From: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
To: Xin Li <xin3.li@intel.com>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org,
linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org,
pbonzini@redhat.com, corbet@lwn.net, tglx@linutronix.de,
mingo@redhat.com, bp@alien8.de, dave.hansen@linux.intel.com,
x86@kernel.org, hpa@zytor.com, shuah@kernel.org,
vkuznets@redhat.com, peterz@infradead.org,
ravi.v.shankar@intel.com, xin@zytor.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 18/25] KVM: nVMX: Add a prerequisite to SHADOW_FIELD_R[OW] macros
Date: Thu, 13 Jun 2024 11:16:21 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <Zms3dVgcuObZOwRR@google.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20240207172646.3981-19-xin3.li@intel.com>
On Wed, Feb 07, 2024, Xin Li wrote:
> @@ -32,48 +32,48 @@ BUILD_BUG_ON(1)
> */
>
> /* 16-bits */
> -SHADOW_FIELD_RW(GUEST_INTR_STATUS, guest_intr_status)
> -SHADOW_FIELD_RW(GUEST_PML_INDEX, guest_pml_index)
> -SHADOW_FIELD_RW(HOST_FS_SELECTOR, host_fs_selector)
> -SHADOW_FIELD_RW(HOST_GS_SELECTOR, host_gs_selector)
> +SHADOW_FIELD_RW(GUEST_INTR_STATUS, guest_intr_status, cpu_has_vmx_apicv())
> +SHADOW_FIELD_RW(GUEST_PML_INDEX, guest_pml_index, cpu_has_vmx_pml())
> +SHADOW_FIELD_RW(HOST_FS_SELECTOR, host_fs_selector, true)
> +SHADOW_FIELD_RW(HOST_GS_SELECTOR, host_gs_selector, true)
>
> /* 32-bits */
> -SHADOW_FIELD_RO(VM_EXIT_REASON, vm_exit_reason)
> -SHADOW_FIELD_RO(VM_EXIT_INTR_INFO, vm_exit_intr_info)
> -SHADOW_FIELD_RO(VM_EXIT_INSTRUCTION_LEN, vm_exit_instruction_len)
> -SHADOW_FIELD_RO(IDT_VECTORING_INFO_FIELD, idt_vectoring_info_field)
> -SHADOW_FIELD_RO(IDT_VECTORING_ERROR_CODE, idt_vectoring_error_code)
> -SHADOW_FIELD_RO(VM_EXIT_INTR_ERROR_CODE, vm_exit_intr_error_code)
> -SHADOW_FIELD_RO(GUEST_CS_AR_BYTES, guest_cs_ar_bytes)
> -SHADOW_FIELD_RO(GUEST_SS_AR_BYTES, guest_ss_ar_bytes)
> -SHADOW_FIELD_RW(CPU_BASED_VM_EXEC_CONTROL, cpu_based_vm_exec_control)
> -SHADOW_FIELD_RW(PIN_BASED_VM_EXEC_CONTROL, pin_based_vm_exec_control)
> -SHADOW_FIELD_RW(EXCEPTION_BITMAP, exception_bitmap)
> -SHADOW_FIELD_RW(VM_ENTRY_EXCEPTION_ERROR_CODE, vm_entry_exception_error_code)
> -SHADOW_FIELD_RW(VM_ENTRY_INTR_INFO_FIELD, vm_entry_intr_info_field)
> -SHADOW_FIELD_RW(VM_ENTRY_INSTRUCTION_LEN, vm_entry_instruction_len)
> -SHADOW_FIELD_RW(TPR_THRESHOLD, tpr_threshold)
> -SHADOW_FIELD_RW(GUEST_INTERRUPTIBILITY_INFO, guest_interruptibility_info)
> -SHADOW_FIELD_RW(VMX_PREEMPTION_TIMER_VALUE, vmx_preemption_timer_value)
> +SHADOW_FIELD_RO(VM_EXIT_REASON, vm_exit_reason, true)
> +SHADOW_FIELD_RO(VM_EXIT_INTR_INFO, vm_exit_intr_info, true)
> +SHADOW_FIELD_RO(VM_EXIT_INSTRUCTION_LEN, vm_exit_instruction_len, true)
> +SHADOW_FIELD_RO(VM_EXIT_INTR_ERROR_CODE, vm_exit_intr_error_code, true)
