From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
To: Ross Philipson <ross.philipson@oracle.com>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org,
linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org,
linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, kexec@lists.infradead.org,
linux-efi@vger.kernel.org, iommu@lists.linux-foundation.org,
dpsmith@apertussolutions.com, tglx@linutronix.de,
mingo@redhat.com, bp@alien8.de, hpa@zytor.com,
dave.hansen@linux.intel.com, ardb@kernel.org,
mjg59@srcf.ucam.org, James.Bottomley@hansenpartnership.com,
peterhuewe@gmx.de, jgg@ziepe.ca, luto@amacapital.net,
nivedita@alum.mit.edu, herbert@gondor.apana.org.au,
davem@davemloft.net, corbet@lwn.net, ebiederm@xmission.com,
dwmw2@infradead.org, baolu.lu@linux.intel.com,
kanth.ghatraju@oracle.com, andrew.cooper3@citrix.com,
trenchboot-devel@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v12 10/19] x86: Secure Launch kernel late boot stub
Date: Fri, 7 Mar 2025 09:02:41 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <Z8qaEdBD8wZLo-yb@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20241219194216.152839-11-ross.philipson@oracle.com>
On Thu, Dec 19, 2024 at 11:42:07AM -0800, Ross Philipson wrote:
> The routine slaunch_setup is called out of the x86 specific setup_arch()
> routine during early kernel boot. After determining what platform is
> present, various operations specific to that platform occur. This
> includes finalizing setting for the platform late launch and verifying
> that memory protections are in place.
>
> Intel VT-d/IOMMU hardware provides special registers called Protected
> Memory Regions (PMRs) that allow all memory to be protected from
> DMA during a TXT DRTM launch. This coverage is validated during the
Hair cutting again. Check through patch set:
1. D-RTM
2. DRTM
Pick one and use it consistently. Small details like this in the end
make the overall thing less exhausting to read.
BR, Jarkko
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2025-03-07 7:02 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 49+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2024-12-19 19:41 [PATCH v12 00/19] x86: Trenchboot secure dynamic launch Linux kernel support Ross Philipson
2024-12-19 19:41 ` [PATCH v12 01/19] Documentation/x86: Secure Launch kernel documentation Ross Philipson
2025-03-07 5:10 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2025-03-07 5:15 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-12-19 19:41 ` [PATCH v12 02/19] x86: Secure Launch Kconfig Ross Philipson
2024-12-19 19:42 ` [PATCH v12 03/19] x86: Secure Launch Resource Table header file Ross Philipson
2025-03-07 5:32 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2025-03-07 19:22 ` ross.philipson
2025-03-07 19:30 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2025-03-07 19:44 ` ross.philipson
2024-12-19 19:42 ` [PATCH v12 04/19] x86: Secure Launch main " Ross Philipson
2025-03-07 5:34 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2025-03-07 19:25 ` ross.philipson
2025-03-07 19:37 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2025-03-07 19:46 ` ross.philipson
2024-12-19 19:42 ` [PATCH v12 05/19] x86: Add early SHA-1 support for Secure Launch early measurements Ross Philipson
2025-03-07 5:35 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-12-19 19:42 ` [PATCH v12 06/19] x86: Add early SHA-256 " Ross Philipson
2025-03-07 5:36 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-12-19 19:42 ` [PATCH v12 07/19] x86/msr: Add variable MTRR base/mask and x2apic ID registers Ross Philipson
2025-03-07 5:55 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2025-03-07 19:29 ` ross.philipson
2024-12-19 19:42 ` [PATCH v12 08/19] x86/boot: Place TXT MLE header in the kernel_info section Ross Philipson
2025-03-07 6:51 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2025-03-07 19:33 ` ross.philipson
2024-12-19 19:42 ` [PATCH v12 09/19] x86: Secure Launch kernel early boot stub Ross Philipson
2025-03-07 7:00 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2025-03-07 19:42 ` ross.philipson
2024-12-19 19:42 ` [PATCH v12 10/19] x86: Secure Launch kernel late " Ross Philipson
2025-03-07 7:02 ` Jarkko Sakkinen [this message]
2025-03-07 19:43 ` ross.philipson
2024-12-19 19:42 ` [PATCH v12 11/19] x86: Secure Launch SMP bringup support Ross Philipson
2024-12-19 19:42 ` [PATCH v12 12/19] kexec: Secure Launch kexec SEXIT support Ross Philipson
2024-12-19 19:42 ` [PATCH v12 13/19] x86/reboot: Secure Launch SEXIT support on reboot paths Ross Philipson
2024-12-19 19:42 ` [PATCH v12 14/19] tpm, tpm_tis: Close all localities Ross Philipson
2025-03-07 7:05 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-12-19 19:42 ` [PATCH v12 15/19] tpm, tpm_tis: Address positive localities in tpm_tis_request_locality() Ross Philipson
2025-03-07 7:07 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2025-03-07 19:35 ` ross.philipson
2024-12-19 19:42 ` [PATCH v12 16/19] tpm, tpm_tis: Allow locality to be set to a different value Ross Philipson
2025-03-07 7:07 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-12-19 19:42 ` [PATCH v12 17/19] tpm, sysfs: Show locality used by kernel Ross Philipson
2025-03-07 7:09 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2025-03-07 19:39 ` ross.philipson
2024-12-19 19:42 ` [PATCH v12 18/19] x86: Secure Launch late initcall platform module Ross Philipson
2024-12-19 19:42 ` [PATCH v12 19/19] x86/efi: EFI stub DRTM launch support for Secure Launch Ross Philipson
2025-02-18 18:21 ` [PATCH v12 00/19] x86: Trenchboot secure dynamic launch Linux kernel support ross.philipson
2025-02-18 18:31 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2025-02-18 19:39 ` ross.philipson
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