From: ross.philipson@oracle.com
To: "Huang, Kai" <kai.huang@intel.com>,
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Subject: Re: [PATCH v14 04/19] x86: Secure Launch main header file
Date: Thu, 24 Apr 2025 11:56:11 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <e68edaab-e7cf-4a13-acb1-87ddbb73765a@oracle.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <e2d00d7cc4cfc33a3b328fe8386f6d164bc46184.camel@intel.com>
On 4/24/25 5:29 AM, Huang, Kai wrote:
> On Mon, 2025-04-21 at 09:26 -0700, Ross Philipson wrote:
>> Introduce the main Secure Launch header file used in the early SL stub
>> and the early setup code.
>>
>> This header file contains the following categories:
>> - Secure Launch implementation specific structures and definitions.
>> - Intel TXT architecture specific DRTM structures, definitions and functions
>> used by Secure Launch.
>> - DRTM TPM event logging definitions and helper functions.
>
> Looking at the actual code in this patch, seems >90% code in the
> <linux/slaunch.h> is Intel specific, e.g., TXT specific macro/structure
> definitions. It doesn't seem to be the right way to organize the code.
>
> E.g., following the current pattern, when we need to add support for another TXT
> similar vendor-specific technology, we will need to add yet-another set of
> macro/structure definitions for that technology to <linux/slaunch.h> as well.
>
> That would be a giant mess IMHO.
>
> Could we make <linux/slaunch.h> only contain the common things, and move Intel
> specific things to some x86 header(s), e.g., <asm/intel-txt.h> or <asm/txt.h>?
Yes this looks to be a good idea. I think it has been something we have
thought of before. We will look into it.
>
>
> [...]
>
>> +/*
>> + * External functions available in mainline kernel.
>> + */
>> +void slaunch_setup_txt(void);
>> +void slaunch_fixup_jump_vector(void);
>> +u32 slaunch_get_flags(void);
>> +struct sl_ap_wake_info *slaunch_get_ap_wake_info(void);
>> +struct acpi_table_header *slaunch_get_dmar_table(struct acpi_table_header *dmar);
>> +void __noreturn slaunch_txt_reset(void __iomem *txt,
>> + const char *msg, u64 error);
>> +void slaunch_finalize(int do_sexit);
>> +
>> +static inline bool slaunch_is_txt_launch(void)
>> +{
>> + u32 mask = SL_FLAG_ACTIVE | SL_FLAG_ARCH_TXT;
>> +
>> + return (slaunch_get_flags() & mask) == mask;
>> +}
>> +
>> +#else
>> +
>> +static inline void slaunch_setup_txt(void)
>> +{
>> +}
>> +
>> +static inline void slaunch_fixup_jump_vector(void)
>> +{
>> +}
>> +
>> +static inline u32 slaunch_get_flags(void)
>> +{
>> + return 0;
>> +}
>> +
>> +static inline struct acpi_table_header *slaunch_get_dmar_table(struct acpi_table_header *dmar)
>> +{
>> + return dmar;
>> +}
>> +
>> +static inline void slaunch_finalize(int do_sexit)
>> +{
>> +}
>> +
>> +static inline bool slaunch_is_txt_launch(void)
>> +{
>> + return false;
>> +}
>>
>
> .. btw it's not clear which part of the code is common code.
>
> Looking at the abvoe code, it seems those functions are common functions called
> from common code. E.g., slaunch_finalize() is called from kernel/kexec_core.c,
> which means it is a concept in the kernel common code and must be available for
> all ARCHs (I haven't read how other functions are called, though).
>
> But the name slaunch_setup_txt(), slaunch_get_dmar_table() and
> slaunch_is_txt_launch() are quite Intel specific. So it seems to me this patch
> _tries_ to support Secure Launch at the arch agnostic level but it doesn't do a
> good job at the abstraction?
If we do what you suggest, I think these ambiguities will go away.
