Re: [PATCH v14 3/3] ACPI: APEI: handle synchronous exceptions in task work

Shuai Xue
2024-10-26T06:46:59Z

在 2024/10/25 22:40, Jarkko Sakkinen 写道:
> On Tue Oct 22, 2024 at 4:11 AM EEST, Shuai Xue wrote:
>> Hi, Jarkko,
>>
>>
>> 在 2024/10/14 16:42, Shuai Xue 写道:
>>> The memory uncorrected error could be signaled by asynchronous interrupt
>>> (specifically, SPI in arm64 platform), e.g. when an error is detected by
>>> a background scrubber, or signaled by synchronous exception
>>> (specifically, data abort excepction in arm64 platform), e.g. when a CPU
>>> tries to access a poisoned cache line. Currently, both synchronous and
>>> asynchronous error use memory_failure_queue() to schedule
>>> memory_failure() exectute in kworker context.
>>>
>>> As a result, when a user-space process is accessing a poisoned data, a
>>> data abort is taken and the memory_failure() is executed in the kworker
>>> context:
>>>
>>> - will send wrong si_code by SIGBUS signal in early_kill mode, and
>>> - can not kill the user-space in some cases resulting a synchronous
>>> error infinite loop
>>>
>>> Issue 1: send wrong si_code in early_kill mode
>>>
>>> Since commit a70297d22132 ("ACPI: APEI: set memory failure flags as
>>> MF_ACTION_REQUIRED on synchronous events")', the flag MF_ACTION_REQUIRED
>>> could be used to determine whether a synchronous exception occurs on
>>> ARM64 platform. When a synchronous exception is detected, the kernel is
>>> expected to terminate the current process which has accessed poisoned
>>> page. This is done by sending a SIGBUS signal with an error code
>>> BUS_MCEERR_AR, indicating an action-required machine check error on
>>> read.
>>>
>>> However, when kill_proc() is called to terminate the processes who have
>>> the poisoned page mapped, it sends the incorrect SIGBUS error code
>>> BUS_MCEERR_AO because the context in which it operates is not the one
>>> where the error was triggered.
>>>
>>> To reproduce this problem:
>>>
>>> #sysctl -w vm.memory_failure_early_kill=1
>>> vm.memory_failure_early_kill = 1
>>>
>>> # STEP2: inject an UCE error and consume it to trigger a synchronous error
>>> #einj_mem_uc single
>>> 0: single vaddr = 0xffffb0d75400 paddr = 4092d55b400
>>> injecting ...
>>> triggering ...
>>> signal 7 code 5 addr 0xffffb0d75000
>>> page not present
>>> Test passed
>>>
>>> The si_code (code 5) from einj_mem_uc indicates that it is BUS_MCEERR_AO
>>> error and it is not fact.
>>>
>>> After this patch:
>>>
>>> # STEP1: enable early kill mode
>>> #sysctl -w vm.memory_failure_early_kill=1
>>> vm.memory_failure_early_kill = 1
>>> # STEP2: inject an UCE error and consume it to trigger a synchronous error
>>> #einj_mem_uc single
>>> 0: single vaddr = 0xffffb0d75400 paddr = 4092d55b400
>>> injecting ...
>>> triggering ...
>>> signal 7 code 4 addr 0xffffb0d75000
>>> page not present
>>> Test passed
>>>
>>> The si_code (code 4) from einj_mem_uc indicates that it is BUS_MCEERR_AR
>>> error as we expected.
>>>
>>> Issue 2: a synchronous error infinite loop
>>>
>>> If a user-space process, e.g. devmem, a poisoned page which has been set
>>> HWPosion flag, kill_accessing_process() is called to send SIGBUS to the
>>> current processs with error info. Because the memory_failure() is
>>> executed in the kworker contex, it will just do nothing but return
>>> EFAULT. So, devmem will access the posioned page and trigger an
>>> excepction again, resulting in a synchronous error infinite loop. Such
>>> loop may cause platform firmware to exceed some threshold and reboot
>>> when Linux could have recovered from this error.
>>>
>>> To reproduce this problem:
>>>
>>> # STEP 1: inject an UCE error, and kernel will set HWPosion flag for related page
>>> #einj_mem_uc single
>>> 0: single vaddr = 0xffffb0d75400 paddr = 4092d55b400
>>> injecting ...
>>> triggering ...
>>> signal 7 code 4 addr 0xffffb0d75000
>>> page not present
>>> Test passed
>>>
>>> # STEP 2: access the same page and it will trigger a synchronous error infinite loop
>>> devmem 0x4092d55b400
>>>
>>> To fix above two issues, queue memory_failure() as a task_work so that it runs in
>>> the context of the process that is actually consuming the poisoned data.
>>>
>>> Signed-off-by: Shuai Xue <xueshuai@linux.alibaba.com>
>>> Tested-by: Ma Wupeng <mawupeng1@huawei.com>
>>> Reviewed-by: Kefeng Wang <wangkefeng.wang@huawei.com>
>>> Reviewed-by: Xiaofei Tan <tanxiaofei@huawei.com>
>>> Reviewed-by: Baolin Wang <baolin.wang@linux.alibaba.com>
>>> ---
>>> drivers/acpi/apei/ghes.c | 78 +++++++++++++++++++++++-----------------
>>> include/acpi/ghes.h | 3 --
>>> include/linux/mm.h | 1 -
>>> mm/memory-failure.c | 13 -------
>>> 4 files changed, 45 insertions(+), 50 deletions(-)
>>>
>>> diff --git a/drivers/acpi/apei/ghes.c b/drivers/acpi/apei/ghes.c
>>> index f2ee28c44d7a..95e9520eb803 100644
>>> --- a/drivers/acpi/apei/ghes.c
>>> +++ b/drivers/acpi/apei/ghes.c
>>> @@ -467,28 +467,42 @@ static void ghes_clear_estatus(struct ghes *ghes,
>>> }
>>>
>>> /*
>>> - * Called as task_work before returning to user-space.
>>> - * Ensure any queued work has been done before we return to the context that
>>> - * triggered the notification.
>>> + * struct ghes_task_work - for synchronous RAS event
>>> + *
>>> + * @twork: callback_head for task work
>>> + * @pfn: page frame number of corrupted page
>>> + * @flags: work control flags
>>> + *
>>> + * Structure to pass task work to be handled before
>>> + * returning to user-space via task_work_add().
>>> */
>>
>>
>> Do you have any futer comments about this patch? Any comments are
>> welcomed. If not, are you happy to explictly give the reveiwed-by tag?
>
> Sorry I've been busy switching to a new job.
>
> I read this now through and both commit messages and the code changes
> look sane to me so I guess I don't have any problem with that:
>
> Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
>
>>
>> Best Regard,
>> Shuai
>
> BR, Jarkko

Thank you.

BR. Shuai