From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.remote-ip=100.103.45.18 ARC-Seal: i=1; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc20261015; a=rsa-sha256; cv=none; t=1795031672; b=hMNGbPb60fVXE0OERe4R5FHEtrtPxDSSD0t8YSkaT5+62MSDvKGRL7lRcNRdStL9/W5c WKvjq0zQT2WqGi9gIc4Wx+FvOLKyy228SjYK2Cb5IS4EiKrRqq7VUtrzvfsbvQ92EEVtG k2eBC+9fwLKkvvb6jBAbVLJJrEUL4varDNzQazZ+RqUTLHJtkPLE0hbR9uD2ZS+qEBZHa 0YWVafrrpeh0yu+GGLNRaoYD9wiSmB9W+NyfenJycSupjzqW8H16LsvGvjzt2hDT2tSfD 612uNEpe6xbqQxsX0DF14Ew9PSzUUu7ORI5G0hbzzleda3+nuPmK/lgFVZNOQjyUoew== ARC-Message-Signature: i=1; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc20261015; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; t=1795031672; h=Received:DKIM-Signature:Date:From:To:Cc:Subject:Message-ID: References:MIME-Version:Content-Type:Content-Disposition:In-Reply-To; bh=dOMAgC0XvS4nP90YCQcBU0h+fNv/5Kz+lJp/v4CzlRY=; b=fKdO95ICercP4AkvPOQUL6U3pxdrGy9RTczD1uWNP8o1u92yPMPYdhrsCDJNYLBpQujs ynRDYujeM1fYPWC4z9k33uNqidZpvAgsVvEbwVmR9HAV9oU+MPwBUSgnP1aLfrXok4qN0 a8fFsVfM4P0yISN/5Zw2A8MzXsfYpcHKgbSyBIKe98l/YafDv2JtMrOt9y9dBRhK8jYs8 3ZZUJhhTyqYiq70dC0H8f38fDWnMvObF6gyTAfdizX/zHISlXqVM/Neuo8cAlYQUi7RIs K1nsIIaSe530F7wVFAp1btO2LgU5PzUZgewn3ON+1m/YjoIli9DNPYMiX4dY9MihLEg== ARC-Authentication-Results: i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.a=rsa-sha256 header.s=k20260515 header.b=eHGDS24t; arc=none smtp.remote-ip=100.103.45.18 Received: from smtp.kernel.org (quasi.space.kernel.org [100.103.45.18]) (using TLSv1.3 with cipher TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (256/256 bits) key-exchange X25519 server-signature ECDSA (prime256v1)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with UTF8SMTPS id 3A9CE606A32A; Wed, 18 Nov 2026 19:54:32 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.a=rsa-sha256 header.s=k20260515 header.b=eHGDS24t Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with UTF8SMTPSA id 409C51F000C4; Wed, 18 Nov 2026 19:54:31 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=kernel.org; s=k20260515; t=1795031671; bh=dOMAgC0XvS4nP90YCQcBU0h+fNv/5Kz+lJp/v4CzlRY=; h=Date:From:To:Cc:Subject:References:In-Reply-To; b=eHGDS24tKkdUdQSDE+m8Q9U7FzbKLF5B1bDQj4MZxp+NpFTpVSXqOqxZkSbRrYUCu xtJKC8BPP86kLhKQWSGTmh00sX0NKvq9TjDCRYonSH8rUaaTLB11cllHumX66RUYyH ScOEhGBFrGL7aznIPo29PaJXS63D224351P4tQaIaa4C2w33oRPpGvjOVaJF1GWXp0 yn3LJKcQWVn44OuzVcIAi7Xe0ILvDdblzEOdRn+tnrG+OFiaNe8nBeMUP2hyUdRH6G ezABsk4drujjXkdYoPEJuXtySKLyTCVIg2d2O1x+lXwN8EOL9gzFhw3UcfphSBmKst FR/hJTy4y6ubA== Date: Wed, 18 Nov 2026 21:54:28 +0200 From: Jarkko Sakkinen To: David Howells Cc: linux-api@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, Alexander Viro , Andrew Morton , Andy Lutomirski , Anna-Maria Behnsen , Ben Segall , Christian Brauner , David Hildenbrand , Davidlohr Bueso , Dietmar Eggemann , Frederic Weisbecker , Ingo Molnar , Jan Kara , John Johansen , Jonathan Corbet , Juri Lelli , Kees Cook , K Prateek Nayak , "Liam R. Howlett" , Lorenzo Stoakes , Manfred Spraul , Mel Gorman , Michal Hocko , Mike Rapoport , Neal Gompa , Paul Moore , Pavel Tikhomirov , Peter Zijlstra , Randy Dunlap , Serge Hallyn , Shuah Khan , Steven Rostedt , Suren Baghdasaryan , Thomas Gleixner , Valentin Schneider , Vincent Guittot , Vincenzo Frascino , Vlastimil Babka , Zygmunt Krynicki Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v3 00/13] Namespace for namespace roots Message-ID: References: <20261118193539.240065-1-jarkko@kernel.org> X-Mailing-List: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: List-Owner: Precedence: list MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <20261118193539.240065-1-jarkko@kernel.org> On Wed, Nov 18, 2026 at 09:35:26PM +0200, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote: > OVERVIEW > ======== > > A root namespace (rootns) is a kernel object backed by a file descriptor > that binds together: > > 1. A full set of