Thank you,
Ross
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2025-04-24 18:57 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 57+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2025-04-21 16:26 [PATCH v14 00/19] x86: Trenchboot secure dynamic launch Linux kernel support Ross Philipson
2025-04-21 16:26 ` [PATCH v14 01/19] Documentation/x86: Secure Launch kernel documentation Ross Philipson
2025-06-18 8:33 ` Mowka, Mateusz
2025-06-18 15:02 ` Dave Hansen
2025-04-21 16:26 ` [PATCH v14 02/19] x86: Secure Launch Kconfig Ross Philipson
2025-04-21 17:41 ` Randy Dunlap
2025-04-22 19:32 ` ross.philipson
2025-06-18 8:32 ` Mowka, Mateusz
2025-04-21 16:26 ` [PATCH v14 03/19] x86: Secure Launch Resource Table header file Ross Philipson
2025-04-21 19:18 ` ALOK TIWARI
2025-04-22 19:33 ` ross.philipson
2025-04-23 18:23 ` ALOK TIWARI
2025-04-23 20:04 ` ross.philipson
2025-04-24 12:36 ` Huang, Kai
2025-04-24 19:19 ` ross.philipson
2025-04-21 16:26 ` [PATCH v14 04/19] x86: Secure Launch main " Ross Philipson
2025-04-24 12:29 ` Huang, Kai
2025-04-24 18:56 ` ross.philipson [this message]
2025-06-23 11:44 ` Camacho Romero, Michal
2025-06-23 21:29 ` ross.philipson
2025-06-27 9:15 ` Camacho Romero, Michal
2025-04-21 16:26 ` [PATCH v14 05/19] x86: Add early SHA-1 support for Secure Launch early measurements Ross Philipson
2025-04-21 16:26 ` [PATCH v14 06/19] x86: Add early SHA-256 " Ross Philipson
2025-04-21 16:27 ` [PATCH v14 07/19] x86/msr: Add variable MTRR base/mask and x2apic ID registers Ross Philipson
2025-04-21 16:27 ` [PATCH v14 08/19] x86/boot: Place TXT MLE header in the kernel_info section Ross Philipson
2025-04-23 20:54 ` ALOK TIWARI
2025-04-21 16:27 ` [PATCH v14 09/19] x86: Secure Launch kernel early boot stub Ross Philipson
2025-04-22 1:18 ` Dave Hansen
2025-04-22 19:38 ` ross.philipson
2025-04-23 20:38 ` ALOK TIWARI
2025-04-23 21:07 ` ross.philipson
2025-04-21 16:27 ` [PATCH v14 10/19] x86: Secure Launch kernel late " Ross Philipson
2025-04-21 16:27 ` [PATCH v14 11/19] x86: Secure Launch SMP bringup support Ross Philipson
2025-04-21 16:27 ` [PATCH v14 12/19] kexec: Secure Launch kexec SEXIT support Ross Philipson
2025-04-23 19:58 ` ALOK TIWARI
2025-04-23 20:07 ` ross.philipson
2025-04-21 16:27 ` [PATCH v14 13/19] x86/reboot: Secure Launch SEXIT support on reboot paths Ross Philipson
2025-04-21 22:57 ` Dave Hansen
2025-04-22 19:31 ` ross.philipson
2025-04-21 16:27 ` [PATCH v14 14/19] tpm, tpm_tis: Close all localities Ross Philipson
2025-04-21 16:27 ` [PATCH v14 15/19] tpm, tpm_tis: Address positive localities in tpm_tis_request_locality() Ross Philipson
2025-04-21 16:27 ` [PATCH v14 16/19] tpm, tpm_tis: Allow locality to be set to a different value Ross Philipson
2025-04-22 10:20 ` Stefano Garzarella
2025-04-23 19:38 ` Daniel P. Smith
2025-04-21 16:27 ` [PATCH v14 17/19] tpm, sysfs: Show locality used by kernel Ross Philipson
2025-04-21 16:27 ` [PATCH v14 18/19] x86: Secure Launch late initcall platform module Ross Philipson
2025-04-28 17:38 ` Andy Lutomirski
2025-04-30 1:40 ` Daniel P. Smith
2025-04-30 18:51 ` Andy Lutomirski
2025-04-21 16:27 ` [PATCH v14 19/19] x86/efi: EFI stub DRTM launch support for Secure Launch Ross Philipson
2025-04-21 20:52 ` [PATCH v14 00/19] x86: Trenchboot secure dynamic launch Linux kernel support Dave Hansen
2025-04-21 21:00 ` Andrew Cooper
2025-04-22 18:17 ` Andrew Cooper
2025-04-22 19:16 ` Dave Hansen
2025-04-22 21:26 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2025-04-22 23:21 ` Dave Hansen
2025-04-24 18:45 ` Dave Hansen
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