Re: [PATCH v10 01/15] x86/cpu: Enumerate the LASS feature bits

[Sohil Mehta <sohil.mehta@intel.com>]

On 10/7/2025 11:28 AM, Dave Hansen wrote:

> STAC/CLAC are also architected to:
> 
> 	#UD - If CPUID.(EAX=07H, ECX=0H):EBX.SMAP[bit 20] = 0.
> 
> So, even though LASS _technically_ doesn't require SMAP, it would be a
> real pain without SMAP and STAC/CLAC. Thus, this series relies on SMAP
> being present.
> 

The spec says,
"A supervisor-mode data access causes a LASS violation if it would
access a linear address of which bit 63 is 0, supervisor-mode access
protection is enabled (by setting CR4.SMAP), and either RFLAGS.AC = 0 or
the access is an implicit supervisor-mode access."

One could argue that the LASS hardware enforcement of the kernel data
accesses *depends* on SMAP being enabled.

> Actually, it might be worth breaking this dependency hunk out into its
> own patch, just so there's a nice clean place to discuss this.

Sure, we can talk about the above wording in the spec, as well as the
STAC/CLAC dependency in a separate patch.

I included some information in the cover letter to explain that:

When there are valid reasons for the kernel to access memory in the user
half, it can temporarily suspend LASS enforcement by toggling the
RFLAGS.AC bit. Most of these cases are already covered today through the
stac()/clac() pairs, which avoid SMAP violations. However, there are
kernel usages, such as text poking, that access mappings (!_PAGE_USER)
in the lower half of the address space. LASS-specific AC bit toggling is
added for these cases.