From: Chao Gao <chao.gao@intel.com>
To: "Xin Li (Intel)" <xin@zytor.com>
Cc: <kvm@vger.kernel.org>, <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
<linux-doc@vger.kernel.org>, <seanjc@google.com>,
<pbonzini@redhat.com>, <corbet@lwn.net>, <tglx@linutronix.de>,
<mingo@redhat.com>, <bp@alien8.de>, <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
<x86@kernel.org>, <hpa@zytor.com>, <luto@kernel.org>,
<peterz@infradead.org>, <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 03/27] KVM: VMX: Add support for the secondary VM exit controls
Date: Mon, 21 Oct 2024 16:28:46 +0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <ZxYQvmc9Ke+PYGkQ@intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20241001050110.3643764-4-xin@zytor.com>
>@@ -2713,21 +2715,43 @@ static int setup_vmcs_config(struct vmcs_config *vmcs_conf,
> &_vmentry_control))
> return -EIO;
>
>- for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(vmcs_entry_exit_pairs); i++) {
>- u32 n_ctrl = vmcs_entry_exit_pairs[i].entry_control;
>- u32 x_ctrl = vmcs_entry_exit_pairs[i].exit_control;
>-
>- if (!(_vmentry_control & n_ctrl) == !(_vmexit_control & x_ctrl))
>+ if (_vmexit_control & VM_EXIT_ACTIVATE_SECONDARY_CONTROLS)
>+ _secondary_vmexit_control =
>+ adjust_vmx_controls64(KVM_OPTIONAL_VMX_SECONDARY_VM_EXIT_CONTROLS,
>+ MSR_IA32_VMX_EXIT_CTLS2);
>+
>+ for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(vmcs_entry_exit_triplets); i++) {
>+ u32 n_ctrl = vmcs_entry_exit_triplets[i].entry_control;
>+ u32 x_ctrl = vmcs_entry_exit_triplets[i].exit_control;
>+ u64 x_ctrl_2 = vmcs_entry_exit_triplets[i].exit_2nd_control;
>+ bool has_n = n_ctrl && ((_vmentry_control & n_ctrl) == n_ctrl);
>+ bool has_x = x_ctrl && ((_vmexit_control & x_ctrl) == x_ctrl);
>+ bool has_x_2 = x_ctrl_2 && ((_secondary_vmexit_control & x_ctrl_2) == x_ctrl_2);
>+
>+ if (x_ctrl_2) {
>+ /* Only activate secondary VM exit control bit should be set */
>+ if ((_vmexit_control & x_ctrl) == VM_EXIT_ACTIVATE_SECONDARY_CONTROLS) {
>+ if (has_n == has_x_2)
>+ continue;
>+ } else {
>+ /* The feature should not be supported in any control */
>+ if (!has_n && !has_x && !has_x_2)
>+ continue;
>+ }
>+ } else if (has_n == has_x) {
> continue;
>+ }
>
>- pr_warn_once("Inconsistent VM-Entry/VM-Exit pair, entry = %x, exit = %x\n",
>- _vmentry_control & n_ctrl, _vmexit_control & x_ctrl);
>+ pr_warn_once("Inconsistent VM-Entry/VM-Exit triplet, entry = %x, exit = %x, secondary_exit = %llx\n",
>+ _vmentry_control & n_ctrl, _vmexit_control & x_ctrl,
>+ _secondary_vmexit_control & x_ctrl_2);
>
> if (error_on_inconsistent_vmcs_config)
> return -EIO;
>
> _vmentry_control &= ~n_ctrl;
> _vmexit_control &= ~x_ctrl;
w/ patch 4, VM_EXIT_ACTIVATE_SECONDARY_CONTROLS is cleared if FRED fails in the
consistent check. this means, all features in the secondary vm-exit controls
are removed. it is overkill.
I prefer to maintain a separate table for the secondary VM-exit controls:
struct {
u32 entry_control;
u64 exit2_control;
} const vmcs_entry_exit2_pairs[] = {
{ VM_ENTRY_LOAD_IA32_FRED, SECONDARY_VM_EXIT_SAVE_IA32_FRED |
SECONDARY_VM_EXIT_LOAD_IA32_FRED},
};
for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(vmcs_entry_exit2_pairs); i++) {
...
