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From: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
To: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Cc: Song Liu <song@kernel.org>,
	corbet@lwn.net, akpm@linux-foundation.org,
	skhan@linuxfoundation.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org,
	gregkh@linuxfoundation.org,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] killswitch: add per-function short-circuit mitigation primitive
Date: Mon, 18 May 2026 20:31:19 -0400	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <aguvV8QCxK28ZHct@laps> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAHC9VhS1DJNs9gDB6gD9WKhL08giSVajBskZ+=mY0AWRCAsw7Q@mail.gmail.com>

On Mon, May 18, 2026 at 05:29:32PM -0400, Paul Moore wrote:
>From my perspective there are two different issues here: should
>killswitch be a LSM, and should killswitch leverage kprobes to be able
>to "kill" security related symbols.  After all, are we okay with
>killswitch killing capable() and friends?

killswitch doesn't do it on it's own. It may be instructed by root to do that,
at which point that is root's problem.

>In my opinion, making killswitch an LSM is more of a procedural item
>that deals with how we view a capability like killswitch.  I
>personally view killswitch as somewhat similar to Lockdown, which is
>why I made the suggestion.

Maybe I'm not all that familiar with LSMs, but we would need to be able to stop
"random" code paths from executing, and I don't think we can create LSM hooks
at that granularity, no?

>The use of kprobes, while an interesting idea, presents problems as
>allowing any kernel symbol to be killed introduces the potential for
>security regressions.  As a reminder, some LSMs, as well as other
>kernel subsystems, have mechanisms in place to restrict root and/or
>enforce one-way configuration locks; while many people equate "root"
>with full control, in many cases today that is not strictly correct.

killswitch "complies" with lockdown. Is there a different scenario which we
should be blocking?

>Yes, kprobes have been around for some time, this is not a new
>problem, but killswitch makes it far more convenient and accessible to
>do dangerous things with kprobes.  If killswitch makes it past the RFC
>stage without any significant changes to its kill mechanism, we may
>need to start considering more liberal usage of NOKPROBE_SYMBOL()
>which I think would be an unfortunate casualty.

Why? If I don't really mind the security impact, I want to be able to have a
killswitch-like interface on my systems. If an attacker is in my systems,
killswitch is the least of my concerns I think.

If you are security concious, just don't enable CONFIG_KILLSWITCH?

-- 
Thanks,
Sasha

  parent reply	other threads:[~2026-05-19  0:31 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 48+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-05-07  7:05 [PATCH] killswitch: add per-function short-circuit mitigation primitive Sasha Levin
2026-05-07 10:47 ` Greg KH
2026-05-07 13:40   ` Sasha Levin
2026-05-07 16:23     ` Greg KH
2026-05-07 15:21 ` Jonathan Corbet
2026-05-08 13:44   ` Sasha Levin
2026-05-08 15:40 ` Joshua Peisach
2026-05-08 15:48   ` Mathieu Desnoyers
2026-05-08 16:13     ` Sasha Levin
2026-05-08 16:18       ` Mathieu Desnoyers
2026-05-08 16:23         ` Sasha Levin
2026-05-08 16:26           ` Mathieu Desnoyers
2026-05-08 16:54             ` Sasha Levin
2026-05-08 20:56 ` Andrew Morton
2026-05-08 21:47   ` Sasha Levin
2026-05-08 23:49     ` Andrew Morton
2026-05-09  0:15       ` Sasha Levin
2026-05-09  0:36         ` Andrew Morton
2026-05-11 11:41     ` Breno Leitao
2026-05-11 13:07       ` Michal Hocko
2026-05-11 13:39         ` Sasha Levin
2026-05-11 13:49           ` Michal Hocko
2026-05-11 13:56             ` Sasha Levin
2026-05-11 14:25               ` Michal Hocko
2026-05-11 15:55                 ` Sasha Levin
2026-05-11 16:10                   ` Michal Hocko
2026-05-11 16:45                     ` Sasha Levin
2026-05-11 17:10                       ` Michal Hocko
2026-05-11 18:09                         ` Sasha Levin
2026-05-14 14:35                           ` Jiri Olsa
2026-05-11 13:40         ` Breno Leitao
2026-05-11 22:31         ` Andrew Morton
2026-05-11 23:01           ` Song Liu
2026-05-11 23:05           ` Sasha Levin
2026-05-15  3:48 ` Paul Moore
2026-05-18  6:31   ` Song Liu
2026-05-18 21:29     ` Paul Moore
2026-05-18 23:22       ` Song Liu
2026-05-18 23:57         ` Paul Moore
2026-05-19  0:01           ` Song Liu
2026-05-19  2:55             ` Paul Moore
2026-05-19  0:21           ` Sasha Levin
2026-05-19  0:31       ` Sasha Levin [this message]
2026-05-19  3:08         ` Paul Moore
2026-05-19 20:00           ` Sasha Levin
2026-05-19 20:50             ` Paul Moore
2026-05-19  5:29         ` Song Liu
2026-05-19 20:33           ` Paul Moore

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