From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Received: from smtp.kernel.org (aws-us-west-2-korg-mail-1.web.codeaurora.org [10.30.226.201]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id A7CE517753; Fri, 1 Nov 2024 00:33:35 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=10.30.226.201 ARC-Seal:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1730421215; cv=none; b=KstCablHElQ6mo4dyFNWFlZ3z9tlGXJYk5wiltppXCNaEZyqZmCWsPBcUG1BS5T5K5Zq5r/Axy9zX2abJMf3HWEIcBWwhnAkN87VyrtofeUU88aUvQmS+ZDD+VjqofdP3ezqwTMsQM0qPZl+cnV0V/5MruRDnbe63jMgTuB7qAY= ARC-Message-Signature:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1730421215; c=relaxed/simple; bh=JOqTpgy5T4UYFfRSxeC8Hsvp7K+oY1FR38Cm1XCvAJw=; h=Mime-Version:Content-Type:Date:Message-Id:To:Cc:Subject:From: References:In-Reply-To; b=BUVz1/RN+gOthH3f28jMa6mjKgQfkHhnG5XOfemXKdTuQu5fbHJBRJ4/FLrbNDuYBAzrkc0p8435nu4Ztw9prtM7tUc1hK9LNkE0ojm21oJoN8WbIDSeh5+egx73+6mVKpX5nTIT7LqXWuOKUzxgssc50Q6ceg3bWWyUIVsiIn4= ARC-Authentication-Results:i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.b=tDVdeGoS; arc=none smtp.client-ip=10.30.226.201 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.b="tDVdeGoS" Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id BEC80C4CED4; Fri, 1 Nov 2024 00:33:34 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=k20201202; t=1730421215; bh=JOqTpgy5T4UYFfRSxeC8Hsvp7K+oY1FR38Cm1XCvAJw=; h=Date:To:Cc:Subject:From:References:In-Reply-To:From; b=tDVdeGoShHzHJ4KUpuULtbcdXFySN9uy/gfThoWBusIWDUa0IeYatInt0hkyM5Tzq LouYEGFgfBSs7YLVVjbNDXK5ZYwAjZXxEA1h5tKRMPrn43fIt5SZuDMqJRJvQlMvp7 A9aR3ACyH58sUg0szTxRf1mgBWMn0RPcGMBsD/hVZpa+SuWf0VXva9aEOSMxSN21FY AbU4us6aTzDvpv+c22zTeTKelXaCjrMDHkfeSY5qLViLUCs4M24IsERwqFWkCSlmNs 0KNTrffIhVhY5TaEgY0gKtHrAPqhzmq2vVKG6HPxD6QQeuBmQ8M+FcEozYJMGq+VEy bUhV66CbYt8rQ== Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Date: Fri, 01 Nov 2024 02:33:30 +0200 Message-Id: To: "Thomas Gleixner" , "Ross Philipson" , , , , , , , , Cc: , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , Subject: Re: [PATCH v11 00/20] x86: Trenchboot secure dynamic launch Linux kernel support From: "Jarkko Sakkinen" X-Mailer: aerc 0.18.2 References: <20240913200517.3085794-1-ross.philipson@oracle.com> <87wmhoulb9.ffs@tglx> <87ldy3vpjh.ffs@tglx> In-Reply-To: <87ldy3vpjh.ffs@tglx> On Fri Nov 1, 2024 at 1:08 AM EET, Thomas Gleixner wrote: > On Fri, Nov 01 2024 at 00:37, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote: > > On Thu Oct 31, 2024 at 9:25 PM EET, Thomas Gleixner wrote: > >> So this looks pretty reasonable to me by now and I'm inclined to take = it > >> through the tip x86 tree, but that needs reviewed/acked-by's from the > >> crypto and TPM folks. EFI has been reviewed already. > >> > >> Can we make progress on this please? > > > > So TPM patches do have bunch of glitches: > > > > - 15/20: I don't get this. There is nothing to report unless tree > > is falling. The reported-by tag literally meaningless. Maybe this > > is something that makes sense with this feature. Explain from that > > angle. > > - 16/20: Is this actually a bug fix? If it is should be before 15/20. > > - 17/20: the commit message could do a better job explaining how the > > locality can vary. I'm not sure how this will be used by rest of > > the patch set. > > - 18/20: I'm not confident we want to give privilege to set locality > > to the user space. The commit message neither makes a case of this. > > Has this been tested to together with bus encryption (just checking)? > > Can you please explicitely voice your detailed technical concerns in > replies to the actual patches? - 15/20 looks like a rigged patch. I don't really know why it is done so it is hard to either suggest how "resolve it". - 16/20 probably makes sense but if it is a bug fix or part of it is, the bug fix should have relevant fixes etc tags so that it can be picked up to stable kernels. - 17-18/20: I'd speak about this as the "one whole" i.e. here the privilege to be able change locality during run-time is really concerning. Could the locality be figured out for the kernel command-line instead? The sysfs attribute can exist as read-only. So yeah, the way I see it 15-16 are the more trivial issue to sort out (probably) but with 17-18 we have an actual architectural concern for kernel overall. > Thanks, > > tglx BR, Jarkko