From: Ross Philipson <ross.philipson@oracle.com>
To: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org,
linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org,
linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, iommu@lists.linux-foundation.org,
kexec@lists.infradead.org, linux-efi@vger.kernel.org,
dpsmith@apertussolutions.com, tglx@linutronix.de,
mingo@redhat.com, bp@alien8.de, hpa@zytor.com, ardb@kernel.org,
mjg59@srcf.ucam.org, James.Bottomley@hansenpartnership.com,
luto@amacapital.net, nivedita@alum.mit.edu,
kanth.ghatraju@oracle.com, trenchboot-devel@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v6 08/14] x86: Secure Launch kernel late boot stub
Date: Fri, 5 May 2023 14:59:24 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <12e91cad-340c-cf90-ab10-16b099bb254f@oracle.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <ZFVCZ1EDxQgdyocc@kernel.org>
On 5/5/23 13:52, Simon Horman wrote:
> On Thu, May 04, 2023 at 02:50:17PM +0000, Ross Philipson wrote:
>> The routine slaunch_setup is called out of the x86 specific setup_arch
>> routine during early kernel boot. After determining what platform is
>> present, various operations specific to that platform occur. This
>> includes finalizing setting for the platform late launch and verifying
>> that memory protections are in place.
>>
>> For TXT, this code also reserves the original compressed kernel setup
>> area where the APs were left looping so that this memory cannot be used.
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Ross Philipson <ross.philipson@oracle.com>
>
> Hi Ross,
>
> a few nits from my side.
Yup we will fix all of those.
Thanks
Ross
>
>> +/*
>> + * The TXT heap is too big to map all at once with early_ioremap
>> + * so it is done a table at a time.
>> + */
>> +static void __init *txt_early_get_heap_table(void __iomem *txt, u32 type,
>> + u32 bytes)
>> +{
>> + u64 base, size, offset = 0;
>> + void *heap;
>> + int i;
>> +
>> + if (type > TXT_SINIT_TABLE_MAX)
>> + slaunch_txt_reset(txt,
>> + "Error invalid table type for early heap walk\n",
>> + SL_ERROR_HEAP_WALK);
>
> nit: the indentation should align to the opening '('.
>
> slaunch_txt_reset(txt,
> "Error invalid table type for early heap walk\n",
> SL_ERROR_HEAP_WALK);
>
> Likewise in a few other places in this patch.
>
> ...
>
>> +static void __init slaunch_txt_reserve_range(u64 base, u64 size)
>> +{
>> + int type;
>> +
>> + type = e820__get_entry_type(base, base + size - 1);
>> + if (type == E820_TYPE_RAM) {
>> + pr_info("memblock reserve base: %llx size: %llx\n", base, size);
>> + memblock_reserve(base, size);
>> + }
>> +}
>> +
>> +/*
>> + * For Intel, certain regions of memory must be marked as reserved by putting
>> + * them on the memblock reserved list if they are not already e820 reserved.
>> + * This includes:
>> + * - The TXT HEAP
>> + * - The ACM area
>> + * - The TXT private register bank
>> + * - The MDR list sent to the MLE by the ACM (see TXT specification)
>> + * (Normally the above are properly reserved by firmware but if it was not
>> + * done, reserve them now)
>> + * - The AP wake block
>> + * - TPM log external to the TXT heap
>> + *
>> + * Also if the low PMR doesn't cover all memory < 4G, any RAM regions above
>> + * the low PMR must be reservered too.
