From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
To: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-api@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org,
linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
Alexander Mikhalitsyn <alex@amutable.com>,
Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>,
Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>,
David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>, Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>,
Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>,
Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>, Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org>,
Neal Gompa <neal@gompa.dev>, Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>,
Serge Hallyn <sergeh@kernel.org>,
Zygmunt Krynicki <zygmunt.krynicki@canonical.com>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v5 02/25] userns: Add userns_set_idmap() system call
Date: Sat, 21 Nov 2026 18:53:10 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <awHMdgo7DbzfLXcj@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <awHLt1IpLcqxUnDW@kernel.org>
On Sat, Nov 21, 2026 at 06:50:03PM +0200, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> On Sat, Nov 21, 2026 at 06:09:53PM +0200, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> > On Sat, Nov 21, 2026 at 02:08:21AM +0200, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> > > Configuring UID, GID, and project ID mappings currently requires writing
> > > formatted text to /proc/<pid>/{uid_map,gid_map,projid_map,setgroups},
> > > which depends on a live task in /proc and enforces write(2) file-opener
> > > CAP_SETUID/CAP_SETGID checks that prevent passing an unprivileged userns
> > > file descriptor over SCM_RIGHTS to a dedicated CAP_SETUID/CAP_SETGID
> > > mapping helper.
> > >
> > > Add userns_set_idmap() to atomically configure setgroups policy and UID,
> > > GID, and project ID extents directly on a CLONE_NEWUSER nsfs file
> > > descriptor. Require CAP_SYS_ADMIN over the target user namespace in
> > > either the caller's or the file opener's credentials, and check parent
> > > ID-range capabilities strictly against the caller's credentials.
> > >
> > > Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
> >
> > I'll remove the flags. I forgot to remove them from final version.
>
> userns_set_idmap() still has flags-parameter but it is gated:
>
> if (flags & ~USERNS_SETGROUPS_ALLOWED)
> return -EINVAL;
>
> And used as a bitmask:
>
> ns->flags = ns->flags & flags;
SYSCALL_DEFINE4(userns_set_idmap, int, fd,
const struct userns_idmap __user *, map,
size_t, size, unsigned int, flags)
{
struct uid_gid_map new_uid = {}, new_gid = {}, new_projid = {};
struct userns_idmap req = {};
struct ns_common *ns_common;
struct user_namespace *ns;
unsigned long old_flags;
struct file *filp;
int ret;
BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(struct userns_idmap) != USERNS_IDMAP_SIZE_VER0);
if (flags & ~USERNS_SETGROUPS_ALLOWED)
return -EINVAL;
CLASS(fd, f)(fd);
if (fd_empty(f))
return -EBADF;
filp = fd_file(f);
if (!proc_ns_file(filp))
return -EINVAL;
ns_common = get_proc_ns(file_inode(filp));
if (ns_common->ns_type != CLONE_NEWUSER)
return -EINVAL;
ns = to_user_ns(ns_common);
if (!map || size < USERNS_IDMAP_SIZE_VER0)
return -EINVAL;
ret = copy_struct_from_user(&req, sizeof(req), map, size);
if (ret)
return ret;
if (req.reserved)
return -EINVAL;
if (!req.nr_uid_extents != !req.uid_extents ||
!req.nr_gid_extents != !req.gid_extents ||
!req.nr_projid_extents != !req.projid_extents)
return -EINVAL;
if (!req.nr_uid_extents && !req.nr_gid_extents &&
!req.nr_projid_extents)
return -EINVAL;
if ((flags & USERNS_SETGROUPS_ALLOWED) && !req.nr_gid_extents)
return -EINVAL;
if (!ns->parent)
return -EPERM;
if (current_user_ns() != ns && current_user_ns() != ns->parent)
return -EPERM;
if (req.nr_uid_extents || req.nr_gid_extents) {
bool file_ok = (filp->f_cred->user_ns == ns ||
filp->f_cred->user_ns == ns->parent) &&
file_ns_capable(filp, ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN);
if (!ns_capable(ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN) && !file_ok)
return -EPERM;
}
if (req.nr_uid_extents) {
ret = parse_user_idmap_extents(req.uid_extents,
req.nr_uid_extents, &new_uid);
if (ret < 0)
goto out_free;
}
if (req.nr_gid_extents) {
ret = parse_user_idmap_extents(req.gid_extents,
req.nr_gid_extents, &new_gid);
if (ret < 0)
goto out_free;
}
if (req.nr_projid_extents) {
ret = parse_user_idmap_extents(req.projid_extents,
req.nr_projid_extents,
&new_projid);
if (ret < 0)
goto out_free;
}
mutex_lock(&userns_state_mutex);
old_flags = ns->flags;
ret = -EPERM;
if (req.nr_uid_extents && ns->uid_map.nr_extents != 0)
goto out_unlock;
if (req.nr_gid_extents && ns->gid_map.nr_extents != 0)
goto out_unlock;
if (req.nr_projid_extents && ns->projid_map.nr_extents != 0)
goto out_unlock;
