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From: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley-d9PhHud1JfjCXq6kfMZ53/egYHeGw8Jk@public.gmane.org>
To: David Howells <dhowells-H+wXaHxf7aLQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>,
	lukas-JFq808J9C/izQB+pC5nmwQ@public.gmane.org
Cc: linux-efi-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org,
	linux-kernel-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org,
	linux-security-module-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org,
	keyrings-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org,
	linux-arm-kernel-IAPFreCvJWM7uuMidbF8XUB+6BGkLq7r@public.gmane.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 5/7] efi: Get the secure boot status [ver #3]
Date: Thu, 24 Nov 2016 11:41:27 -0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <1480016487.2444.18.camel@HansenPartnership.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <147990565051.7576.9673287945782426886.stgit-S6HVgzuS8uM4Awkfq6JHfwNdhmdF6hFW@public.gmane.org>

On Wed, 2016-11-23 at 12:54 +0000, David Howells wrote:
> Get the firmware's secure-boot status in the kernel boot wrapper and 
> stash it somewhere that the main kernel image can find.
> 
> The efi_get_secureboot() function is extracted from the arm stub and 
> (a) generalised so that it can be called from x86 and (b) made to use
> efi_call_runtime() so that it can be run in mixed-mode.
> 
> Suggested-by: Lukas Wunner <lukas-JFq808J9C/izQB+pC5nmwQ@public.gmane.org>
> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells-H+wXaHxf7aLQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>

Since you seem to be using this to mean "is the platform locked down?",
this looks to be no longer complete in the UEFI 2.6 world.  If
DeployedMode == 0, even if SecureBoot == 1 and SetupMode == 0, you can
remove the platform key by writing 1 to AuditMode and gain control of
the secure variables.  The lock down state becomes DeployedMode == 1,
SecureBoot == 1 and SetupMode == 0

See the diagram on page 1817

http://www.uefi.org/sites/default/files/resources/UEFI%20Spec%202_6.pdf

James

  parent reply	other threads:[~2016-11-24 19:41 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 23+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2016-11-23 12:53 [PATCH 0/7] efi: Pass secure boot mode to kernel [ver #3] David Howells
2016-11-23 12:53 ` [PATCH 2/7] x86/efi: Allow invocation of arbitrary runtime services " David Howells
2016-11-23 12:53 ` [PATCH 3/7] arm/efi: " David Howells
     [not found] ` <147990561294.7576.6464430479448167484.stgit-S6HVgzuS8uM4Awkfq6JHfwNdhmdF6hFW@public.gmane.org>
2016-11-23 12:53   ` [PATCH 1/7] efi: use typed function pointers for runtime services table " David Howells
2016-11-23 12:54   ` [PATCH 4/7] efi: Add SHIM and image security database GUID definitions " David Howells
2016-11-23 12:54 ` [PATCH 5/7] efi: Get the secure boot status " David Howells
     [not found]   ` <147990565051.7576.9673287945782426886.stgit-S6HVgzuS8uM4Awkfq6JHfwNdhmdF6hFW@public.gmane.org>
2016-11-24 19:41     ` James Bottomley [this message]
2016-11-25  9:30       ` David Howells
     [not found]         ` <15173.1480066220-S6HVgzuS8uM4Awkfq6JHfwNdhmdF6hFW@public.gmane.org>
2016-11-25  9:52           ` Ard Biesheuvel
     [not found]         ` <CAKv+Gu_JxNLDjaK5jGbX9ACzM0uHJYMOFx7XDo4t7DtBMtFRGA-JsoAwUIsXosN+BqQ9rBEUg@public.gmane.org>
2016-11-25 12:03           ` David Howells
     [not found]             ` <16661.1480075392-S6HVgzuS8uM4Awkfq6JHfwNdhmdF6hFW@public.gmane.org>
2016-11-25 12:24               ` Ard Biesheuvel
2016-11-25 12:35                 ` David Howells
2016-11-25 12:43                   ` Ard Biesheuvel
2016-11-25 12:51                     ` David Howells
2016-11-25 12:52                       ` Ard Biesheuvel
     [not found]                   ` <CAKv+Gu9c-C2uXZ0fVatCM8ffXJZDgjBcDb_T0nsFecGqgrF11Q-JsoAwUIsXosN+BqQ9rBEUg@public.gmane.org>
2016-11-25 13:00                     ` David Howells
     [not found]                       ` <31374.1480078855-S6HVgzuS8uM4Awkfq6JHfwNdhmdF6hFW@public.gmane.org>
2016-11-25 13:50                         ` Ard Biesheuvel
2016-11-25 15:59                           ` David Howells
2016-11-25 16:50                       ` David Howells
2016-11-25 16:51                         ` Ard Biesheuvel
2016-11-25 16:57                           ` David Howells
2016-11-23 12:54 ` [PATCH 6/7] efi: Disable secure boot if shim is in insecure mode " David Howells
2016-11-23 12:54 ` [PATCH 7/7] efi: Add EFI_SECURE_BOOT bit " David Howells

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