> +SHADOW_FIELD_RO(IDT_VECTORING_INFO_FIELD, idt_vectoring_info_field, true)
> +SHADOW_FIELD_RO(IDT_VECTORING_ERROR_CODE, idt_vectoring_error_code, true)
> +SHADOW_FIELD_RO(GUEST_CS_AR_BYTES, guest_cs_ar_bytes, true)
> +SHADOW_FIELD_RO(GUEST_SS_AR_BYTES, guest_ss_ar_bytes, true)
> +SHADOW_FIELD_RW(CPU_BASED_VM_EXEC_CONTROL, cpu_based_vm_exec_control, true)
> +SHADOW_FIELD_RW(PIN_BASED_VM_EXEC_CONTROL, pin_based_vm_exec_control, true)
> +SHADOW_FIELD_RW(EXCEPTION_BITMAP, exception_bitmap, true)
> +SHADOW_FIELD_RW(VM_ENTRY_EXCEPTION_ERROR_CODE, vm_entry_exception_error_code, true)
> +SHADOW_FIELD_RW(VM_ENTRY_INTR_INFO_FIELD, vm_entry_intr_info_field, true)
> +SHADOW_FIELD_RW(VM_ENTRY_INSTRUCTION_LEN, vm_entry_instruction_len, true)
> +SHADOW_FIELD_RW(TPR_THRESHOLD, tpr_threshold, true)
> +SHADOW_FIELD_RW(GUEST_INTERRUPTIBILITY_INFO, guest_interruptibility_info, true)
> +SHADOW_FIELD_RW(VMX_PREEMPTION_TIMER_VALUE, vmx_preemption_timer_value, cpu_has_vmx_preemption_timer())
>
> /* Natural width */
> -SHADOW_FIELD_RO(EXIT_QUALIFICATION, exit_qualification)
> -SHADOW_FIELD_RO(GUEST_LINEAR_ADDRESS, guest_linear_address)
> -SHADOW_FIELD_RW(GUEST_RIP, guest_rip)
> -SHADOW_FIELD_RW(GUEST_RSP, guest_rsp)
> -SHADOW_FIELD_RW(GUEST_CR0, guest_cr0)
> -SHADOW_FIELD_RW(GUEST_CR3, guest_cr3)
> -SHADOW_FIELD_RW(GUEST_CR4, guest_cr4)
> -SHADOW_FIELD_RW(GUEST_RFLAGS, guest_rflags)
> -SHADOW_FIELD_RW(CR0_GUEST_HOST_MASK, cr0_guest_host_mask)
> -SHADOW_FIELD_RW(CR0_READ_SHADOW, cr0_read_shadow)
> -SHADOW_FIELD_RW(CR4_READ_SHADOW, cr4_read_shadow)
> -SHADOW_FIELD_RW(HOST_FS_BASE, host_fs_base)
> -SHADOW_FIELD_RW(HOST_GS_BASE, host_gs_base)
> +SHADOW_FIELD_RO(EXIT_QUALIFICATION, exit_qualification, true)
> +SHADOW_FIELD_RO(GUEST_LINEAR_ADDRESS, guest_linear_address, true)
> +SHADOW_FIELD_RW(GUEST_RIP, guest_rip, true)
> +SHADOW_FIELD_RW(GUEST_RSP, guest_rsp, true)
> +SHADOW_FIELD_RW(GUEST_CR0, guest_cr0, true)
> +SHADOW_FIELD_RW(GUEST_CR3, guest_cr3, true)
> +SHADOW_FIELD_RW(GUEST_CR4, guest_cr4, true)
> +SHADOW_FIELD_RW(GUEST_RFLAGS, guest_rflags, true)
> +SHADOW_FIELD_RW(CR0_GUEST_HOST_MASK, cr0_guest_host_mask, true)
> +SHADOW_FIELD_RW(CR0_READ_SHADOW, cr0_read_shadow, true)
> +SHADOW_FIELD_RW(CR4_READ_SHADOW, cr4_read_shadow, true)
> +SHADOW_FIELD_RW(HOST_FS_BASE, host_fs_base, true)
> +SHADOW_FIELD_RW(HOST_GS_BASE, host_gs_base, true)
>
> /* 64-bit */
> -SHADOW_FIELD_RO(GUEST_PHYSICAL_ADDRESS, guest_physical_address)
> -SHADOW_FIELD_RO(GUEST_PHYSICAL_ADDRESS_HIGH, guest_physical_address)
> +SHADOW_FIELD_RO(GUEST_PHYSICAL_ADDRESS, guest_physical_address, true)
> +SHADOW_FIELD_RO(GUEST_PHYSICAL_ADDRESS_HIGH, guest_physical_address, true)
This is not a net postive for readability or maintability. I don't hate the
idea, it just needs MOAR MACROs :-) E.g. add a layer for the common case where
the field unconditionally exists.
