From: Xin Li <xin@zytor.com>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org,
linux-doc@vger.kernel.org
Cc: pbonzini@redhat.com, seanjc@google.com, corbet@lwn.net,
tglx@linutronix.de, mingo@redhat.com, bp@alien8.de,
dave.hansen@linux.intel.com, x86@kernel.org, hpa@zytor.com,
luto@kernel.org, peterz@infradead.org, andrew.cooper3@citrix.com,
chao.gao@intel.com, hch@infradead.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v7 05/21] x86/cea: Export API for per-CPU exception stacks for KVM
Date: Fri, 29 Aug 2025 09:52:57 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <e7dd1510-6ffa-429a-9b07-55ad83d40d7b@zytor.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20250829153149.2871901-6-xin@zytor.com>
On 8/29/2025 8:31 AM, Xin Li (Intel) wrote:
> Convert the __this_cpu_ist_{top,bottom}_va() macros into proper functions,
> and export __this_cpu_ist_top_va() to allow KVM to retrieve the top of the
> per-CPU exception stack.
>
> FRED introduced new fields in the host-state area of the VMCS for stack
> levels 1->3 (HOST_IA32_FRED_RSP[123]), each respectively corresponding to
> per-CPU exception stacks for #DB, NMI and #DF. KVM must populate these
> fields each time a vCPU is loaded onto a CPU.
>
> To simplify access to the exception stacks in struct cea_exception_stacks,
> a union is used to create an array alias, enabling array-style indexing of
> the stack entries.
After introducing array-style indexing, we can further simplify the code by
removing ESTACKS_MEMBERS() from struct cea_exception_stacks, as done in the
following patch. However, including this change in the current patch set
may be distracting, so I plan to submit it separately at a later time.
commit b305b83ab90c77242030727139c9b2e04f4de11e
Author: Xin Li (Intel) <xin@zytor.com>
Date: Fri Aug 29 12:22:35 2025 -0400
x86/cea: Simplify cea_exception_stacks by removing ESTACKS_MEMBERS()
With most accesses to cea_exception_stacks now using array-style indexing,
the ESTACKS_MEMBERS() macro is no longer necessary in cea_exception_stacks
and can be removed to streamline the structure and improve code
readability.
Remove the CEA_ESTACK_SIZE macro, which redundantly defines
EXCEPTION_STKSZ.
Signed-off-by: Xin Li (Intel) <xin@zytor.com>
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpu_entry_area.h
b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpu_entry_area.h
index 58cd71144e5e..509e52fc3a0f 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpu_entry_area.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpu_entry_area.h
@@ -52,22 +52,15 @@ struct exception_stacks {
/* The effective cpu entry area mapping with guard pages. */
struct cea_exception_stacks {
- union{
- struct {
- ESTACKS_MEMBERS(PAGE_SIZE, EXCEPTION_STKSZ)
- };
- struct {
- char stack_guard[PAGE_SIZE];
- char stack[EXCEPTION_STKSZ];
- } event_stacks[N_EXCEPTION_STACKS];
- };
+ struct {
+ char stack_guard[PAGE_SIZE];
+ char stack[EXCEPTION_STKSZ];
+ } event_stacks[N_EXCEPTION_STACKS];
+ char IST_top_guard[PAGE_SIZE];
};
-#define CEA_ESTACK_SIZE(st) \
- sizeof(((struct cea_exception_stacks *)0)->st## _stack)
-
#define CEA_ESTACK_OFFS(st) \
- offsetof(struct cea_exception_stacks, st## _stack)
+ offsetof(struct cea_exception_stacks, event_stacks[st].stack)
#define CEA_ESTACK_PAGES \
(sizeof(struct cea_exception_stacks) / PAGE_SIZE)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack_64.c b/arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack_64.c
