From: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
To: "Xin Li (Intel)" <xin@zytor.com>
Cc: pbonzini@redhat.com, kvm@vger.kernel.org,
linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
corbet@lwn.net, tglx@linutronix.de, mingo@redhat.com,
bp@alien8.de, dave.hansen@linux.intel.com, x86@kernel.org,
hpa@zytor.com, andrew.cooper3@citrix.com, luto@kernel.org,
peterz@infradead.org, chao.gao@intel.com, xin3.li@intel.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v4 06/19] KVM: VMX: Set FRED MSR interception
Date: Tue, 24 Jun 2025 08:27:52 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <aFrD-Pn9cmHcVxWs@google.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20250328171205.2029296-7-xin@zytor.com>
On Fri, Mar 28, 2025, Xin Li (Intel) wrote:
> @@ -7935,6 +7945,34 @@ static void update_intel_pt_cfg(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
> vmx->pt_desc.ctl_bitmask &= ~(0xfULL << (32 + i * 4));
> }
>
> +static void vmx_set_intercept_for_fred_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
> +{
This function should short-circult on
if (!kvm_cpu_cap_has(X86_FEATURE_FRED))
return;
Functionally, it shouldn't matter. It's mostly for documentation purposes, and
to avoid doing unnecessary work.
> + bool flag = !guest_cpu_cap_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_FRED);
"flag" is unnecessarily ambiguous (eww, I see that the exiting PT code does that).
I like "set", as it has (hopefully) obvious polarity, and aligns with the function
being called.
> +
> + vmx_set_intercept_for_msr(vcpu, MSR_IA32_FRED_RSP1, MSR_TYPE_RW, flag);
> + vmx_set_intercept_for_msr(vcpu, MSR_IA32_FRED_RSP2, MSR_TYPE_RW, flag);
> + vmx_set_intercept_for_msr(vcpu, MSR_IA32_FRED_RSP3, MSR_TYPE_RW, flag);
> + vmx_set_intercept_for_msr(vcpu, MSR_IA32_FRED_STKLVLS, MSR_TYPE_RW, flag);
> + vmx_set_intercept_for_msr(vcpu, MSR_IA32_FRED_SSP1, MSR_TYPE_RW, flag);
> + vmx_set_intercept_for_msr(vcpu, MSR_IA32_FRED_SSP2, MSR_TYPE_RW, flag);
> + vmx_set_intercept_for_msr(vcpu, MSR_IA32_FRED_SSP3, MSR_TYPE_RW, flag);
> + vmx_set_intercept_for_msr(vcpu, MSR_IA32_FRED_CONFIG, MSR_TYPE_RW, flag);
> +
> + /*
> + * IA32_FRED_RSP0 and IA32_PL0_SSP (a.k.a. IA32_FRED_SSP0) are only used
> + * for delivering events when running userspace, while KVM always runs in
> + * kernel mode (the CPL is always 0 after any VM exit), thus KVM can run
> + * safely with guest IA32_FRED_RSP0 and IA32_PL0_SSP.
> + *
> + * As a result, no need to intercept IA32_FRED_RSP0 and IA32_PL0_SSP.
> + *
> + * Note, save and restore of IA32_PL0_SSP belong to CET supervisor context
> + * management no matter whether FRED is enabled or not. So leave its
> + * state management to CET code.
