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From: Chao Gao <chao.gao@intel.com>
To: Xin Li <xin@zytor.com>
Cc: <kvm@vger.kernel.org>, <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	<linux-doc@vger.kernel.org>, <seanjc@google.com>,
	<pbonzini@redhat.com>, <corbet@lwn.net>, <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	<mingo@redhat.com>, <bp@alien8.de>, <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
	<x86@kernel.org>, <hpa@zytor.com>, <luto@kernel.org>,
	<peterz@infradead.org>, <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 03/27] KVM: VMX: Add support for the secondary VM exit controls
Date: Tue, 22 Oct 2024 10:47:26 +0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <ZxcSPpuBHO8Y1jfG@intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <10aa42de-a448-40d4-a874-514c9deb56a3@zytor.com>

On Mon, Oct 21, 2024 at 10:03:45AM -0700, Xin Li wrote:
>On 10/21/2024 1:28 AM, Chao Gao wrote:
>> > +	for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(vmcs_entry_exit_triplets); i++) {
>> > +		u32 n_ctrl = vmcs_entry_exit_triplets[i].entry_control;
>> > +		u32 x_ctrl = vmcs_entry_exit_triplets[i].exit_control;
>> > +		u64 x_ctrl_2 = vmcs_entry_exit_triplets[i].exit_2nd_control;
>> > +		bool has_n = n_ctrl && ((_vmentry_control & n_ctrl) == n_ctrl);
>> > +		bool has_x = x_ctrl && ((_vmexit_control & x_ctrl) == x_ctrl);
>> > +		bool has_x_2 = x_ctrl_2 && ((_secondary_vmexit_control & x_ctrl_2) == x_ctrl_2);
>> > +
>> > +		if (x_ctrl_2) {
>> > +			/* Only activate secondary VM exit control bit should be set */
>> > +			if ((_vmexit_control & x_ctrl) == VM_EXIT_ACTIVATE_SECONDARY_CONTROLS) {
>> > +				if (has_n == has_x_2)
>> > +					continue;
>> > +			} else {
>> > +				/* The feature should not be supported in any control */
>> > +				if (!has_n && !has_x && !has_x_2)
>> > +					continue;
>> > +			}
>> > +		} else if (has_n == has_x) {
>> > 			continue;
>> > +		}
>> > 
>> > -		pr_warn_once("Inconsistent VM-Entry/VM-Exit pair, entry = %x, exit = %x\n",
>> > -			     _vmentry_control & n_ctrl, _vmexit_control & x_ctrl);
>> > +		pr_warn_once("Inconsistent VM-Entry/VM-Exit triplet, entry = %x, exit = %x, secondary_exit = %llx\n",
>> > +			     _vmentry_control & n_ctrl, _vmexit_control & x_ctrl,
>> > +			     _secondary_vmexit_control & x_ctrl_2);
>> > 
>> > 		if (error_on_inconsistent_vmcs_config)
>> > 			return -EIO;
>> > 
>> > 		_vmentry_control &= ~n_ctrl;
>> > 		_vmexit_control &= ~x_ctrl;
>> 
>> w/ patch 4, VM_EXIT_ACTIVATE_SECONDARY_CONTROLS is cleared if FRED fails in the
>> consistent check. this means, all features in the secondary vm-exit controls
>> are removed. it is overkill.
>
>Good catch!
>
>> 
>> I prefer to maintain a separate table for the secondary VM-exit controls:
>> 
>>   	struct {
>>   		u32 entry_control;
>>   		u64 exit2_control;
>> 	} const vmcs_entry_exit2_pairs[] = {
>> 		{ VM_ENTRY_LOAD_IA32_FRED, SECONDARY_VM_EXIT_SAVE_IA32_FRED |
>> 					   SECONDARY_VM_EXIT_LOAD_IA32_FRED},
>> 	};
>> 
>> 	for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(vmcs_entry_exit2_pairs); i++) {
>> 	...
>> 	}
>
>Hmm, I prefer one table, as it's more straight forward.

One table is fine if we can fix the issue and improve readability. The three
nested if() statements hurts readability.

I just thought using two tables would eliminate the need for any if() statements.

