From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.remote-ip=113.46.200.223 ARC-Seal: i=1; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc20261015; a=rsa-sha256; cv=none; t=1794992392; b=e0YMyep6eJwCCQBU9a/9LeYja2WYaSPNUnD2B3aTOeLnJoWfFvhL4DQLOMSwg1AEMvur lOb4SbTNRdtrBoj+PvMbM+3zEqqrdhTClguw7XofUYf4cQphQs2OJKf/3J8A7f97P4rAx pbneEDxV1vtDZB3pWa/9sC5aMpd+PYEoaTgNElPxhSo3CzBFCcGPEQ5e+ELp+ZIl0S/aW pbGkO9VP/gFYbOIHupiy2ShQsMlQWGXp+xdkaHsP8kUQlS/JsScP5Drypdxi51rdm+SjR BmwnXEtXyXyj/XV8hXYWP4a7g+/hgwULRg/UXWaDcqHj/xl4Rz2FGBan4+/CpvX4K7A== ARC-Message-Signature: i=1; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc20261015; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; t=1794992392; h=DMARC-Filter:dkim-signature:Received:Received:Received:Message-ID: Date:MIME-Version:User-Agent:Subject:To:CC:References: Content-Language:From:In-Reply-To:Content-Type: Content-Transfer-Encoding:X-Originating-IP:X-ClientProxiedBy; bh=zDjwPIFBALJRu9G1JpFQxNCh37Ku2FGitfdnf5CWttU=; b=XgtlHz/XhptJpgOSFRInWECSMvdZl2+AsM95Yj11y7A/b29Js3+A70h6tddO2mtfo8um R9zx/Jq1jk9rr1ypLrv0bQEMrNXP561sqk5wX/y75rrEmoImIzSyBp0T/wBsmXPqOBNCF zWqa9yIPAeofnsjmowFhgyxBrPmj8oDvYgbZ8SnIvataqnpPdw7sCvVQd3NJtMI42F5cE JPjKROiod3fvkkwgVA9CvDFq0Y6azPmrokS0JIYgMJL54uTbKg6hYFVOmrrbkOkObfVDP p5SRbMEz4e8sWZqkXufYtwyskJOATRENeejQgrNUfi3oaq4dk6tPjjNSMqSIj9lE8TA== ARC-Authentication-Results: i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dmarc=pass header.from=huawei.com; spf=pass smtp.mailfrom=huawei.com; dkim=pass header.d=huawei.com header.i=@huawei.com header.a=rsa-sha256 header.s=dkim header.b=YG0f5s+2; arc=none smtp.remote-ip=113.46.200.223 Received: from canpmsgout08.his.huawei.com (canpmsgout08.his.huawei.com [113.46.200.223]) (using TLSv1.3 with cipher TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (256/256 bits) key-exchange X25519 server-signature ECDSA (prime256v1) server-digest SHA256) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 70493606A325; Wed, 18 Nov 2026 08:59:50 +0000 (UTC) DMARC-Filter: OpenDMARC Filter v1.4.2 smtp.subspace.kernel.org 70493606A325 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dmarc=pass (p=quarantine dis=none) header.from=huawei.com Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; spf=pass smtp.mailfrom=huawei.com Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key, unprotected) header.d=huawei.com header.i=@huawei.com header.a=rsa-sha256 header.s=dkim header.b=YG0f5s+2 dkim-signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=huawei.com; s=dkim; c=relaxed/relaxed; q=dns/txt; h=From; bh=zDjwPIFBALJRu9G1JpFQxNCh37Ku2FGitfdnf5CWttU=; b=YG0f5s+2kvHrKlKCN7CB4HY4p0LT+CaaaGw+BSvo7+/ssB/SQ9sM0FXb1MTh9BFkL9Mv7Wn3S BNOqmdVJd6x1gk7TjCfNf3D3ZpPYsdFv+Yf8GC5xj0argsiNrvpyQ++8NgtWzUN+FazgOOGwEZ0 m7pnB1IrMWzbaj4bmorQi1I= Received: from mail.maildlp.com (unknown [172.19.163.163]) by canpmsgout08.his.huawei.com (SkyGuard) with ESMTPS id 4jTwWs2RMwzmV6N; Wed, 18 Nov 2026 16:59:21 +0800 (CST) Received: from whupemk100010.china.huawei.com (unknown [7.152.184.41]) by mail.maildlp.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id B45424048B; Wed, 18 Nov 2026 16:59:40 +0800 (CST) Received: from [10.67.110.140] (10.67.110.140) by whupemk100010.china.huawei.com (7.152.184.41) with Microsoft SMTP Server (version=TLS1_2, cipher=TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) id 15.2.2562.45; Wed, 18 Nov 2026 16:59:31 +0800 Message-ID: Date: Wed, 18 Nov 2026 16:59:29 +0800 X-Mailing-List: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: List-Owner: Precedence: list MIME-Version: 1.0 User-Agent: Mozilla Thunderbird Subject: Re: [PATCH -next -v4 02/17] LSM: pass struct path to the inode_setsecctx hook To: Al Viro CC: , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , References: <20261117150542.1169451-1-caixinchen1@huawei.com> <20261117150542.1169451-3-caixinchen1@huawei.com> <20261117184342.GR989762@ZenIV> <20261118001641.GA1669148@ZenIV> Content-Language: