User space will only
> +receive MSR exit traps when a particular reason was requested during through
> +ENABLE_CAP. Currently valid exit reasons are:
> +
> +       KVM_MSR_EXIT_REASON_INVAL - access to invalid MSRs or reserved bits


Can we also have ENOENT?
        KVM_MSR_EXIT_REASON_ENOENT - Unknown MSR

>
> +
> +For KVM_EXIT_X86_RDMSR, the "index" field tells user space which MSR the guest
> +wants to read. To respond to this request with a successful read, user space
> +writes the respective data into the "data" field and must continue guest
> +execution to ensure the read data is transferred into guest register state.
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
> index 88c593f83b28..4d285bf054fb 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
> @@ -1549,12 +1549,88 @@ int kvm_set_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 index, u64 data)
>  }
>  EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_set_msr);
>
> +static int complete_emulated_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool is_read)
> +{
> +       if (vcpu->run->msr.error) {
> +               kvm_inject_gp(vcpu, 0);

Add return 1. The RIP doesn’t advance when the instruction raises a fault.

>
> +       } else if (is_read) {
> +               kvm_rax_write(vcpu, (u32)vcpu->run->msr.data);
> +               kvm_rdx_write(vcpu, vcpu->run->msr.data >> 32);
> +       }
> +
> +       return kvm_skip_emulated_instruction(vcpu);
> +}
> +
> +static int complete_emulated_rdmsr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
> +{
> +       return complete_emulated_msr(vcpu, true);
> +}
> +
>
>  /* For KVM_EXIT_INTERNAL_ERROR */
>  /* Emulate instruction failed. */
> @@ -412,6 +414,15 @@ struct kvm_run {
>                         __u64 esr_iss;
>                         __u64 fault_ipa;
>                 } arm_nisv;
> +               /* KVM_EXIT_X86_RDMSR / KVM_EXIT_X86_WRMSR */
> +               struct {
> +                       __u8 error; /* user -> kernel */
> +                       __u8 pad[3];

__u8 pad[7] to maintain 8 byte alignment?  unless we can get away with
fewer bits for 'reason' and
get them from 'pad'.

> +#define KVM_MSR_EXIT_REASON_INVAL      (1 << 0)
> +                       __u32 reason; /* kernel -> user */
> +                       __u32 index; /* kernel -> user */
> +                       __u64 data; /* kernel <-> user */
> +               } msr;
>                 /* Fix the size of the union. */
>                 char padding[256];
>         };
> @@ -1031,6 +1042,7 @@ struct kvm_ppc_resize_hpt {
>  #define KVM_CAP_PPC_SECURE_GUEST 181
>  #define KVM_CAP_HALT_POLL 182
>  #define KVM_CAP_ASYNC_PF_INT 183
> +#define KVM_CAP_X86_USER_SPACE_MSR 184
>
>  #ifdef KVM_CAP_IRQ_ROUTING
>
> --
> 2.17.1
>
>
>
>
> Amazon Development Center Germany GmbH
> Krausenstr. 38
> 10117 Berlin
> Geschaeftsfuehrung: Christian Schlaeger, Jonathan Weiss
> Eingetragen am Amtsgericht Charlottenburg unter HRB 149173 B
> Sitz: Berlin
> Ust-ID: DE 289 237 879
>
>
>

  reply	other threads:[~2020-09-03 19:27 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 19+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2020-09-02 12:59 [PATCH v6 0/7] Allow user space to restrict and augment MSR emulation Alexander Graf
2020-09-02 12:59 ` [PATCH v6 1/7] KVM: x86: Deflect unknown MSR accesses to user space Alexander Graf
2020-09-03 19:27   ` Aaron Lewis [this message]
2020-09-16  9:31     ` Alexander Graf
2020-09-16 17:08       ` Sean Christopherson
2020-09-16 19:15         ` Alexander Graf
2020-09-17 19:38       ` Aaron Lewis
2020-09-02 12:59 ` [PATCH v6 2/7] KVM: x86: Add infrastructure for MSR filtering Alexander Graf
2020-09-02 12:59 ` [PATCH v6 3/7] KVM: x86: Prepare MSR bitmaps for userspace tracked MSRs Alexander Graf
2020-09-02 12:59 ` [PATCH v6 4/7] KVM: x86: SVM: Prevent MSR passthrough when MSR access is denied Alexander Graf
2020-09-02 12:59 ` [PATCH v6 5/7] KVM: x86: VMX: " Alexander Graf
2020-09-04  2:18   ` Aaron Lewis
2020-09-16 19:44     ` Alexander Graf
2020-09-16 20:13       ` Aaron Lewis
2020-09-16 20:36         ` Alexander Graf
2020-09-02 12:59 ` [PATCH v6 6/7] KVM: x86: Introduce MSR filtering Alexander Graf
2020-09-02 12:59 ` [PATCH v6 7/7] KVM: selftests: Add test for user space MSR handling Alexander Graf
2020-09-03 19:31   ` Aaron Lewis
  -- strict thread matches above, loose matches on Subject: below --
2020-09-01 20:15 [PATCH v6 0/7] Allow user space to restrict and augment MSR emulation Alexander Graf
2020-09-01 20:15 ` [PATCH v6 1/7] KVM: x86: Deflect unknown MSR accesses to user space Alexander Graf

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=CAAAPnDFGD8+5KBCLKERrH0hajHEwU9UdEEGqp3RZu3Lws+5rmw@mail.gmail.com \
    --to=aaronlewis@google.com \
    --cc=corbet@lwn.net \
    --cc=dan.carpenter@oracle.com \
    --cc=graf@amazon.com \
    --cc=jmattson@google.com \
    --cc=joro@8bytes.org \
    --cc=karahmed@amazon.de \
    --cc=kvm@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-doc@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=pbonzini@redhat.com \
    --cc=sean.j.christopherson@intel.com \
    --cc=vkuznets@redhat.com \
    --cc=wanpengli@tencent.com \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox;
as well as URLs for NNTP newsgroup(s).