  reply	other threads:[~2024-10-22  2:47 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 81+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2024-10-01  5:00 [PATCH v3 00/27] Enable FRED with KVM VMX Xin Li (Intel)
2024-10-01  5:00 ` [PATCH v3 01/27] KVM: x86: Use a dedicated flow for queueing re-injected exceptions Xin Li (Intel)
2024-10-01  5:00 ` [PATCH v3 02/27] KVM: VMX: Don't modify guest XFD_ERR if CR0.TS=1 Xin Li (Intel)
2024-10-01  5:00 ` [PATCH v3 03/27] KVM: VMX: Add support for the secondary VM exit controls Xin Li (Intel)
2024-10-21  8:28   ` Chao Gao
2024-10-21 17:03     ` Xin Li
2024-10-22  2:47       ` Chao Gao [this message]
2024-10-22 16:30         ` Xin Li
2025-02-25 17:28           ` Sean Christopherson
2024-10-01  5:00 ` [PATCH v3 04/27] KVM: VMX: Initialize FRED VM entry/exit controls in vmcs_config Xin Li (Intel)
2024-10-01  5:00 ` [PATCH v3 05/27] KVM: VMX: Disable FRED if FRED consistency checks fail Xin Li (Intel)
2024-10-22  8:48   ` Chao Gao
2024-10-22 16:21     ` Xin Li
2024-11-26 15:32   ` Borislav Petkov
2024-11-26 18:53     ` Xin Li
2024-11-26 19:04       ` Borislav Petkov
2024-10-01  5:00 ` [PATCH v3 06/27] x86/cea: Export per CPU variable cea_exception_stacks Xin Li (Intel)
2024-10-01 16:12   ` Dave Hansen
2024-10-01 17:51     ` Xin Li
2024-10-01 18:18       ` Dave Hansen
2024-10-01  5:00 ` [PATCH v3 07/27] KVM: VMX: Initialize VMCS FRED fields Xin Li (Intel)
2024-10-22  9:06   ` Chao Gao
2024-10-22 16:18     ` Xin Li
2024-10-01  5:00 ` [PATCH v3 08/27] KVM: x86: Use KVM-governed feature framework to track "FRED enabled" Xin Li (Intel)
2024-10-01  5:00 ` [PATCH v3 09/27] KVM: VMX: Do not use MAX_POSSIBLE_PASSTHROUGH_MSRS in array definition Xin Li (Intel)
2024-11-26 18:02   ` Borislav Petkov
2024-11-26 19:22     ` Xin Li
2024-11-26 20:06       ` Borislav Petkov
2024-11-27  6:46         ` Xin Li
2024-11-27  6:55           ` Borislav Petkov
2024-11-27  7:02             ` Xin Li
2024-11-27  7:10               ` Borislav Petkov
2024-11-27  7:32                 ` Xin Li
2024-11-27  7:58                   ` Borislav Petkov
2024-10-01  5:00 ` [PATCH v3 10/27] KVM: VMX: Set FRED MSR interception Xin Li (Intel)
2024-11-13 11:31   ` Chao Gao
2024-10-01  5:00 ` [PATCH v3 11/27] KVM: VMX: Save/restore guest FRED RSP0 Xin Li (Intel)
2024-10-01  5:00 ` [PATCH v3 12/27] KVM: VMX: Add support for FRED context save/restore Xin Li (Intel)
2024-10-01  5:00 ` [PATCH v3 13/27] KVM: x86: Add a helper to detect if FRED is enabled for a vCPU Xin Li (Intel)
2024-10-01  5:00 ` [PATCH v3 14/27] KVM: VMX: Pass XFD_ERR as pseudo-payload when injecting #NM Xin Li (Intel)
2024-10-01  5:00 ` [PATCH v3 15/27] KVM: VMX: Virtualize FRED event_data Xin Li (Intel)
2024-10-01  5:00 ` [PATCH v3 16/27] KVM: VMX: Virtualize FRED nested exception tracking Xin Li (Intel)
2024-10-24  6:24   ` Chao Gao
2024-10-25  8:04     ` Xin Li
2024-10-28  6:33       ` Chao Gao
2024-12-05  7:16         ` Xin Li
2024-10-01  5:01 ` [PATCH v3 17/27] KVM: x86: Mark CR4.FRED as not reserved when guest can use FRED Xin Li (Intel)
2024-10-24  7:18   ` Chao Gao
2024-12-12 18:48     ` Xin Li
2024-12-12 19:05       ` Sean Christopherson
2024-12-13 18:43         ` Xin Li
2024-10-01  5:01 ` [PATCH v3 18/27] KVM: VMX: Dump FRED context in dump_vmcs() Xin Li (Intel)
2024-10-24  7:23   ` Chao Gao
2024-10-24 16:50     ` Xin Li
2024-10-01  5:01 ` [PATCH v3 19/27] KVM: x86: Allow FRED/LKGS to be advertised to guests Xin Li (Intel)
2024-10-01  5:01 ` [PATCH v3 20/27] KVM: x86: Allow WRMSRNS " Xin Li (Intel)
2025-02-25 15:41   ` Sean Christopherson
2024-10-01  5:01 ` [PATCH v3 21/27] KVM: VMX: Invoke vmx_set_cpu_caps() before nested setup Xin Li (Intel)
2024-10-24  7:49   ` Chao Gao
2024-10-25  7:34     ` Xin Li
2025-02-25 16:01       ` Sean Christopherson
2024-10-01  5:01 ` [PATCH v3 22/27] KVM: nVMX: Add support for the secondary VM exit controls Xin Li (Intel)
2024-10-01  5:01 ` [PATCH v3 23/27] KVM: nVMX: Add a prerequisite to SHADOW_FIELD_R[OW] macros Xin Li (Intel)
2024-10-01  5:01 ` [PATCH v3 24/27] KVM: nVMX: Add a prerequisite to existence of VMCS fields Xin Li (Intel)
2025-02-25 16:22   ` Sean Christopherson
2025-02-25 16:37     ` Xin Li
2025-02-25 19:32       ` Sean Christopherson
2024-10-01  5:01 ` [PATCH v3 25/27] KVM: nVMX: Add FRED " Xin Li (Intel)
2024-10-24  7:42   ` Chao Gao
2024-10-25  7:25     ` Xin Li
2024-10-28  9:07       ` Chao Gao
2024-10-28 18:27         ` Sean Christopherson
2024-10-29 17:40           ` Xin Li
2024-10-01  5:01 ` [PATCH v3 26/27] KVM: nVMX: Add VMCS FRED states checking Xin Li (Intel)
2024-10-01  5:01 ` [PATCH v3 27/27] KVM: nVMX: Allow VMX FRED controls Xin Li (Intel)
2025-02-19  0:26 ` [PATCH v3 00/27] Enable FRED with KVM VMX Xin Li
2025-02-25 15:24   ` Sean Christopherson
2025-02-25 17:04     ` Xin Li
2025-02-25 17:35       ` Sean Christopherson
2025-02-25 18:48         ` Xin Li
2025-02-28 17:06 ` Sean Christopherson

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