index 40f51e278171..93b10b264e53 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack_64.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack_64.c
@@ -70,9 +70,9 @@ struct estack_pages {
#define EPAGERANGE(st) \
[PFN_DOWN(CEA_ESTACK_OFFS(st)) ... \
- PFN_DOWN(CEA_ESTACK_OFFS(st) + CEA_ESTACK_SIZE(st) - 1)] = { \
+ PFN_DOWN(CEA_ESTACK_OFFS(st) + EXCEPTION_STKSZ - 1)] = { \
.offs = CEA_ESTACK_OFFS(st), \
- .size = CEA_ESTACK_SIZE(st), \
+ .size = EXCEPTION_STKSZ, \
.type = STACK_TYPE_EXCEPTION + st, }
/*
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/cpu_entry_area.c b/arch/x86/mm/cpu_entry_area.c
index 595c2e03ddd5..de0deb8b824c 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/cpu_entry_area.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/cpu_entry_area.c
@@ -157,7 +157,7 @@ static void __init percpu_setup_debug_store(unsigned
int cpu)
#define cea_map_stack(name) do { \
npages = sizeof(estacks->name## _stack) / PAGE_SIZE; \
- cea_map_percpu_pages(cea->estacks.name## _stack, \
+ cea_map_percpu_pages(cea->estacks.event_stacks[name].stack, \
estacks->name## _stack, npages, PAGE_KERNEL); \
} while (0)
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2025-08-29 16:53 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 23+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2025-08-29 15:31 [PATCH v7 00/21] Enable FRED with KVM VMX Xin Li (Intel)
2025-08-29 15:31 ` [PATCH v7 01/21] KVM: VMX: Add support for the secondary VM exit controls Xin Li (Intel)
2025-08-29 15:31 ` [PATCH v7 02/21] KVM: VMX: Initialize VM entry/exit FRED controls in vmcs_config Xin Li (Intel)
2025-08-29 15:31 ` [PATCH v7 03/21] KVM: VMX: Disable FRED if FRED consistency checks fail Xin Li (Intel)
2025-08-29 15:31 ` [PATCH v7 04/21] x86/cea: Prefix event stack names with ESTACK_ Xin Li (Intel)
2025-08-29 15:31 ` [PATCH v7 05/21] x86/cea: Export API for per-CPU exception stacks for KVM Xin Li (Intel)
2025-08-29 16:52 ` Xin Li [this message]
2025-08-29 15:31 ` [PATCH v7 06/21] KVM: VMX: Initialize VMCS FRED fields Xin Li (Intel)
2025-08-29 15:31 ` [PATCH v7 07/21] KVM: VMX: Set FRED MSR intercepts Xin Li (Intel)
2025-08-29 15:31 ` [PATCH v7 08/21] KVM: VMX: Save/restore guest FRED RSP0 Xin Li (Intel)
2025-08-29 15:31 ` [PATCH v7 09/21] KVM: VMX: Add support for saving and restoring FRED MSRs Xin Li (Intel)
2025-08-29 15:31 ` [PATCH v7 10/21] KVM: x86: Add a helper to detect if FRED is enabled for a vCPU Xin Li (Intel)
2025-08-29 15:31 ` [PATCH v7 11/21] KVM: VMX: Virtualize FRED event_data Xin Li (Intel)
2025-08-29 15:31 ` [PATCH v7 12/21] KVM: VMX: Virtualize FRED nested exception tracking Xin Li (Intel)
2025-08-29 15:31 ` [PATCH v7 13/21] KVM: x86: Save/restore the nested flag of an exception Xin Li (Intel)
2025-08-29 15:31 ` [PATCH v7 14/21] KVM: x86: Mark CR4.FRED as not reserved Xin Li (Intel)
2025-08-29 15:31 ` [PATCH v7 15/21] KVM: VMX: Dump FRED context in dump_vmcs() Xin Li (Intel)
2025-08-29 15:31 ` [PATCH v7 16/21] KVM: x86: Advertise support for FRED Xin Li (Intel)
2025-08-29 15:31 ` [PATCH v7 17/21] KVM: nVMX: Add support for the secondary VM exit controls Xin Li (Intel)
2025-08-29 15:31 ` [PATCH v7 18/21] KVM: nVMX: Add FRED VMCS fields to nested VMX context handling Xin Li (Intel)
2025-08-29 15:31 ` [PATCH v7 19/21] KVM: nVMX: Add FRED-related VMCS field checks Xin Li (Intel)
2025-08-29 15:31 ` [PATCH v7 20/21] KVM: nVMX: Add prerequisites to SHADOW_FIELD_R[OW] macros Xin Li (Intel)
2025-08-29 15:31 ` [PATCH v7 21/21] KVM: nVMX: Allow VMX FRED controls Xin Li (Intel)
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