detached namespaces owned by a fresh user namespace. > 2. A dedicated PID namespace for spawning processes into, signaling > members, and polling or waiting on PID 1 exit. > 3. An initially empty mount namespace (CLONE_EMPTY_MNTNS) populated > directly in its target user namespace before going live, without > inheriting host mounts or cloning staged trees, while still allowing > new mounts to be attached at runtime. > > Work on this feature started in 2025 from David Howells' container object > patch set [1], which I turned into a namespace for namespace roots and > rebuilt around that premise. > > While the patch set is manually written, the original motivation came > from isolating LLM agents. Running untrusted agent workloads made it > clear that OCI runtimes need to minimize their live configuration > surface. > > Assembling mounts, credentials, and namespaces inside helper processes > with a half-configured container is what I see as the main challenge, > and the existential debate around namespaces and container objects is an > unfocused discussion topic. > > [1] https://lore.kernel.org/all/155059610368.17079.2220554006494174417.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk/ > > IMPLEMENTATION > ============== > > rootns_create() allocates a rootns instance backed by a pollable > anonymous inode fd, creating a fresh owning user namespace and a full set > of detached namespaces: empty mount (CLONE_EMPTY_MNTNS), PID, UTS, IPC, > network, cgroup, and time. ioctl(rootnsfd, ROOTNS_GET_NSFD, nstype) > returns nsfs file descriptors for individual member namespaces when > standalone namespace operations are needed. > > Superblocks are configured directly in the target user namespace via > fsopen(), FSCONFIG_SET_ROOTNS, and fsmount(), allowing unprivileged > callers to assemble FS_USERNS_MOUNT filesystems without holding > CAP_SYS_ADMIN in their own user namespace or entering the target user > namespace first. move_mount(..., MOVE_MOUNT_T_MNTNS) operates on any > non-anonymous mount namespace fd: on an empty mount namespace it installs > "/" onto the nullfs root once, and it attaches relative submounts both > before entry and into live mount namespaces. > > Once "/" is installed, processes are spawned into the rootns via clone3() > with CLONE_INTO_ROOTNS and struct clone_args.rootns, without mutating the > caller in place. Pairing CLONE_INTO_ROOTNS with CLONE_VM | CLONE_VFORK > and opening the target binary via openat2(..., RESOLVE_IN_ROOT) on the > retained "/" mount fd allows spawning with execveat() without copying > page tables. > > The first entrant becomes PID 1; once it exits and > zap_pid_ns_processes() reaps all members, poll() reports EPOLLHUP and > rootns_wait() returns init's exit status and rusage. rootns_kill() walks > pid_ns->idr under tasklist_lock to signal member thread groups. > > CHANGES > ======= > > v3: > - The patch set size increased predominantly because the coverage of > kselftest had to widened to cover the introduced changes. > - Replace MOVE_MOUNT_T_ROOTNS_ROOT with MOVE_MOUNT_T_MNTNS targeting > mnt_ns nsfs fds, and add ioctl(ROOTNS_GET_NSFD) to open member > namespace fds (Andy Lutomirski). > - Allow unprivileged fsopen(), FSCONFIG_SET_ROOTNS, and fsmount() to > configure and mount FS_USERNS_MOUNT filesystems directly in the target > user namespace without entering it first (Andy Lutomirski). > - Fix locking, refcounting, credential/dumpability/timens setup, > pivot_root() lookup, and cross-userns mount checks across copy_rootns(), > CLONE_INTO_ROOTNS, rootns_kill(), FSCONFIG_SET_ROOTNS, and move_mount() > (Sashiko). > - Mark PowerPC rootns syscalls nospu (Sashiko). > - Update documentation and kselftests. I.e. before PID 1 and /proc//ns/* existss, nsfd for namespace other than root nsfd can be acquired as follows: int mnts_fd = ioctl(root_fd, ROOTNS_GET_NSFD, CLONE_NEWNS); Br, Jarkko