From: Chao Gao <chao.gao@intel.com>
To: Xin Li <xin3.li@intel.com>
Cc: <kvm@vger.kernel.org>, <linux-doc@vger.kernel.org>,
<linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>, <linux-hyperv@vger.kernel.org>,
<linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org>, <seanjc@google.com>,
<pbonzini@redhat.com>, <corbet@lwn.net>, <kys@microsoft.com>,
<haiyangz@microsoft.com>, <wei.liu@kernel.org>,
<decui@microsoft.com>, <tglx@linutronix.de>, <mingo@redhat.com>,
<bp@alien8.de>, <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>, <x86@kernel.org>,
<hpa@zytor.com>, <vkuznets@redhat.com>, <peterz@infradead.org>,
<ravi.v.shankar@intel.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v1 05/23] KVM: VMX: Initialize FRED VM entry/exit controls in vmcs_config
Date: Thu, 9 Nov 2023 16:53:21 +0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <ZUyeATu4Fd2xI0+h@chao-email> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20231108183003.5981-6-xin3.li@intel.com>
On Wed, Nov 08, 2023 at 10:29:45AM -0800, Xin Li wrote:
>Setup the global vmcs_config for FRED:
>1) Add VM_ENTRY_LOAD_IA32_FRED to KVM_OPTIONAL_VMX_VM_ENTRY_CONTROLS to
> have a FRED CPU load guest FRED MSRs from VMCS upon VM entry.
>2) Add SECONDARY_VM_EXIT_SAVE_IA32_FRED to
> KVM_OPTIONAL_VMX_SECONDARY_VM_EXIT_CONTROLS to have a FRED CPU save
> guest FRED MSRs to VMCS during VM exit.
>3) add SECONDARY_VM_EXIT_LOAD_IA32_FRED to
> KVM_OPTIONAL_VMX_SECONDARY_VM_EXIT_CONTROLS to have a FRED CPU load
> host FRED MSRs from VMCS during VM exit.
>
>Also add sanity checks to make sure FRED VM entry/exit controls can be
>set on a FRED CPU.
>
>Tested-by: Shan Kang <shan.kang@intel.com>
>Signed-off-by: Xin Li <xin3.li@intel.com>
>---
> arch/x86/include/asm/vmx.h | 3 +++
> arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c | 19 ++++++++++++++++++-
> arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h | 7 +++++--
> 3 files changed, 26 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
>
>diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/vmx.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/vmx.h
>index 4d4177ec802c..41796a733bc9 100644
>--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/vmx.h
>+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/vmx.h
>@@ -106,6 +106,8 @@
> #define VM_EXIT_PT_CONCEAL_PIP 0x01000000
> #define VM_EXIT_CLEAR_IA32_RTIT_CTL 0x02000000
> #define VM_EXIT_ACTIVATE_SECONDARY_CONTROLS 0x80000000
>+#define SECONDARY_VM_EXIT_SAVE_IA32_FRED 0x00000001
>+#define SECONDARY_VM_EXIT_LOAD_IA32_FRED 0x00000002
>
> #define VM_EXIT_ALWAYSON_WITHOUT_TRUE_MSR 0x00036dff
>
>@@ -119,6 +121,7 @@
> #define VM_ENTRY_LOAD_BNDCFGS 0x00010000
> #define VM_ENTRY_PT_CONCEAL_PIP 0x00020000
> #define VM_ENTRY_LOAD_IA32_RTIT_CTL 0x00040000
>+#define VM_ENTRY_LOAD_IA32_FRED 0x00800000
>
> #define VM_ENTRY_ALWAYSON_WITHOUT_TRUE_MSR 0x000011ff
>
>diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
>index df769207cbe0..9186f41974ab 100644
>--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
>+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
>@@ -2694,10 +2694,27 @@ static int setup_vmcs_config(struct vmcs_config *vmcs_conf,
> _vmexit_control &= ~x_ctrl;
> }
>
>- if (_vmexit_control & VM_EXIT_ACTIVATE_SECONDARY_CONTROLS)
>+ if (_vmexit_control & VM_EXIT_ACTIVATE_SECONDARY_CONTROLS) {
> _secondary_vmexit_control =
> adjust_vmx_controls64(KVM_OPTIONAL_VMX_SECONDARY_VM_EXIT_CONTROLS,
> MSR_IA32_VMX_EXIT_CTLS2);
>+ if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_FRED) &&
>+ !(_secondary_vmexit_control & SECONDARY_VM_EXIT_SAVE_IA32_FRED &&
>+ _secondary_vmexit_control & SECONDARY_VM_EXIT_LOAD_IA32_FRED)) {
>+ pr_warn_once("FRED enabled but no VMX VM-Exit {SAVE,LOAD}_IA32_FRED controls: %llx\n",
>+ _secondary_vmexit_control);
if there is no VM_EXIT_ACTIVATE_SECONDARY_CONTROLS, shouldn't we also emit this
warning?
>+ if (error_on_inconsistent_vmcs_config)
>+ return -EIO;
>+ }
>+ }
>+
>+ if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_FRED) &&
>+ !(_vmentry_control & VM_ENTRY_LOAD_IA32_FRED)) {
>+ pr_warn_once("FRED enabled but no VMX VM-Entry LOAD_IA32_FRED control: %x\n",
>+ _vmentry_control);
Can we just hide FRED from guests like what KVM does for other features which
have similar dependencies? see vmx_set_cpu_caps().
