From: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley-d9PhHud1JfjCXq6kfMZ53/egYHeGw8Jk@public.gmane.org>
To: Josh Boyer
<jwboyer-rxtnV0ftBwyoClj4AeEUq9i2O/JbrIOy@public.gmane.org>,
Ard Biesheuvel
<ard.biesheuvel-QSEj5FYQhm4dnm+yROfE0A@public.gmane.org>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells-H+wXaHxf7aLQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>,
keyrings-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org,
Matthew Garrett
<matthew.garrett-05XSO3Yj/JvQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>,
"linux-efi-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org"
<linux-efi-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org>,
"linux-kernel-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org"
<linux-kernel-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org>,
linux-security-module
<linux-security-module-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 8/9] MODSIGN: Import certificates from UEFI Secure Boot
Date: Thu, 24 Nov 2016 11:22:17 -0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1480015337.2444.12.camel@HansenPartnership.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CA+5PVA6dWw-p3q9SBmJwQvuru4k7JZAraRZeb2=VDf8E=c=SmA-JsoAwUIsXosN+BqQ9rBEUg@public.gmane.org>
On Mon, 2016-11-21 at 11:25 -0500, Josh Boyer wrote:
> On Mon, Nov 21, 2016 at 11:16 AM, Ard Biesheuvel
> <ard.biesheuvel-QSEj5FYQhm4dnm+yROfE0A@public.gmane.org> wrote:
> > On 16 November 2016 at 18:11, David Howells <dhowells-H+wXaHxf7aLQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>
> > wrote:
> > > From: Josh Boyer <jwboyer-rxtnV0ftBwyoClj4AeEUq9i2O/JbrIOy@public.gmane.org>
> > >
> > > Secure Boot stores a list of allowed certificates in the 'db'
> > > variable. This imports those certificates into the system trusted
> > > keyring. This allows for a third party signing certificate to
> > > be used in conjunction with signed modules. By importing the
> > > public certificate into the 'db' variable, a user can allow a
> > > module signed with that certificate to load. The shim UEFI
> > > bootloader has a similar certificate list stored in the
> > > 'MokListRT' variable. We import those as well.
> > >
> >
> > This sounds like a bad idea to me. For the standard databases like
> > db and dbx, we can rely on the firmware to ensure that they are
> > what you expect. For MokListRt, not so much: anyone with sufficient
> > capabilities can generate such a variable from userland, and not
> > every arch/distro combo will be using shim and/or mokmanager. (The
> > debates are still ongoing, but my position is that there is no need
> > for shim at all on ARM given that the M$ problem only exists on
> > x86)
>
> In order for MokListRT to be modified, the user has to have physical
> access and boot into Mok and complete the enrollment. That is no
> different than simply enrolling in db or dbx. I don't see a
> difference in security under the thread model that Secure Boot is
> attempting to protect against.
Isn't a potential attack to write to MokListRT and then force a kexec?
That means shim doesn't validate the variable yet you treat it as
though it has been validated.
James
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2016-11-24 19:22 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 40+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2016-11-16 18:10 [PATCH 0/9] KEYS: Blacklisting & UEFI database load David Howells
2016-11-16 18:10 ` [PATCH 1/9] KEYS: Add a system blacklist keyring David Howells
2016-11-16 18:10 ` [PATCH 2/9] X.509: Allow X.509 certs to be blacklisted David Howells
2016-11-16 18:11 ` [PATCH 3/9] PKCS#7: Handle blacklisted certificates David Howells
2016-11-16 18:11 ` [PATCH 4/9] KEYS: Allow unrestricted boot-time addition of keys to secondary keyring David Howells
2016-11-17 6:41 ` Petko Manolov
2016-11-17 9:56 ` David Howells
2016-11-17 11:18 ` David Howells
[not found] ` <26349.1479376560-S6HVgzuS8uM4Awkfq6JHfwNdhmdF6hFW@public.gmane.org>
2016-11-17 10:22 ` Petko Manolov
2016-11-21 14:04 ` Mimi Zohar
2016-11-21 15:17 ` David Howells
2016-11-21 16:24 ` Mimi Zohar
2016-11-16 18:11 ` [PATCH 5/9] efi: Add SHIM and image security database GUID definitions David Howells
2016-11-21 16:07 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2016-11-16 18:11 ` [PATCH 6/9] efi: Add EFI signature data types David Howells
2016-11-16 23:43 ` Mat Martineau
[not found] ` <alpine.OSX.2.20.1611161535590.67352-zaFMaa3cLiZe6KzckbbZvYT4S9po1h25@public.gmane.org>
2016-11-17 9:44 ` David Howells
[not found] ` <26198.1479375840-S6HVgzuS8uM4Awkfq6JHfwNdhmdF6hFW@public.gmane.org>
2016-11-21 16:08 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2016-11-16 18:11 ` [PATCH 7/9] efi: Add an EFI signature blob parser David Howells
2016-11-16 18:11 ` [PATCH 8/9] MODSIGN: Import certificates from UEFI Secure Boot David Howells
2016-11-21 16:16 ` Ard Biesheuvel
[not found] ` <CAKv+Gu_QVyd1Jx7ZdnBzYmZzUnH4ZuhQgiGO-zx-JPViWosjXQ-JsoAwUIsXosN+BqQ9rBEUg@public.gmane.org>
2016-11-21 16:25 ` Josh Boyer
[not found] ` <CA+5PVA6dWw-p3q9SBmJwQvuru4k7JZAraRZeb2=VDf8E=c=SmA-JsoAwUIsXosN+BqQ9rBEUg@public.gmane.org>
2016-11-24 19:22 ` James Bottomley [this message]
2016-11-24 19:17 ` James Bottomley
2016-12-02 18:57 ` James Bottomley
2016-12-02 20:18 ` Mimi Zohar
2016-11-16 18:11 ` [PATCH 9/9] MODSIGN: Allow the "db" UEFI variable to be suppressed David Howells
[not found] ` <147931990959.16460.3038875071067540418.stgit-S6HVgzuS8uM4Awkfq6JHfwNdhmdF6hFW@public.gmane.org>
2016-11-21 16:18 ` Ard Biesheuvel
[not found] ` <CAKv+Gu96ihE7pHrCCeCpy78man-r821b3Vs4Tn_RsYyzY4HV2Q-JsoAwUIsXosN+BqQ9rBEUg@public.gmane.org>
2016-11-21 16:26 ` Josh Boyer
[not found] ` <CA+5PVA7SivAegwxdxuiAFL41Apie4JLK5KbtGGHLr1fP0p3MsQ-JsoAwUIsXosN+BqQ9rBEUg@public.gmane.org>
2016-11-21 16:42 ` Ard Biesheuvel
[not found] ` <CAKv+Gu__wAnOawWZWVF6NF3En0suuFTBrFwwZ5KosqBU8LVHMA-JsoAwUIsXosN+BqQ9rBEUg@public.gmane.org>
2016-11-21 19:05 ` Peter Jones
2016-11-21 19:06 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2016-11-21 19:18 ` Peter Jones
2016-11-21 19:33 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2018-03-06 14:05 ` [PATCH 0/9] KEYS: Blacklisting & UEFI database load Jiri Slaby
2018-03-07 13:18 ` Mimi Zohar
2018-03-07 15:28 ` James Bottomley
2018-03-11 3:20 ` joeyli
2018-03-19 14:12 ` Mimi Zohar
2018-03-27 11:08 ` joeyli
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