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From: "Jarkko Sakkinen" <jarkko@kernel.org>
To: "Jarkko Sakkinen" <jarkko@kernel.org>,
	<ross.philipson@oracle.com>, <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	<x86@kernel.org>, <linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org>,
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Cc: <dpsmith@apertussolutions.com>, <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	<mingo@redhat.com>, <bp@alien8.de>, <hpa@zytor.com>,
	<dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>, <ardb@kernel.org>,
	<mjg59@srcf.ucam.org>, <James.Bottomley@hansenpartnership.com>,
	<peterhuewe@gmx.de>, <jgg@ziepe.ca>, <luto@amacapital.net>,
	<nivedita@alum.mit.edu>, <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>,
	<davem@davemloft.net>, <corbet@lwn.net>, <ebiederm@xmission.com>,
	<dwmw2@infradead.org>, <baolu.lu@linux.intel.com>,
	<kanth.ghatraju@oracle.com>, <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>,
	<trenchboot-devel@googlegroups.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v9 04/19] x86: Secure Launch Resource Table header file
Date: Wed, 05 Jun 2024 03:27:08 +0300	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <D1RNOFV1R1IK.2MSSUT0CAPVMB@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <D1RNKV4JIE5L.1LNG82UAC916M@kernel.org>

On Wed Jun 5, 2024 at 3:22 AM EEST, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> On Wed Jun 5, 2024 at 2:00 AM EEST,  wrote:
> > On 6/4/24 3:36 PM, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> > > On Tue Jun 4, 2024 at 11:31 PM EEST,  wrote:
> > >> On 6/4/24 11:21 AM, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> > >>> On Fri May 31, 2024 at 4:03 AM EEST, Ross Philipson wrote:
> > >>>> Introduce the Secure Launch Resource Table which forms the formal
> > >>>> interface between the pre and post launch code.
> > >>>>
> > >>>> Signed-off-by: Ross Philipson <ross.philipson@oracle.com>
> > >>>
> > >>> If a uarch specific, I'd appreciate Intel SDM reference here so that I
> > >>> can look it up and compare. Like in section granularity.
> > >>
> > >> This table is meant to not be architecture specific though it can
> > >> contain architecture specific sub-entities. E.g. there is a TXT specific
> > >> table and in the future there will be an AMD and ARM one (and hopefully
> > >> some others). I hope that addresses what you are pointing out or maybe I
> > >> don't fully understand what you mean here...
> > > 
> > > At least Intel SDM has a definition of any possible architecture
> > > specific data structure. It is handy to also have this available
> > > in inline comment for any possible such structure pointing out the
> > > section where it is defined.
> >
> > The TXT specific structure is not defined in the SDM or the TXT dev 
> > guide. Part of it is driven by requirements in the TXT dev guide but 
> > that guide does not contain implementation details.
> >
> > That said, if you would like links to relevant documents in the comments 
> > before arch specific structures, I can add them.
>
> Vol. 2D 7-40, in the description of GETSEC[WAKEUP] there is in fact a
> description of MLE JOINT structure at least:
>
> 1. GDT limit (offset 0)
> 2. GDT base (offset 4)
> 3. Segment selector initializer (offset 8)
> 4. EIP (offset 12)
>
> So is this only exercised in protect mode, and not in long mode? Just
> wondering whether I should make a bug report on this for SDM or not.
>
> Especially this puzzles me, given that x86s won't have protected
> mode in the first place...

That raises a relevant question: will this ever work in x86s? SDM does
not really support that it would but it could be also just outdated
information.

I'm neither sure how or will AMD align with x86s.

Just point out a glitch...