>
> nit: s/reservered/reserved/
>
>> + */
>> +static void __init slaunch_txt_reserve(void __iomem *txt)
>> +{
>> + struct txt_sinit_memory_descriptor_record *mdr;
>> + struct txt_sinit_mle_data *sinit_mle_data;
>> + u64 base, size, heap_base, heap_size;
>> + u32 mdrnum, mdroffset, mdrslen;
>> + u32 field_offset, i;
>> + void *mdrs;
>> +
>> + base = TXT_PRIV_CONFIG_REGS_BASE;
>> + size = TXT_PUB_CONFIG_REGS_BASE - TXT_PRIV_CONFIG_REGS_BASE;
>> + slaunch_txt_reserve_range(base, size);
>> +
>> + memcpy_fromio(&heap_base, txt + TXT_CR_HEAP_BASE, sizeof(heap_base));
>> + memcpy_fromio(&heap_size, txt + TXT_CR_HEAP_SIZE, sizeof(heap_size));
>> + slaunch_txt_reserve_range(heap_base, heap_size);
>> +
>> + memcpy_fromio(&base, txt + TXT_CR_SINIT_BASE, sizeof(base));
>> + memcpy_fromio(&size, txt + TXT_CR_SINIT_SIZE, sizeof(size));
>> + slaunch_txt_reserve_range(base, size);
>> +
>> + field_offset = offsetof(struct txt_sinit_mle_data,
>> + sinit_vtd_dmar_table_size);
>> + sinit_mle_data = txt_early_get_heap_table(txt, TXT_SINIT_MLE_DATA_TABLE,
>> + field_offset);
>> +
>> + mdrnum = sinit_mle_data->num_of_sinit_mdrs;
>> + mdroffset = sinit_mle_data->sinit_mdrs_table_offset;
>> +
>> + txt_early_put_heap_table(sinit_mle_data, field_offset);
>> +
>> + if (!mdrnum)
>> + goto nomdr;
>> +
>> + mdrslen = mdrnum * sizeof(struct txt_sinit_memory_descriptor_record);
>> +
>> + mdrs = txt_early_get_heap_table(txt, TXT_SINIT_MLE_DATA_TABLE,
>> + mdroffset + mdrslen - 8);
>> +
>> + mdr = mdrs + mdroffset - 8;
>> +
>> + for (i = 0; i < mdrnum; i++, mdr++) {
>> + /* Spec says some entries can have length 0, ignore them */
>> + if (mdr->type > 0 && mdr->length > 0)
>> + slaunch_txt_reserve_range(mdr->address, mdr->length);
>> + }
>> +
>> + txt_early_put_heap_table(mdrs, mdroffset + mdrslen - 8);
>> +
>> +nomdr:
>> + slaunch_txt_reserve_range(ap_wake_info.ap_wake_block,
>> + ap_wake_info.ap_wake_block_size);
>> +
>> + /*
>> + * Earlier checks ensured that the event log was properly situated
>> + * either inside the TXT heap or outside. This is a check to see if the
>> + * event log needs to be reserved. If it is in the TXT heap, it is
>> + * already reserved.
>> + */
>> + if (evtlog_addr < heap_base || evtlog_addr > (heap_base + heap_size))
>> + slaunch_txt_reserve_range(evtlog_addr, evtlog_size);
>> +
>> + for (i = 0; i < e820_table->nr_entries; i++) {
>> + base = e820_table->entries[i].addr;
>> + size = e820_table->entries[i].size;
>> + if ((base >= vtd_pmr_lo_size) && (base < 0x100000000ULL))
>
> nit: unnecessary parentheses
>
>> + slaunch_txt_reserve_range(base, size);
>> + else if ((base < vtd_pmr_lo_size) &&
>> + (base + size > vtd_pmr_lo_size))
>> + slaunch_txt_reserve_range(vtd_pmr_lo_size,
>> + base + size - vtd_pmr_lo_size);
>> + }
>> +}
>> +
>> +/*
>> + * TXT stashes a safe copy of the DMAR ACPI table to prevent tampering.
>> + * It is stored in the TXT heap. Fetch it from there and make it available
>> + * to the IOMMU driver.
>> + */
>> +static void __init slaunch_copy_dmar_table(void __iomem *txt)
>> +{
>> + struct txt_sinit_mle_data *sinit_mle_data;
>> + u32 field_offset, dmar_size, dmar_offset;
>> + void *dmar;
>> +
>> + memset(&txt_dmar, 0, PAGE_SIZE);
>> +
>> + field_offset = offsetof(struct txt_sinit_mle_data,
>> + processor_scrtm_status);
>> + sinit_mle_data = txt_early_get_heap_table(txt, TXT_SINIT_MLE_DATA_TABLE,
>> + field_offset);
>> +
>> + dmar_size = sinit_mle_data->sinit_vtd_dmar_table_size;
>> + dmar_offset = sinit_mle_data->sinit_vtd_dmar_table_offset;
>> +
>> + txt_early_put_heap_table(sinit_mle_data, field_offset);
>> +
>> + if (!dmar_size || !dmar_offset)
>> + slaunch_txt_reset(txt,
>> + "Error invalid DMAR table values\n",
>> + SL_ERROR_HEAP_INVALID_DMAR);
>> +
>> + if (unlikely(dmar_size > PAGE_SIZE))
>> + slaunch_txt_reset(txt,
>> + "Error DMAR too big to store\n",
>> + SL_ERROR_HEAP_DMAR_SIZE);
>> +
>> +
>
> nit: one blank line is enough
>
>> + dmar = txt_early_get_heap_table(txt, TXT_SINIT_MLE_DATA_TABLE,
>> + dmar_offset + dmar_size - 8);
>> + if (!dmar)
>> + slaunch_txt_reset(txt,
>> + "Error early_ioremap of DMAR\n",
>> + SL_ERROR_HEAP_DMAR_MAP);
>> +
>> + memcpy(&txt_dmar[0], dmar + dmar_offset - 8, dmar_size);
>> +
>> + txt_early_put_heap_table(dmar, dmar_offset + dmar_size - 8);
>> +}
>
> ...