en-US From: Cai Xinchen In-Reply-To: <20261118001641.GA1669148@ZenIV> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8"; format=flowed Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-ClientProxiedBy: kwepems500001.china.huawei.com (7.221.188.70) To whupemk100010.china.huawei.com (7.152.184.41) Sorry, this is a major issue. I checked the current state of the patchset - fs/attr.c, fs/open.c, fs/inode.c, fs/utimes.c, fs/namei.c, fs/coredump.c, drivers/block/loop.c: nd->path or file->f_path (in loop.c: the f_path of the backing file, where file == NULL is intentional). - drivers/base/devtmpfs.c: the mount point of the parent directory, which contains a directory entry that was just created or is about to be deleted. - fs/cachefiles/xattr.c: cache->mnt, under which a directory entry is searched. - fs/ecryptfs: ecryptfs_lower_path(), which is the mount point of the lower-level directory entry itself. - fs/nfsd: exp->ex_path.mnt, which contains fh_dentry, a value decoded via exportfs_decode_fh_raw(exp->ex_path.mnt,...), or exp->ex_path.dentry. - fs/overlayfs: ovl_upper_mnt(ofs), which contains the actual upper-level directory entry. There are two places that violate (1), both introduced by this series of patches in ksmbd: smb2_parent_compressed() and smb_inherit_dacl() pair the directory entry returned by dget_parent() with path->mnt, and problems arise once that directory entry becomes the root of its mount point. I will fix these issues in v5 and ensure this invariant. If you find any place where (1) still does not hold, please point it out, and I will fix it. On 11/18/2026 8:16 AM, Al Viro wrote: > On Tue, Nov 17, 2026 at 06:43:42PM +0000, Al Viro wrote: >> On Tue, Nov 17, 2026 at 11:05:27PM +0800, Cai Xinchen wrote: >>> The inode_setsecctx hook and its security_inode_setsecctx() caller in >>> fs/nfsd operate on a dentry even though both have a struct path >>> available. Pass a const struct path so that the coming conversion of the >>> xattr helpers can be reflected in the implementations; for now SELinux >>> and Smack keep passing path->dentry and &nop_mnt_idmap to >>> __vfs_setxattr_locked(). >>> >>> Also document in lsm_hook_defs.h what a struct path argument may be used >>> for: it can be passed to VFS helpers taking a struct path, but nothing is >>> guaranteed about path->mnt. >> No, with the side of Hell, No. >> >>> + * Hooks that take a struct path argument: the VFS only sanctions passing >>> + * the path to VFS helpers that take a struct path (e.g. notify_change()); >>> + * it makes no guarantees with regard to path->mnt, whose layout and >>> + * implementation details are subject to change. Implementations must >>> + * not rely on its properties. >> NAKed-by: Al Viro >> >> If that kind of stuff actually does get passed to any existing hooks, we need >> to fix that ASAP. If not, consider that a blanket NAK on any patch series >> that would introduce such. >> >> We are not going there. At all. "Must not rely on its properties" == >> "must make sure that no existing functions with struct path * arguments >> ever have such malformed instances passed to them". Which is not going >> to be feasible to enforce. And yes, that very much includes any VFS helpers. > To elaborate a bit: correctness of quite a few places does depend upon the > following invaraint: > path->mnt->mnt_sb == path->dentry->d_sb (1) > for all struct path pointers they might possibly run into. _Some_ > functions might _currently_ be safe to call with that constraint violated; > there's neither a list of such functions nor any promise whatsoever that > call that is currently safe in such conditions will remain safe at any > later point. > > _IF_ you can guarantee that (1) is not violated, we have something to > talk about; otherwise, don't call your object struct path and don't > pass it to anything that expects to deal with struct path.