BR, Jarkko

  reply	other threads:[~2024-06-05  0:27 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 113+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2024-05-31  1:03 [PATCH v9 00/19] x86: Trenchboot secure dynamic launch Linux kernel support Ross Philipson
2024-05-31  1:03 ` [PATCH v9 01/19] x86/boot: Place kernel_info at a fixed offset Ross Philipson
2024-06-04 18:18   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-06-04 20:28     ` ross.philipson
2024-05-31  1:03 ` [PATCH v9 02/19] Documentation/x86: Secure Launch kernel documentation Ross Philipson
2024-05-31  1:03 ` [PATCH v9 03/19] x86: Secure Launch Kconfig Ross Philipson
2024-05-31  1:03 ` [PATCH v9 04/19] x86: Secure Launch Resource Table header file Ross Philipson
2024-06-04 18:21   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-06-04 20:31     ` ross.philipson
2024-06-04 22:36       ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-06-04 23:00         ` ross.philipson
2024-06-05  0:22           ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-06-05  0:27             ` Jarkko Sakkinen [this message]
2024-06-05  2:33             ` ross.philipson
2024-06-05  4:04               ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-06-05 19:03                 ` ross.philipson
2024-06-06  6:02                   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-06-06 16:49                     ` ross.philipson
2024-06-20  0:18                       ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-06-20 16:55                         ` ross.philipson
2024-05-31  1:03 ` [PATCH v9 05/19] x86: Secure Launch main " Ross Philipson
2024-06-04 18:24   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-06-04 20:52     ` ross.philipson
2024-05-31  1:03 ` [PATCH v9 06/19] x86: Add early SHA-1 support for Secure Launch early measurements Ross Philipson
2024-05-31  2:16   ` Eric Biggers
2024-05-31 13:54     ` Eric W. Biederman
2024-08-15 17:38       ` Daniel P. Smith
2024-08-15 19:10         ` Thomas Gleixner
2024-08-16 10:42           ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-08-16 11:01           ` Andrew Cooper
2024-08-16 11:22             ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-08-16 18:41               ` Matthew Garrett
2024-08-19 18:05                 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-08-19 18:24                   ` Matthew Garrett
2024-08-20 15:26                     ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-08-22 18:29           ` Daniel P. Smith
2024-08-29  3:17           ` Andy Lutomirski
2024-08-29  3:25             ` Matthew Garrett
2024-08-29 17:26               ` Andy Lutomirski
2024-09-05  1:01             ` Daniel P. Smith
2024-09-13  0:34               ` Daniel P. Smith
2024-09-14  3:57                 ` Andy Lutomirski
2024-09-21 18:36                   ` Daniel P. Smith
2024-09-21 22:40                     ` Andy Lutomirski
2024-11-02 14:53                       ` Daniel P. Smith
2024-11-02 16:04                         ` James Bottomley
2024-11-15  1:17                           ` Daniel P. Smith
2024-11-18 18:43                             ` Andy Lutomirski
2024-11-18 18:50                               ` Andy Lutomirski
2024-11-18 19:12                               ` James Bottomley
2024-11-18 20:02                                 ` Andy Lutomirski
2024-11-21 20:11                                   ` ross.philipson
2024-11-21 20:54                                     ` Andy Lutomirski
2024-11-21 22:42                                       ` Andy Lutomirski
2024-11-22 23:37                                         ` ross.philipson
2024-12-12 19:56                                   ` Daniel P. Smith
2024-12-12 22:30                                     ` Andy Lutomirski
2024-12-14  2:56                                       ` Daniel P. Smith
2024-05-31 16:18     ` ross.philipson
2024-08-27 18:14     ` Eric Biggers
2024-08-28 20:14       ` ross.philipson
2024-08-28 23:13         ` Eric Biggers
2024-06-04 18:52   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-06-04 21:02     ` ross.philipson
2024-06-04 22:40       ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-05-31  1:03 ` [PATCH v9 07/19] x86: Add early SHA-256 " Ross Philipson
2024-05-31  1:03 ` [PATCH v9 08/19] x86: Secure Launch kernel early boot stub Ross Philipson
2024-05-31 11:00   ` Ard Biesheuvel
2024-05-31 13:33     ` Ard Biesheuvel
2024-05-31 14:04       ` Ard Biesheuvel
2024-05-31 16:13         ` Ard Biesheuvel
2024-06-04 17:31         ` ross.philipson
2024-06-04 17:24       ` ross.philipson
2024-06-04 17:27         ` Ard Biesheuvel
2024-06-04 17:33           ` ross.philipson
2024-06-04 20:54             ` Ard Biesheuvel
2024-06-04 21:12               ` ross.philipson
2024-06-04 17:14     ` ross.philipson
2024-06-04 19:56   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-06-04 21:09     ` ross.philipson
2024-06-04 22:43       ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-05-31  1:03 ` [PATCH v9 09/19] x86: Secure Launch kernel late " Ross Philipson
2024-06-04 19:58   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-06-04 21:16     ` ross.philipson
2024-06-04 22:45       ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-06-04 19:59   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-06-04 21:17     ` ross.philipson
2024-08-12 19:02     ` ross.philipson
2024-08-15 18:35       ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-05-31  1:03 ` [PATCH v9 10/19] x86: Secure Launch SMP bringup support Ross Philipson
2024-06-04 20:05   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-06-04 21:47     ` ross.philipson
2024-06-04 22:46       ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-05-31  1:03 ` [PATCH v9 11/19] kexec: Secure Launch kexec SEXIT support Ross Philipson
2024-05-31  1:03 ` [PATCH v9 12/19] reboot: Secure Launch SEXIT support on reboot paths Ross Philipson
2024-05-31  1:03 ` [PATCH v9 13/19] tpm: Protect against locality counter underflow Ross Philipson
2024-06-04 20:12   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-08-15 18:52     ` Daniel P. Smith
2024-05-31  1:03 ` [PATCH v9 14/19] tpm: Ensure tpm is in known state at startup Ross Philipson
2024-06-04 20:14   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-08-15 19:24     ` Daniel P. Smith
2024-05-31  1:03 ` [PATCH v9 15/19] tpm: Make locality requests return consistent values Ross Philipson
2024-05-31  1:03 ` [PATCH v9 16/19] tpm: Add ability to set the preferred locality the TPM chip uses Ross Philipson
2024-06-04 20:27   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-06-04 22:14     ` ross.philipson
2024-06-04 22:50       ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-06-04 23:04         ` ross.philipson
2024-05-31  1:03 ` [PATCH v9 17/19] tpm: Add sysfs interface to allow setting and querying the preferred locality Ross Philipson
2024-06-04 20:27   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-05-31  1:03 ` [PATCH v9 18/19] x86: Secure Launch late initcall platform module Ross Philipson
2024-05-31  1:03 ` [PATCH v9 19/19] x86: EFI stub DRTM launch support for Secure Launch Ross Philipson
2024-05-31 11:09   ` Ard Biesheuvel
2024-06-04 17:22     ` ross.philipson

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