From: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
To: Fan Wu <wufan@linux.microsoft.com>,
corbet@lwn.net, zohar@linux.ibm.com, jmorris@namei.org,
serge@hallyn.com, tytso@mit.edu, ebiggers@kernel.org,
axboe@kernel.dk, agk@redhat.com, snitzer@kernel.org,
eparis@redhat.com
Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
linux-fscrypt@vger.kernel.org, linux-block@vger.kernel.org,
dm-devel@redhat.com, audit@vger.kernel.org,
roberto.sassu@huawei.com, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
Deven Bowers <deven.desai@linux.microsoft.com>,
Fan Wu <wufan@linux.microsoft.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH RFC v10 9/17] ipe: add permissive toggle
Date: Sat, 08 Jul 2023 01:37:01 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <b7334846cb475edd0e9b970a2bb011d7.paul@paul-moore.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1687986571-16823-10-git-send-email-wufan@linux.microsoft.com>
On Jun 28, 2023 Fan Wu <wufan@linux.microsoft.com> wrote:
>
> IPE, like SELinux, supports a permissive mode. This mode allows policy
> authors to test and evaluate IPE policy without it effecting their
> programs. When the mode is changed, a 1404 AUDIT_MAC_STATUS
> be reported.
>
> This patch adds the following audit records:
>
> audit: MAC_STATUS enforcing=0 old_enforcing=1 auid=4294967295
> ses=4294967295 enabled=1 old-enabled=1 lsm=ipe res=1
> audit: MAC_STATUS enforcing=1 old_enforcing=0 auid=4294967295
> ses=4294967295 enabled=1 old-enabled=1 lsm=ipe res=1
>
> The audit record only emit when the value from the user input is
> different from the current enforce value.
>
> Signed-off-by: Deven Bowers <deven.desai@linux.microsoft.com>
> Signed-off-by: Fan Wu <wufan@linux.microsoft.com>
> ---
> security/ipe/audit.c | 22 ++++++++++++++
> security/ipe/audit.h | 1 +
> security/ipe/eval.c | 9 ++++++
> security/ipe/eval.h | 1 +
> security/ipe/fs.c | 69 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> 5 files changed, 102 insertions(+)
...
> diff --git a/security/ipe/fs.c b/security/ipe/fs.c
> index 6bd2aa84831b..1761d39e4d04 100644
> --- a/security/ipe/fs.c
> +++ b/security/ipe/fs.c
> @@ -16,6 +16,7 @@ static struct dentry *np __ro_after_init;
> static struct dentry *root __ro_after_init;
> struct dentry *policy_root __ro_after_init;
> static struct dentry *audit_node __ro_after_init;
> +static struct dentry *enforce_node __ro_after_init;
>
> /**
> * setaudit - Write handler for the securityfs node, "ipe/success_audit"
> @@ -68,6 +69,61 @@ static ssize_t getaudit(struct file *f, char __user *data,
> return simple_read_from_buffer(data, len, offset, result, 1);
> }
>
> +/**
> + * setenforce - Write handler for the securityfs node, "ipe/enforce"
> + * @f: Supplies a file structure representing the securityfs node.
> + * @data: Supplies a buffer passed to the write syscall.
> + * @len: Supplies the length of @data.
> + * @offset: unused.
> + *
> + * Return:
> + * * >0 - Success, Length of buffer written
> + * * <0 - Error
> + */
> +static ssize_t setenforce(struct file *f, const char __user *data,
> + size_t len, loff_t *offset)
> +{
> + int rc = 0;
> + bool new_value, old_value;
> +
> + if (!file_ns_capable(f, &init_user_ns, CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
> + return -EPERM;
> +
> + old_value = READ_ONCE(enforce);
> + new_value = old_value;
Why set @new_value equal to @old_value here?