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2023-11-09 8:53 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 70+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2023-11-08 18:29 [PATCH v1 00/23] Enable FRED with KVM VMX Xin Li
2023-11-08 18:29 ` [PATCH v1 01/23] KVM: VMX: Cleanup VMX basic information defines and usages Xin Li
2023-11-08 18:29 ` [PATCH v1 02/23] KVM: VMX: Cleanup VMX misc " Xin Li
2023-11-08 18:29 ` [PATCH v1 03/23] KVM: VMX: Add support for the secondary VM exit controls Xin Li
2023-11-08 18:29 ` [PATCH v1 04/23] KVM: x86: Mark CR4.FRED as not reserved Xin Li
2023-11-08 18:29 ` [PATCH v1 05/23] KVM: VMX: Initialize FRED VM entry/exit controls in vmcs_config Xin Li
2023-11-09 8:53 ` Chao Gao [this message]
2023-11-09 15:15 ` Sean Christopherson
2023-11-10 0:04 ` Li, Xin3
2023-11-10 15:01 ` Sean Christopherson
2023-11-14 4:05 ` Li, Xin3
2023-11-13 17:18 ` Nikolay Borisov
2023-11-15 2:39 ` Li, Xin3
2023-11-08 18:29 ` [PATCH v1 06/23] KVM: VMX: Defer enabling FRED MSRs save/load until after set CPUID Xin Li
2023-11-09 9:15 ` Chao Gao
2023-11-09 23:50 ` Li, Xin3
2023-11-10 0:18 ` Sean Christopherson
2023-11-14 2:50 ` Li, Xin3
2023-11-15 21:47 ` Sean Christopherson
2023-11-08 18:29 ` [PATCH v1 07/23] KVM: VMX: Disable intercepting FRED MSRs Xin Li
2023-11-09 9:21 ` Chao Gao
2023-11-08 18:29 ` [PATCH v1 08/23] KVM: VMX: Initialize VMCS FRED fields Xin Li
2023-11-13 3:04 ` Chao Gao
2023-11-14 6:02 ` Li, Xin3
2023-11-14 6:51 ` Li, Xin3
2023-11-08 18:29 ` [PATCH v1 09/23] KVM: VMX: Switch FRED RSP0 between host and guest Xin Li
2023-11-13 3:47 ` Chao Gao
2023-11-14 5:17 ` Li, Xin3
2023-11-14 7:47 ` Chao Gao
2023-11-15 3:04 ` Li, Xin3
2023-11-08 18:29 ` [PATCH v1 10/23] KVM: VMX: Add support for FRED context save/restore Xin Li
2023-11-13 5:24 ` Chao Gao
2023-11-14 4:48 ` Li, Xin3
2023-11-08 18:29 ` [PATCH v1 11/23] KVM: x86: Add kvm_is_fred_enabled() Xin Li
2023-11-13 7:35 ` Chao Gao
2023-11-14 4:42 ` Li, Xin3
2023-11-14 8:16 ` Chao Gao
2023-11-14 18:57 ` Li, Xin3
2023-11-20 9:04 ` Li, Xin3
2023-11-08 18:29 ` [PATCH v1 12/23] KVM: VMX: Handle FRED event data Xin Li
2023-11-13 10:14 ` Chao Gao
2023-11-14 4:34 ` Li, Xin3
2023-11-14 8:58 ` Chao Gao
2023-11-15 2:52 ` Li, Xin3
2023-11-16 2:39 ` Chao Gao
2023-11-20 8:16 ` Li, Xin3
2023-11-08 18:29 ` [PATCH v1 13/23] KVM: VMX: Handle VMX nested exception for FRED Xin Li
2023-11-14 7:40 ` Chao Gao
2023-11-15 3:03 ` Li, Xin3
2023-12-06 8:37 ` Li, Xin3
2023-12-07 8:42 ` Chao Gao
2023-12-07 10:09 ` Li, Xin3
2023-12-08 1:56 ` Chao Gao
2023-12-08 23:48 ` Li, Xin3
2023-11-08 18:29 ` [PATCH v1 14/23] KVM: VMX: Dump FRED context in dump_vmcs() Xin Li
2023-11-14 14:36 ` Nikolay Borisov
2023-11-15 2:41 ` Li, Xin3
2023-11-08 18:29 ` [PATCH v1 15/23] KVM: nVMX: Add support for the secondary VM exit controls Xin Li
2023-11-09 8:21 ` Jeremi Piotrowski
2023-11-10 0:12 ` Li, Xin3
2023-11-20 15:52 ` Vitaly Kuznetsov
2023-11-20 17:42 ` Li, Xin3
2023-11-08 18:29 ` [PATCH v1 16/23] KVM: nVMX: Add FRED VMCS fields Xin Li
2023-11-08 18:29 ` [PATCH v1 17/23] KVM: nVMX: Add support for VMX FRED controls Xin Li
2023-11-08 18:29 ` [PATCH v1 18/23] KVM: nVMX: Add VMCS FRED states checking Xin Li
2023-11-08 18:29 ` [PATCH v1 19/23] KVM: x86: Allow FRED/LKGS/WRMSRNS to be exposed to guests Xin Li
2023-11-08 18:30 ` [PATCH v1 20/23] KVM: selftests: Add FRED VMCS fields to evmcs Xin Li
2023-11-08 18:30 ` [PATCH v1 21/23] KVM: selftests: Run debug_regs test with FRED enabled Xin Li
2023-11-08 18:30 ` [PATCH v1 22/23] KVM: selftests: Add a new VM guest mode to run user level code Xin Li
2023-11-08 18:30 ` [PATCH v1 23/23] KVM: selftests: Add fred exception tests Xin Li
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