>
>> +/*
>> + * Intel TXT specific late stub setup and validation.
>> + */
>> +void __init slaunch_setup_txt(void)
>> +{
>> + u64 one = TXT_REGVALUE_ONE, val;
>> + void __iomem *txt;
>> +
>> + if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SMX))
>> + return;
>> +
>> + /*
>> + * If booted through secure launch entry point, the loadflags
>> + * option will be set.
>> + */
>> + if (!(boot_params.hdr.loadflags & SLAUNCH_FLAG))
>> + return;
>> +
>> + /*
>> + * See if SENTER was done by reading the status register in the
>> + * public space. If the public register space cannot be read, TXT may
>> + * be disabled.
>> + */
>> + txt = early_ioremap(TXT_PUB_CONFIG_REGS_BASE,
>> + TXT_NR_CONFIG_PAGES * PAGE_SIZE);
>> + if (!txt)
>> + return;
>> +
>> + memcpy_fromio(&val, txt + TXT_CR_STS, sizeof(val));
>> + early_iounmap(txt, TXT_NR_CONFIG_PAGES * PAGE_SIZE);
>> +
>> + /* SENTER should have been done */
>> + if (!(val & TXT_SENTER_DONE_STS))
>> + panic("Error TXT.STS SENTER_DONE not set\n");
>> +
>> + /* SEXIT should have been cleared */
>> + if (val & TXT_SEXIT_DONE_STS)
>> + panic("Error TXT.STS SEXIT_DONE set\n");
>> +
>> + /* Now we want to use the private register space */
>> + txt = early_ioremap(TXT_PRIV_CONFIG_REGS_BASE,
>> + TXT_NR_CONFIG_PAGES * PAGE_SIZE);
>> + if (!txt) {
>> + /* This is really bad, no where to go from here */
>> + panic("Error early_ioremap of TXT priv registers\n");
>> + }
>> +
>> + /*
>> + * Try to read the Intel VID from the TXT private registers to see if
>> + * TXT measured launch happened properly and the private space is
>> + * available.
>> + */
>> + memcpy_fromio(&val, txt + TXT_CR_DIDVID, sizeof(val));
>> + if ((val & 0xffff) != 0x8086) {
>> + /*
>> + * Can't do a proper TXT reset since it appears something is
>> + * wrong even though SENTER happened and it should be in SMX
>> + * mode.
>> + */
>> + panic("Invalid TXT vendor ID, not in SMX mode\n");
>> + }
>> +
>> + /* Set flags so subsequent code knows the status of the launch */
>> + sl_flags |= (SL_FLAG_ACTIVE|SL_FLAG_ARCH_TXT);
>
> nit: spaces around '|'
>
> ...
>
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2023-05-05 19:00 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 100+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2023-05-04 14:50 [PATCH v6 00/14] x86: Trenchboot secure dynamic launch Linux kernel support Ross Philipson
2023-05-04 14:50 ` [PATCH v6 01/14] x86/boot: Place kernel_info at a fixed offset Ross Philipson
2023-05-04 14:50 ` [PATCH v6 02/14] Documentation/x86: Secure Launch kernel documentation Ross Philipson
2023-05-05 16:19 ` Simon Horman
2023-05-05 17:32 ` Ross Philipson
2023-05-06 8:48 ` Bagas Sanjaya
2023-05-10 15:41 ` Ross Philipson
2023-05-12 10:47 ` Matthew Garrett
2023-06-16 16:44 ` Daniel P. Smith
2023-06-16 16:54 ` Matthew Garrett
2023-06-16 18:21 ` Daniel P. Smith
2023-05-12 13:19 ` Thomas Gleixner
2023-05-04 14:50 ` [PATCH v6 03/14] x86: Secure Launch Kconfig Ross Philipson
2023-05-04 14:50 ` [PATCH v6 04/14] x86: Secure Launch Resource Table header file Ross Philipson
2023-05-05 16:22 ` Simon Horman
2023-05-05 17:34 ` Ross Philipson
2023-05-10 23:04 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2023-05-15 20:58 ` Daniel P. Smith
2023-05-12 10:55 ` Matthew Garrett
2023-05-15 21:15 ` Daniel P. Smith
2023-05-15 21:22 ` Matthew Garrett
2023-05-16 0:41 ` Daniel P. Smith
2023-05-16 1:43 ` Matthew Garrett
2023-06-16 20:01 ` Daniel P. Smith
2023-06-16 20:15 ` Matthew Garrett
2023-07-07 19:31 ` Daniel P. Smith