> + rc = kstrtobool_from_user(data, len, &new_value);
> + if (rc)
> + return rc;
> +
> + if (new_value != old_value) {
> + ipe_audit_enforce(new_value, old_value);
> + WRITE_ONCE(enforce, new_value);
> + }
> +
> + return len;
> +}
--
paul-moore.com
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2023-07-08 5:38 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 45+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2023-06-28 21:09 [RFC PATCH v10 00/17] Integrity Policy Enforcement LSM (IPE) Fan Wu
2023-06-28 21:09 ` [RFC PATCH v10 01/17] security: add ipe lsm Fan Wu
2023-07-08 5:36 ` [PATCH RFC v10 1/17] " Paul Moore
[not found] ` <ffd5c67f4a9bf45df0ce95a8fe0932a3.paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-07-13 23:31 ` Fan Wu
2023-06-28 21:09 ` [RFC PATCH v10 02/17] ipe: add policy parser Fan Wu
2023-07-08 5:36 ` [PATCH RFC v10 2/17] " Paul Moore
[not found] ` <b2abfd3883dce682ee911413fea2ec66.paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-07-14 4:18 ` Fan Wu
2023-06-28 21:09 ` [RFC PATCH v10 03/17] ipe: add evaluation loop Fan Wu
2023-07-08 5:36 ` [PATCH RFC v10 3/17] " Paul Moore
[not found] ` <309cfd62a474a7e93be6a0886a3d5aa8.paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-07-14 20:28 ` Fan Wu
2023-06-28 21:09 ` [RFC PATCH v10 04/17] ipe: add LSM hooks on execution and kernel read Fan Wu
2023-07-08 5:36 ` [PATCH RFC v10 4/17] " Paul Moore
[not found] ` <cbe877b3905033d2b8c7c92e6d0cad4e.paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-07-14 21:47 ` Fan Wu
2023-06-28 21:09 ` [RFC PATCH v10 05/17] ipe: introduce 'boot_verified' as a trust provider Fan Wu
2023-07-08 5:36 ` [PATCH RFC v10 5/17] " Paul Moore
[not found] ` <7b0f16fd49fb3490af1018eba986d0e4.paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-07-14 23:56 ` Fan Wu
2023-06-28 21:09 ` [RFC PATCH v10 06/17] security: add new securityfs delete function Fan Wu
2023-07-08 5:36 ` [PATCH RFC v10 6/17] " Paul Moore
[not found] ` <80ae988288d2ac277a4429e85524a9bb.paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-07-14 23:59 ` Fan Wu
2023-06-28 21:09 ` [RFC PATCH v10 07/17] ipe: add userspace interface Fan Wu
2023-07-08 5:36 ` [PATCH RFC v10 7/17] " Paul Moore
[not found] ` <fcc5de3f153eb60b5acf799c159e6ec8.paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-07-15 3:26 ` Fan Wu
2023-08-01 19:29 ` Paul Moore
2023-06-28 21:09 ` [RFC PATCH v10 08/17] uapi|audit|ipe: add ipe auditing support Fan Wu
2023-07-08 5:37 ` [PATCH RFC v10 8/17] " Paul Moore
[not found] ` <ec09144af7c7109d8b457ceccd50ba7a.paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-07-15 3:57 ` Fan Wu
2023-08-01 19:24 ` Paul Moore
2023-06-28 21:09 ` [RFC PATCH v10 09/17] ipe: add permissive toggle Fan Wu
2023-07-08 5:37 ` Paul Moore [this message]
[not found] ` <85af33c02638ebb501b40fd0f3785b12.paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-07-15 4:00 ` [PATCH RFC v10 9/17] " Fan Wu
2023-06-28 21:09 ` [RFC PATCH v10 10/17] block|security: add LSM blob to block_device Fan Wu
2023-06-28 21:09 ` [RFC PATCH v10 11/17] dm-verity: consume root hash digest and signature data via LSM hook Fan Wu
2023-07-07 14:53 ` Mike Snitzer
2023-07-12 3:43 ` Fan Wu
2023-07-25 20:43 ` Paul Moore
2023-08-08 22:45 ` Fan Wu
2023-08-08 23:40 ` Alasdair G Kergon
2023-08-09 18:02 ` Fan Wu
2023-06-28 21:09 ` [RFC PATCH v10 12/17] ipe: add support for dm-verity as a trust provider Fan Wu
2023-07-08 5:37 ` [PATCH RFC " Paul Moore
2023-06-28 21:09 ` [RFC PATCH v10 13/17] fsverity: consume builtin signature via LSM hook Fan Wu
2023-06-28 21:09 ` [RFC PATCH v10 14/17] ipe: enable support for fs-verity as a trust provider Fan Wu
2023-06-28 21:09 ` [RFC PATCH v10 15/17] scripts: add boot policy generation program Fan Wu
2023-06-28 21:09 ` [RFC PATCH v10 16/17] ipe: kunit test for parser Fan Wu
2023-06-28 21:09 ` [RFC PATCH v10 17/17] documentation: add ipe documentation Fan Wu
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