Linux EFI development
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From: Matthew Garrett <matthew.garrett-05XSO3Yj/JvQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>
To: linux-kernel-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org
Cc: linux-efi-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org,
	linux-security-module-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org,
	Matthew Garrett
	<matthew.garrett-05XSO3Yj/JvQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>,
	Josh Boyer <jwboyer-H+wXaHxf7aLQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>
Subject: [PATCH 04/15] efi: Enable secure boot lockdown automatically when enabled in firmware
Date: Mon, 28 Jan 2013 11:42:28 -0500	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <1359391359-25783-5-git-send-email-matthew.garrett@nebula.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1359391359-25783-1-git-send-email-matthew.garrett-05XSO3Yj/JvQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>

The firmware has a set of flags that indicate whether secure boot is enabled
and enforcing. Use them to indicate whether the kernel should lock itself
down.  We also indicate the machine is in secure boot mode by adding the
EFI_SECURE_BOOT bit for use with efi_enabled.

Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <matthew.garrett-05XSO3Yj/JvQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>
Signed-off-by: Josh Boyer <jwboyer-H+wXaHxf7aLQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>
---
 Documentation/x86/zero-page.txt       |  2 ++
 arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c      | 32 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/bootparam.h |  3 ++-
 arch/x86/kernel/setup.c               |  5 +++++
 include/linux/cred.h                  |  2 ++
 include/linux/efi.h                   |  1 +
 6 files changed, 44 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/Documentation/x86/zero-page.txt b/Documentation/x86/zero-page.txt
index cf5437d..7f9ed48 100644
--- a/Documentation/x86/zero-page.txt
+++ b/Documentation/x86/zero-page.txt
@@ -27,6 +27,8 @@ Offset	Proto	Name		Meaning
 1E9/001	ALL	eddbuf_entries	Number of entries in eddbuf (below)
 1EA/001	ALL	edd_mbr_sig_buf_entries	Number of entries in edd_mbr_sig_buffer
 				(below)
+1EB/001	ALL	kbd_status	Numlock is enabled
+1EC/001	ALL	secure_boot	Kernel should enable secure boot lockdowns
 290/040	ALL	edd_mbr_sig_buffer EDD MBR signatures
 2D0/A00	ALL	e820_map	E820 memory map table
 				(array of struct e820entry)
diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c
index 18e329c..f44adce 100644
--- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c
+++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c
@@ -848,6 +848,36 @@ fail:
 	return status;
 }
 
+static int get_secure_boot(efi_system_table_t *_table)
+{
+	u8 sb, setup;
+	unsigned long datasize = sizeof(sb);
+	efi_guid_t var_guid = EFI_GLOBAL_VARIABLE_GUID;
+	efi_status_t status;
+
+	status = efi_call_phys5(sys_table->runtime->get_variable,
+				L"SecureBoot", &var_guid, NULL, &datasize, &sb);
+
+	if (status != EFI_SUCCESS)
+		return 0;
+
+	if (sb == 0)
+		return 0;
+
+
+	status = efi_call_phys5(sys_table->runtime->get_variable,
+				L"SetupMode", &var_guid, NULL, &datasize,
+				&setup);
+
+	if (status != EFI_SUCCESS)
+		return 0;
+
+	if (setup == 1)
+		return 0;
+
+	return 1;
+}
+
 /*
  * Because the x86 boot code expects to be passed a boot_params we
  * need to create one ourselves (usually the bootloader would create
@@ -1142,6 +1172,8 @@ struct boot_params *efi_main(void *handle, efi_system_table_t *_table,
 	if (sys_table->hdr.signature != EFI_SYSTEM_TABLE_SIGNATURE)
 		goto fail;
 
+	boot_params->secure_boot = get_secure_boot(sys_table);
+
 	setup_graphics(boot_params);
 
 	setup_efi_pci(boot_params);
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/bootparam.h b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/bootparam.h
index 92862cd..422e056 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/bootparam.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/bootparam.h
@@ -115,7 +115,8 @@ struct boot_params {
 	__u8  eddbuf_entries;				/* 0x1e9 */
 	__u8  edd_mbr_sig_buf_entries;			/* 0x1ea */
 	__u8  kbd_status;				/* 0x1eb */
-	__u8  _pad6[5];					/* 0x1ec */
+	__u8  secure_boot;				/* 0x1ec */
+	__u8  _pad6[4];					/* 0x1ed */
 	struct setup_header hdr;    /* setup header */	/* 0x1f1 */
 	__u8  _pad7[0x290-0x1f1-sizeof(struct setup_header)];
 	__u32 edd_mbr_sig_buffer[EDD_MBR_SIG_MAX];	/* 0x290 */
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c b/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c
index 8b24289..5355a54 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c
@@ -1042,6 +1042,11 @@ void __init setup_arch(char **cmdline_p)
 
 	io_delay_init();
 