2023-05-04 14:50 ` [PATCH v6 05/14] x86: Secure Launch main " Ross Philipson
2023-05-05 16:25 ` Simon Horman
2023-05-05 17:37 ` Ross Philipson
2023-05-12 11:00 ` Matthew Garrett
2023-05-12 16:10 ` Ross Philipson
2023-10-31 21:37 ` ross.philipson
2023-05-04 14:50 ` [PATCH v6 06/14] x86: Add early SHA support for Secure Launch early measurements Ross Philipson
2023-05-05 16:34 ` Simon Horman
2023-05-09 16:09 ` Daniel P. Smith
2023-05-10 1:21 ` Eric Biggers
2023-05-10 22:28 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2023-05-12 11:04 ` Matthew Garrett
2023-05-12 11:18 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2023-05-12 11:28 ` Matthew Garrett
2023-05-12 11:58 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2023-05-12 12:24 ` Andrew Cooper
2023-05-14 18:18 ` Eric Biggers
2023-05-14 19:11 ` Matthew Garrett
2023-05-12 13:24 ` Thomas Gleixner
2023-05-12 16:13 ` Matthew Garrett
2023-05-12 18:17 ` Thomas Gleixner
2023-05-12 19:12 ` Matthew Garrett
2023-05-12 19:42 ` Andrew Cooper
2023-05-15 21:23 ` Daniel P. Smith
2023-05-11 3:33 ` Herbert Xu
2023-05-16 0:50 ` Daniel P. Smith
2023-05-04 14:50 ` [PATCH v6 07/14] x86: Secure Launch kernel early boot stub Ross Philipson
2023-05-05 17:47 ` Simon Horman
2023-05-05 18:58 ` Ross Philipson
2023-05-05 19:46 ` Simon Horman
2023-05-12 11:26 ` Matthew Garrett
2023-05-12 16:17 ` Ross Philipson
2023-05-12 16:27 ` Matthew Garrett
2023-05-16 1:11 ` Daniel P. Smith
2023-05-16 1:45 ` Matthew Garrett
2023-06-15 18:00 ` Ross Philipson
2023-05-12 18:04 ` Thomas Gleixner
2023-05-15 20:13 ` Ross Philipson
2023-09-20 21:40 ` ross.philipson
2023-05-04 14:50 ` [PATCH v6 08/14] x86: Secure Launch kernel late " Ross Philipson
2023-05-05 17:52 ` Simon Horman
2023-05-05 18:59 ` Ross Philipson [this message]
2023-05-10 23:02 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2023-05-12 15:58 ` Ross Philipson
2023-05-24 2:55 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2023-05-12 15:44 ` Thomas Gleixner
2023-05-15 20:06 ` Ross Philipson
2023-05-04 14:50 ` [PATCH v6 09/14] x86: Secure Launch SMP bringup support Ross Philipson
2023-05-05 17:54 ` Simon Horman
2023-05-05 18:59 ` Ross Philipson
2023-05-10 22:55 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2023-05-11 16:21 ` Ross Philipson
2023-05-12 18:02 ` Thomas Gleixner
2023-05-15 20:19 ` Ross Philipson
2023-05-04 14:50 ` [PATCH v6 10/14] kexec: Secure Launch kexec SEXIT support Ross Philipson
2023-05-04 14:50 ` [PATCH v6 11/14] reboot: Secure Launch SEXIT support on reboot paths Ross Philipson
2023-05-12 11:40 ` Matthew Garrett
2023-05-15 18:16 ` Ross Philipson
2023-05-16 1:23 ` Daniel P. Smith
2023-05-04 14:50 ` [PATCH v6 12/14] x86: Secure Launch late initcall platform module Ross Philipson
2023-05-05 19:42 ` Simon Horman
2023-05-08 15:07 ` Ross Philipson
2023-05-10 22:39 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2023-05-12 15:53 ` Ross Philipson
2023-05-10 22:40 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2023-05-12 15:54 ` Ross Philipson
2023-05-04 14:50 ` [PATCH v6 13/14] tpm: Allow locality 2 to be set when initializing the TPM for Secure Launch Ross Philipson
2023-05-12 11:43 ` Matthew Garrett
2023-05-12 16:22 ` Ross Philipson
2023-05-16 1:37 ` Daniel P. Smith
2023-05-04 14:50 ` [PATCH v6 14/14] x86: EFI stub DRTM launch support " Ross Philipson
2023-05-05 8:39 ` [PATCH v6 00/14] x86: Trenchboot secure dynamic launch Linux kernel support Bagas Sanjaya
2023-05-05 15:45 ` Ross Philipson
2023-05-06 7:56 ` Bagas Sanjaya
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