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From: "Huang, Kai" <kai.huang@intel.com>
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Subject: Re: [PATCH v14 03/19] x86: Secure Launch Resource Table header file
Date: Thu, 24 Apr 2025 12:36:57 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <e5f5a76b5cc93861df23bd96642a94b7d549a467.camel@intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20250421162712.77452-4-ross.philipson@oracle.com>


> +
> +#ifndef __ASSEMBLY__
> 
[...]

> +#endif /* !__ASSEMBLY */
> 

A minor thing:

There's an attempt to convert __ASSEMBLY__ to __ASSEMBLER__ at tree-wide level:

https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20250314071013.1575167-1-thuth@redhat.com/

I am not sure the final result (there's some discussion around uapi part, but it
seems there's no objection to changes to the headers visible only to the
kernel), but the x86 ones have been merged:

      x86/headers: Replace __ASSEMBLY__ with __ASSEMBLER__ in non-UAPI headers
      x86/headers: Replace __ASSEMBLY__ with __ASSEMBLER__ in UAPI headers

So perhaps we should use __ASSEMBLER__ for the new code.

  parent reply	other threads:[~2025-04-24 12:37 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 57+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2025-04-21 16:26 [PATCH v14 00/19] x86: Trenchboot secure dynamic launch Linux kernel support Ross Philipson
2025-04-21 16:26 ` [PATCH v14 01/19] Documentation/x86: Secure Launch kernel documentation Ross Philipson
2025-06-18  8:33   ` Mowka, Mateusz
2025-06-18 15:02     ` Dave Hansen
2025-04-21 16:26 ` [PATCH v14 02/19] x86: Secure Launch Kconfig Ross Philipson
2025-04-21 17:41   ` Randy Dunlap
2025-04-22 19:32     ` ross.philipson
2025-06-18  8:32   ` Mowka, Mateusz
2025-04-21 16:26 ` [PATCH v14 03/19] x86: Secure Launch Resource Table header file Ross Philipson
2025-04-21 19:18   ` ALOK TIWARI
2025-04-22 19:33     ` ross.philipson
2025-04-23 18:23   ` ALOK TIWARI
2025-04-23 20:04     ` ross.philipson
2025-04-24 12:36   ` Huang, Kai [this message]
2025-04-24 19:19     ` ross.philipson
2025-04-21 16:26 ` [PATCH v14 04/19] x86: Secure Launch main " Ross Philipson
2025-04-24 12:29   ` Huang, Kai
2025-04-24 18:56     ` ross.philipson
2025-06-23 11:44   ` Camacho Romero, Michal
2025-06-23 21:29     ` ross.philipson
2025-06-27  9:15       ` Camacho Romero, Michal
2025-04-21 16:26 ` [PATCH v14 05/19] x86: Add early SHA-1 support for Secure Launch early measurements Ross Philipson
2025-04-21 16:26 ` [PATCH v14 06/19] x86: Add early SHA-256 " Ross Philipson
2025-04-21 16:27 ` [PATCH v14 07/19] x86/msr: Add variable MTRR base/mask and x2apic ID registers Ross Philipson
2025-04-21 16:27 ` [PATCH v14 08/19] x86/boot: Place TXT MLE header in the kernel_info section Ross Philipson
2025-04-23 20:54   ` ALOK TIWARI
2025-04-21 16:27 ` [PATCH v14 09/19] x86: Secure Launch kernel early boot stub Ross Philipson
2025-04-22  1:18   ` Dave Hansen
2025-04-22 19:38     ` ross.philipson
2025-04-23 20:38   ` ALOK TIWARI
2025-04-23 21:07     ` ross.philipson
2025-04-21 16:27 ` [PATCH v14 10/19] x86: Secure Launch kernel late " Ross Philipson
2025-04-21 16:27 ` [PATCH v14 11/19] x86: Secure Launch SMP bringup support Ross Philipson
2025-04-21 16:27 ` [PATCH v14 12/19] kexec: Secure Launch kexec SEXIT support Ross Philipson
2025-04-23 19:58   ` ALOK TIWARI
2025-04-23 20:07     ` ross.philipson
2025-04-21 16:27 ` [PATCH v14 13/19] x86/reboot: Secure Launch SEXIT support on reboot paths Ross Philipson
2025-04-21 22:57   ` Dave Hansen
2025-04-22 19:31     ` ross.philipson
2025-04-21 16:27 ` [PATCH v14 14/19] tpm, tpm_tis: Close all localities Ross Philipson
2025-04-21 16:27 ` [PATCH v14 15/19] tpm, tpm_tis: Address positive localities in tpm_tis_request_locality() Ross Philipson
2025-04-21 16:27 ` [PATCH v14 16/19] tpm, tpm_tis: Allow locality to be set to a different value Ross Philipson
2025-04-22 10:20   ` Stefano Garzarella
2025-04-23 19:38     ` Daniel P. Smith
2025-04-21 16:27 ` [PATCH v14 17/19] tpm, sysfs: Show locality used by kernel Ross Philipson
2025-04-21 16:27 ` [PATCH v14 18/19] x86: Secure Launch late initcall platform module Ross Philipson
2025-04-28 17:38   ` Andy Lutomirski
2025-04-30  1:40     ` Daniel P. Smith
2025-04-30 18:51       ` Andy Lutomirski
2025-04-21 16:27 ` [PATCH v14 19/19] x86/efi: EFI stub DRTM launch support for Secure Launch Ross Philipson
2025-04-21 20:52 ` [PATCH v14 00/19] x86: Trenchboot secure dynamic launch Linux kernel support Dave Hansen
2025-04-21 21:00   ` Andrew Cooper
2025-04-22 18:17   ` Andrew Cooper
2025-04-22 19:16     ` Dave Hansen
2025-04-22 21:26     ` Ard Biesheuvel
2025-04-22 23:21       ` Dave Hansen
2025-04-24 18:45 ` Dave Hansen

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