if (req.nr_gid_extents) {
if ((flags & USERNS_SETGROUPS_ALLOWED) &&
!(ns->flags & USERNS_SETGROUPS_ALLOWED))
goto out_unlock;
if (!(flags & USERNS_SETGROUPS_ALLOWED))
ns->flags &= ~USERNS_SETGROUPS_ALLOWED;
}
if (req.nr_uid_extents) {
ret = prepare_caller_idmap(ns, CAP_SETUID, &new_uid,
&ns->parent->uid_map);
if (ret < 0)
goto out_restore;
}
if (req.nr_gid_extents) {
ret = prepare_caller_idmap(ns, CAP_SETGID, &new_gid,
&ns->parent->gid_map);
if (ret < 0)
goto out_restore;
}
if (req.nr_projid_extents) {
ret = prepare_caller_idmap(ns, -1, &new_projid,
&ns->parent->projid_map);
if (ret < 0)
goto out_restore;
}
if (req.nr_uid_extents)
commit_new_idmap(&ns->uid_map, &new_uid);
if (req.nr_gid_extents)
commit_new_idmap(&ns->gid_map, &new_gid);
if (req.nr_projid_extents)
commit_new_idmap(&ns->projid_map, &new_projid);
mutex_unlock(&userns_state_mutex);
return 0;
out_restore:
ns->flags = old_flags;
out_unlock:
mutex_unlock(&userns_state_mutex);
out_free:
free_new_idmap(&new_uid);
free_new_idmap(&new_gid);
free_new_idmap(&new_projid);
return ret;
}
Br, Jarkko
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-11-21 16:53 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 34+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-11-21 0:08 [RFC PATCH v5 00/25] rootns: fd-bound process closures Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-21 0:08 ` [RFC PATCH v5 01/25] userns: Factor out idmap validation and commit helpers Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-21 0:08 ` [RFC PATCH v5 02/25] userns: Add userns_set_idmap() system call Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-21 16:09 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-21 16:49 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-21 16:53 ` Jarkko Sakkinen [this message]
2026-11-21 0:08 ` [RFC PATCH v5 03/25] arch: Wire up " Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-21 15:58 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-21 0:08 ` [RFC PATCH v5 04/25] mount: Add mnt_ns_get_root() Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-21 0:08 ` [RFC PATCH v5 05/25] mount: Enforce mount_too_revealing() for foreign mntns Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-21 0:08 ` [RFC PATCH v5 06/25] mount: Support MOVE_MOUNT_T_MNTNS in move_mount() Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-21 0:08 ` [RFC PATCH v5 07/25] mount: Support MOVE_MOUNT_CLONE with MOVE_MOUNT_T_MNTNS Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-21 0:08 ` [RFC PATCH v5 08/25] userns: Factor out install_user_ns_cred() Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-21 0:08 ` [RFC PATCH v5 09/25] nsfs: Add nsproxy_open_namespace() Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-21 0:08 ` [RFC PATCH v5 10/25] nsproxy: Pass nsproxy to create_new_namespaces() Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-21 0:08 ` [RFC PATCH v5 11/25] rootns: Add core infrastructure for root namespaces Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-21 0:08 ` [RFC PATCH v5 12/25] rootns: Track init lifecycle via copy_process() and pid_namespace Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-21 1:32 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-21 0:08 ` [RFC PATCH v5 13/25] rootns: Add rootns() system call Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-21 0:08 ` [RFC PATCH v5 14/25] rootns: Add ROOTNS_WAIT ioctl Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-21 0:17 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-21 0:18 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-21 1:09 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-21 0:08 ` [RFC PATCH v5 15/25] rootns: Add ROOTNS_KILL ioctl Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-21 1:19 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-21 11:24 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-21 0:08 ` [RFC PATCH v5 16/25] fork: Support CLONE_INTO_ROOTNS in clone3() Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-21 0:08 ` [RFC PATCH v5 21/25] bpf: Register rootns LSM hooks Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-21 0:08 ` [RFC PATCH v5 22/25] arch: Wire up rootns() system call Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-21 0:08 ` [RFC PATCH v5 23/25] docs: Document root namespace uAPI Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-21 0:08 ` [RFC PATCH v5 24/25] selftests/rootns: Add root namespace test suite Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-21 0:08 ` [RFC PATCH v5 25/25] MAINTAINERS: Add entry for ROOT NAMESPACE Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-21 17:21 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
[not found] ` <20261121000844.1863324-21-jarkko@kernel.org>
2026-11-21 11:47 ` [RFC PATCH v5 20/25] security: Add rootns LSM hooks Jarkko Sakkinen
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