From mboxrd@z Thu Jan  1 00:00:00 1970
From: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 01/12] Security: Add CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL
Date: Wed, 20 Mar 2013 12:41:57 -0400
Message-ID: <1363797717.2580.10.camel@falcor1.watson.ibm.com>
References: <1363642353-30749-1-git-send-email-matthew.garrett@nebula.com>
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To: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Matthew Garrett <matthew.garrett@nebula.com>, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-efi@vger.kernel.org, kexec@lists.infradead.org, linux-pci@vger.kernel.org
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On Tue, 2013-03-19 at 15:47 +1100, James Morris wrote:
> On Mon, 18 Mar 2013, Matthew Garrett wrote:
> 
> > This patch introduces CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL. 
> 
> I'd like to see this named CAP_MODIFY_KERNEL, which is more accurate and 
> less emotive.  Otherwise I think core kernel developers will be scratching 
> their head over where to sprinkle this.
> 
> Apart from that, I like the idea, especially when it's wired up to MAC 
> security.

Matthrew, perhaps you could clarify whether this will be tied to MAC
security.  Based on the kexec thread, I'm under the impression that is
not the intention, or at least not for kexec.  As root isn't trusted,
neither is the boot command line, nor any policy that is loaded by root,
including those for MAC.

thanks,

Mimi