+	if (boot_params.secure_boot) {
+		set_bit(EFI_SECURE_BOOT, &x86_efi_facility);
+		secureboot_enable();
+	}
+
 	/*
 	 * Parse the ACPI tables for possible boot-time SMP configuration.
 	 */
diff --git a/include/linux/cred.h b/include/linux/cred.h
index 04421e8..9e69542 100644
--- a/include/linux/cred.h
+++ b/include/linux/cred.h
@@ -156,6 +156,8 @@ extern int set_security_override_from_ctx(struct cred *, const char *);
 extern int set_create_files_as(struct cred *, struct inode *);
 extern void __init cred_init(void);
 
+extern void secureboot_enable(void);
+
 /*
  * check for validity of credentials
  */
diff --git a/include/linux/efi.h b/include/linux/efi.h
index 7a9498a..1ae16b6 100644
--- a/include/linux/efi.h
+++ b/include/linux/efi.h
@@ -627,6 +627,7 @@ extern int __init efi_setup_pcdp_console(char *);
 #define EFI_RUNTIME_SERVICES	3	/* Can we use runtime services? */
 #define EFI_MEMMAP		4	/* Can we use EFI memory map? */
 #define EFI_64BIT		5	/* Is the firmware 64-bit? */
+#define EFI_SECURE_BOOT	6	/* Are we in Secure Boot mode? */
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_EFI
 # ifdef CONFIG_X86
-- 
1.8.0.2

  parent reply	other threads:[~2013-01-28 16:42 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 19+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2013-01-28 16:42 [PATCH 00/15] Secure boot policy support Matthew Garrett
2013-01-28 16:42 ` [PATCH 01/15] Secure boot: Add new capability Matthew Garrett
2013-01-28 16:42 ` [PATCH 02/15] SELinux: define mapping for new Secure Boot capability Matthew Garrett
2013-01-28 16:42 ` [PATCH 05/15] PCI: Lock down BAR access in secure boot environments Matthew Garrett
2013-01-28 16:42 ` [PATCH 07/15] ACPI: Limit access to custom_method Matthew Garrett
2013-01-28 16:42 ` [PATCH 08/15] asus-wmi: Restrict debugfs interface Matthew Garrett
2013-01-28 16:42 ` [PATCH 09/15] Restrict /dev/mem and /dev/kmem in secure boot setups Matthew Garrett
2013-01-28 16:42 ` [PATCH 10/15] acpi: Ignore acpi_rsdp kernel parameter in a secure boot environment Matthew Garrett
2013-02-17  9:00   ` Dave Young
     [not found]     ` <CABqxG0cJGp7UEREvMW49QA0BfDXPsyEbAuMMLZwcHPdUAKT+Dw-JsoAwUIsXosN+BqQ9rBEUg@public.gmane.org>
2013-02-20 13:39       ` Josh Boyer
2013-01-28 16:42 ` [PATCH 11/15] Add EFI signature data types Matthew Garrett
2013-01-28 16:42 ` [PATCH 12/15] Add an EFI signature blob parser and key loader Matthew Garrett
2013-01-28 16:42 ` [PATCH 13/15] MODSIGN: Add module certificate blacklist keyring Matthew Garrett
     [not found] ` <1359391359-25783-1-git-send-email-matthew.garrett-05XSO3Yj/JvQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>
2013-01-28 16:42   ` [PATCH 03/15] Secure boot: Add a dummy kernel parameter that will switch on Secure Boot mode Matthew Garrett
2013-01-28 16:42   ` Matthew Garrett [this message]
2013-01-28 16:42   ` [PATCH 06/15] x86: Lock down IO port access in secure boot environments Matthew Garrett
2013-01-28 16:42   ` [PATCH 14/15] MODSIGN: Import certificates from UEFI Secure Boot Matthew Garrett
2013-01-28 16:42   ` [PATCH 15/15] MODSIGN: Always enforce module signing in a Secure Boot environment Matthew Garrett
2013-02-17 19:19   ` [PATCH 00/15] Secure boot policy support Yves-Alexis Perez

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