#ifndef __SHADOW_FIELD_RO
#define __SHADOW_FIELD_RO(x, y, c)
#endif
#ifndef __SHADOW_FIELD_RW
#define __SHADOW_FIELD_RW(x, y, c)
#endif
#define SHADOW_FIELD_RO(x, y) __SHADOW_FIELD_RO(x, y, true)
#define SHADOW_FIELD_RW(x, y) __SHADOW_FIELD_RW(x, y, true)
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2024-06-13 18:16 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 96+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2024-02-07 17:26 [PATCH v2 00/25] Enable FRED with KVM VMX Xin Li
2024-02-07 17:26 ` [PATCH v2 01/25] KVM: VMX: Cleanup VMX basic information defines and usages Xin Li
2024-02-07 17:26 ` [PATCH v2 02/25] KVM: VMX: Cleanup VMX misc " Xin Li
2024-02-07 17:26 ` [PATCH v2 03/25] KVM: VMX: Add support for the secondary VM exit controls Xin Li
2024-04-19 10:21 ` Chao Gao
2024-02-07 17:26 ` [PATCH v2 04/25] KVM: x86: Mark CR4.FRED as not reserved Xin Li
2024-04-19 10:22 ` Chao Gao
2024-06-12 21:12 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-06-13 3:27 ` Li, Xin3
2024-02-07 17:26 ` [PATCH v2 05/25] KVM: VMX: Initialize FRED VM entry/exit controls in vmcs_config Xin Li
2024-04-19 10:24 ` Chao Gao
2024-02-07 17:26 ` [PATCH v2 06/25] KVM: VMX: Defer enabling FRED MSRs save/load until after set CPUID Xin Li
2024-04-19 11:02 ` Chao Gao
2024-06-12 21:19 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-06-13 3:31 ` Li, Xin3
2024-02-07 17:26 ` [PATCH v2 07/25] KVM: VMX: Set intercept for FRED MSRs Xin Li
2024-04-19 13:35 ` Chao Gao
2024-04-19 17:06 ` Li, Xin3
2024-06-12 21:32 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-09-05 17:09 ` Xin Li
2024-09-12 20:05 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-09-18 8:35 ` Xin Li
2024-09-25 14:12 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-09-25 22:13 ` Xin Li
2024-09-27 17:48 ` Xin Li
2024-09-30 16:56 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-06-12 21:20 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-02-07 17:26 ` [PATCH v2 08/25] KVM: VMX: Initialize VMCS FRED fields Xin Li
2024-04-19 14:01 ` Chao Gao
2024-04-19 17:02 ` Li, Xin3
2024-06-12 21:41 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-02-07 17:26 ` [PATCH v2 09/25] KVM: VMX: Switch FRED RSP0 between host and guest Xin Li
2024-04-19 14:23 ` Chao Gao
2024-04-19 16:37 ` Li, Xin3
2024-06-12 21:53 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-07-10 15:51 ` Li, Xin3
2024-07-12 15:12 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-07-12 16:15 ` Li, Xin3
2024-07-12 16:27 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-07-12 17:17 ` Li, Xin3
2024-07-12 19:30 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-07-17 17:31 ` Li, Xin3
2024-07-18 13:59 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-07-18 17:44 ` Li, Xin3
2024-07-18 21:04 ` H. Peter Anvin
2024-07-19 15:59 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-07-21 18:09 ` Li, Xin3
2024-02-07 17:26 ` [PATCH v2 10/25] KVM: VMX: Add support for FRED context save/restore Xin Li