}
>+ _secondary_vmexit_control &= ~x_ctrl_2;
> }
>
> rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_VMX_BASIC, basic_msr);
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2024-10-21 8:29 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 81+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2024-10-01 5:00 [PATCH v3 00/27] Enable FRED with KVM VMX Xin Li (Intel)
2024-10-01 5:00 ` [PATCH v3 01/27] KVM: x86: Use a dedicated flow for queueing re-injected exceptions Xin Li (Intel)
2024-10-01 5:00 ` [PATCH v3 02/27] KVM: VMX: Don't modify guest XFD_ERR if CR0.TS=1 Xin Li (Intel)
2024-10-01 5:00 ` [PATCH v3 03/27] KVM: VMX: Add support for the secondary VM exit controls Xin Li (Intel)
2024-10-21 8:28 ` Chao Gao [this message]
2024-10-21 17:03 ` Xin Li
2024-10-22 2:47 ` Chao Gao
2024-10-22 16:30 ` Xin Li
2025-02-25 17:28 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-10-01 5:00 ` [PATCH v3 04/27] KVM: VMX: Initialize FRED VM entry/exit controls in vmcs_config Xin Li (Intel)
2024-10-01 5:00 ` [PATCH v3 05/27] KVM: VMX: Disable FRED if FRED consistency checks fail Xin Li (Intel)
2024-10-22 8:48 ` Chao Gao
2024-10-22 16:21 ` Xin Li
2024-11-26 15:32 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-11-26 18:53 ` Xin Li
2024-11-26 19:04 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-10-01 5:00 ` [PATCH v3 06/27] x86/cea: Export per CPU variable cea_exception_stacks Xin Li (Intel)
2024-10-01 16:12 ` Dave Hansen
2024-10-01 17:51 ` Xin Li
2024-10-01 18:18 ` Dave Hansen
2024-10-01 5:00 ` [PATCH v3 07/27] KVM: VMX: Initialize VMCS FRED fields Xin Li (Intel)
2024-10-22 9:06 ` Chao Gao
2024-10-22 16:18 ` Xin Li
2024-10-01 5:00 ` [PATCH v3 08/27] KVM: x86: Use KVM-governed feature framework to track "FRED enabled" Xin Li (Intel)
2024-10-01 5:00 ` [PATCH v3 09/27] KVM: VMX: Do not use MAX_POSSIBLE_PASSTHROUGH_MSRS in array definition Xin Li (Intel)
2024-11-26 18:02 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-11-26 19:22 ` Xin Li
2024-11-26 20:06 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-11-27 6:46 ` Xin Li
2024-11-27 6:55 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-11-27 7:02 ` Xin Li
2024-11-27 7:10 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-11-27 7:32 ` Xin Li
2024-11-27 7:58 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-10-01 5:00 ` [PATCH v3 10/27] KVM: VMX: Set FRED MSR interception Xin Li (Intel)
2024-11-13 11:31 ` Chao Gao
2024-10-01 5:00 ` [PATCH v3 11/27] KVM: VMX: Save/restore guest FRED RSP0 Xin Li (Intel)
2024-10-01 5:00 ` [PATCH v3 12/27] KVM: VMX: Add support for FRED context save/restore Xin Li (Intel)
2024-10-01 5:00 ` [PATCH v3 13/27] KVM: x86: Add a helper to detect if FRED is enabled for a vCPU Xin Li (Intel)
2024-10-01 5:00 ` [PATCH v3 14/27] KVM: VMX: Pass XFD_ERR as pseudo-payload when injecting #NM Xin Li (Intel)
2024-10-01 5:00 ` [PATCH v3 15/27] KVM: VMX: Virtualize FRED event_data Xin Li (Intel)
2024-10-01 5:00 ` [PATCH v3 16/27] KVM: VMX: Virtualize FRED nested exception tracking Xin Li (Intel)
2024-10-24 6:24 ` Chao Gao
2024-10-25 8:04 ` Xin Li
2024-10-28 6:33 ` Chao Gao
2024-12-05 7:16 ` Xin Li
2024-10-01 5:01 ` [PATCH v3 17/27] KVM: x86: Mark CR4.FRED as not reserved when guest can use FRED Xin Li (Intel)
2024-10-24 7:18 ` Chao Gao
2024-12-12 18:48 ` Xin Li
2024-12-12 19:05 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-12-13 18:43 ` Xin Li
2024-10-01 5:01 ` [PATCH v3 18/27] KVM: VMX: Dump FRED context in dump_vmcs() Xin Li (Intel)
2024-10-24 7:23 ` Chao Gao
2024-10-24 16:50 ` Xin Li
2024-10-01 5:01 ` [PATCH v3 19/27] KVM: x86: Allow FRED/LKGS to be advertised to guests Xin Li (Intel)
2024-10-01 5:01 ` [PATCH v3 20/27] KVM: x86: Allow WRMSRNS " Xin Li (Intel)
2025-02-25 15:41 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-10-01 5:01 ` [PATCH v3 21/27] KVM: VMX: Invoke vmx_set_cpu_caps() before nested setup Xin Li (Intel)
2024-10-24 7:49 ` Chao Gao
2024-10-25 7:34 ` Xin Li
2025-02-25 16:01 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-10-01 5:01 ` [PATCH v3 22/27] KVM: nVMX: Add support for the secondary VM exit controls Xin Li (Intel)
2024-10-01 5:01 ` [PATCH v3 23/27] KVM: nVMX: Add a prerequisite to SHADOW_FIELD_R[OW] macros Xin Li (Intel)
2024-10-01 5:01 ` [PATCH v3 24/27] KVM: nVMX: Add a prerequisite to existence of VMCS fields Xin Li (Intel)
2025-02-25 16:22 ` Sean Christopherson
2025-02-25 16:37 ` Xin Li
2025-02-25 19:32 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-10-01 5:01 ` [PATCH v3 25/27] KVM: nVMX: Add FRED " Xin Li (Intel)
2024-10-24 7:42 ` Chao Gao
2024-10-25 7:25 ` Xin Li
2024-10-28 9:07 ` Chao Gao
2024-10-28 18:27 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-10-29 17:40 ` Xin Li
2024-10-01 5:01 ` [PATCH v3 26/27] KVM: nVMX: Add VMCS FRED states checking Xin Li (Intel)
2024-10-01 5:01 ` [PATCH v3 27/27] KVM: nVMX: Allow VMX FRED controls Xin Li (Intel)
2025-02-19 0:26 ` [PATCH v3 00/27] Enable FRED with KVM VMX Xin Li
2025-02-25 15:24 ` Sean Christopherson
2025-02-25 17:04 ` Xin Li
2025-02-25 17:35 ` Sean Christopherson
2025-02-25 18:48 ` Xin Li
2025-02-28 17:06 ` Sean Christopherson
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