> + */
> + vmx_set_intercept_for_msr(vcpu, MSR_IA32_FRED_RSP0, MSR_TYPE_RW, flag);
> +}
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2025-06-24 15:27 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 44+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2025-03-28 17:11 [PATCH v4 00/19] Enable FRED with KVM VMX Xin Li (Intel)
2025-03-28 17:11 ` [PATCH v4 01/19] KVM: VMX: Add support for the secondary VM exit controls Xin Li (Intel)
2025-03-28 17:11 ` [PATCH v4 02/19] KVM: VMX: Initialize VM entry/exit FRED controls in vmcs_config Xin Li (Intel)
2025-04-14 7:41 ` Chao Gao
2025-04-14 16:53 ` Xin Li
2025-03-28 17:11 ` [PATCH v4 03/19] KVM: VMX: Disable FRED if FRED consistency checks fail Xin Li (Intel)
2025-06-24 15:20 ` Sean Christopherson
2025-03-28 17:11 ` [PATCH v4 04/19] x86/cea: Export per CPU array 'cea_exception_stacks' for KVM to use Xin Li (Intel)
2025-04-10 8:53 ` Christoph Hellwig
2025-04-10 14:18 ` Dave Hansen
2025-04-11 16:16 ` Xin Li
2025-03-28 17:11 ` [PATCH v4 05/19] KVM: VMX: Initialize VMCS FRED fields Xin Li (Intel)
2025-03-28 17:11 ` [PATCH v4 06/19] KVM: VMX: Set FRED MSR interception Xin Li (Intel)
2025-06-24 15:27 ` Sean Christopherson [this message]
2025-03-28 17:11 ` [PATCH v4 07/19] KVM: VMX: Save/restore guest FRED RSP0 Xin Li (Intel)
2025-06-24 15:44 ` Sean Christopherson
2025-03-28 17:11 ` [PATCH v4 08/19] KVM: VMX: Add support for FRED context save/restore Xin Li (Intel)
2025-06-24 16:27 ` Sean Christopherson
2025-06-25 17:18 ` Xin Li
2025-06-26 17:22 ` Xin Li
2025-06-26 20:50 ` Sean Christopherson
2025-03-28 17:11 ` [PATCH v4 09/19] KVM: x86: Add a helper to detect if FRED is enabled for a vCPU Xin Li (Intel)
2025-03-28 17:11 ` [PATCH v4 10/19] KVM: VMX: Virtualize FRED event_data Xin Li (Intel)
2025-03-28 17:11 ` [PATCH v4 11/19] KVM: VMX: Virtualize FRED nested exception tracking Xin Li (Intel)
2025-03-28 17:11 ` [PATCH v4 12/19] KVM: x86: Save/restore the nested flag of an exception Xin Li (Intel)
2025-03-28 17:11 ` [PATCH v4 13/19] KVM: x86: Mark CR4.FRED as not reserved Xin Li (Intel)
2025-03-28 17:12 ` [PATCH v4 14/19] KVM: VMX: Dump FRED context in dump_vmcs() Xin Li (Intel)
2025-06-24 16:32 ` Sean Christopherson
2025-06-25 17:38 ` Xin Li
2025-03-28 17:12 ` [PATCH v4 15/19] KVM: x86: Allow FRED/LKGS to be advertised to guests Xin Li (Intel)
2025-06-24 16:38 ` Sean Christopherson
2025-06-25 18:05 ` Xin Li
2025-06-25 18:29 ` Sean Christopherson
2025-03-28 17:12 ` [PATCH v4 16/19] KVM: nVMX: Add support for the secondary VM exit controls Xin Li (Intel)
2025-06-24 16:54 ` Sean Christopherson
2025-03-28 17:12 ` [PATCH v4 17/19] KVM: nVMX: Add FRED VMCS fields to nested VMX context management Xin Li (Intel)
2025-03-28 17:12 ` [PATCH v4 18/19] KVM: nVMX: Add VMCS FRED states checking Xin Li (Intel)
2025-03-28 17:12 ` [PATCH v4 19/19] KVM: nVMX: Allow VMX FRED controls Xin Li (Intel)
2025-03-28 17:25 ` [PATCH v4 00/19] Enable FRED with KVM VMX Xin Li
2025-06-24 17:06 ` Sean Christopherson
2025-06-24 17:43 ` Xin Li
2025-06-24 17:47 ` H. Peter Anvin
2025-06-24 18:02 ` Xin Li
2025-06-24 18:40 ` H. Peter Anvin
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