2024-04-29 6:31 ` Chao Gao
2024-06-12 22:09 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-02-07 17:26 ` [PATCH v2 11/25] KVM: x86: Add kvm_is_fred_enabled() Xin Li
2024-04-29 8:24 ` Chao Gao
2024-05-11 1:24 ` Li, Xin3
2024-05-11 1:53 ` Chao Gao
2024-06-12 22:13 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-06-13 16:55 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-02-07 17:26 ` [PATCH v2 12/25] KVM: VMX: Handle FRED event data Xin Li
2024-04-30 3:14 ` Chao Gao
2024-05-10 9:36 ` Li, Xin3
2024-05-11 3:03 ` Chao Gao
2024-06-12 23:31 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-06-13 5:29 ` Chao Gao
2024-06-13 17:57 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-06-12 22:52 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-06-13 16:57 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-06-13 18:02 ` Li, Xin3
2024-02-07 17:26 ` [PATCH v2 13/25] KVM: VMX: Handle VMX nested exception for FRED Xin Li
2024-04-30 7:34 ` Chao Gao
2024-06-13 17:01 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-02-07 17:26 ` [PATCH v2 14/25] KVM: VMX: Disable FRED if FRED consistency checks fail Xin Li
2024-04-30 8:21 ` Chao Gao
2024-06-13 18:00 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-02-07 17:26 ` [PATCH v2 15/25] KVM: VMX: Dump FRED context in dump_vmcs() Xin Li
2024-04-30 9:09 ` Chao Gao
2024-06-12 23:55 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-02-07 17:26 ` [PATCH v2 16/25] KVM: VMX: Invoke vmx_set_cpu_caps() before nested setup Xin Li
2024-02-07 17:26 ` [PATCH v2 17/25] KVM: nVMX: Add support for the secondary VM exit controls Xin Li
2024-06-13 18:11 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-02-07 17:26 ` [PATCH v2 18/25] KVM: nVMX: Add a prerequisite to SHADOW_FIELD_R[OW] macros Xin Li
2024-06-13 18:16 ` Sean Christopherson [this message]
2024-02-07 17:26 ` [PATCH v2 19/25] KVM: nVMX: Add FRED VMCS fields Xin Li
2024-06-13 18:29 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-02-07 17:26 ` [PATCH v2 20/25] KVM: nVMX: Add support for VMX FRED controls Xin Li
2024-02-07 17:26 ` [PATCH v2 21/25] KVM: nVMX: Add VMCS FRED states checking Xin Li
2024-02-07 17:26 ` [PATCH v2 22/25] KVM: x86: Allow FRED/LKGS/WRMSRNS to be exposed to guests Xin Li
2024-06-13 18:31 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-02-07 17:26 ` [PATCH v2 23/25] KVM: selftests: Run debug_regs test with FRED enabled Xin Li
2024-02-07 17:26 ` [PATCH v2 24/25] KVM: selftests: Add a new VM guest mode to run user level code Xin Li
2024-02-07 17:26 ` [PATCH v2 25/25] KVM: selftests: Add fred exception tests Xin Li
2024-03-29 20:18 ` Muhammad Usama Anjum
2024-03-29 20:18 ` Muhammad Usama Anjum
2024-04-24 16:08 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-03-27 8:08 ` [PATCH v2 00/25] Enable FRED with KVM VMX Kang, Shan
2024-06-13 18:38 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-06-14 0:52 ` Li, Xin3
2024-04-15 17:58 ` Li, Xin3
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