From: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
To: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
Matthew Garrett <mjg59@srcf.ucam.org>,
linux-efi@vger.kernel.org, gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk,
Chun-Yi Lee <jlee@suse.com>,
gregkh@linuxfoundation.org, kexec@lists.infradead.org,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, keyrings@vger.kernel.org,
matthew.garrett@nebula.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH 09/24] kexec_file: Disable at runtime if securelevel has been set
Date: Fri, 07 Apr 2017 03:46:20 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1491551180.4184.50.camel@linux.vnet.ibm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <21572.1491548994@warthog.procyon.org.uk>
On Fri, 2017-04-07 at 08:09 +0100, David Howells wrote:
> Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> wrote:
>
> > > > + if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG) && kernel_is_locked_down())
> > > > + return -EPERM;
> > > > +
> > > >
> >
> > IMA can be used to verify file signatures too, based on the LSM hooks
> > in kernel_read_file_from_fd(). CONFIG_KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG should not be
> > required.
>
> Okay, fair enough. I can stick in an OR with an IS_ENABLED on some IMA
> symbol. CONFIG_IMA_KEXEC maybe? And also require IMA be enabled?
Not quite, since as Dave pointed out, IMA is policy driven. As a
policy is installed, we could set a flag.
Mimi
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2017-04-07 7:46 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 83+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2017-04-05 20:14 [PATCH 00/24] Kernel lockdown David Howells
2017-04-05 20:14 ` [PATCH 01/24] efi: Add EFI_SECURE_BOOT bit David Howells
2017-04-06 8:26 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2017-04-06 8:48 ` David Howells
2017-04-05 20:14 ` [PATCH 03/24] efi: Lock down the kernel if booted in secure boot mode David Howells
2017-04-05 20:15 ` [PATCH 04/24] Enforce module signatures if the kernel is locked down David Howells
2017-04-05 20:15 ` [PATCH 05/24] Restrict /dev/mem and /dev/kmem when " David Howells
2017-04-05 20:15 ` [PATCH 06/24] Add a sysrq option to exit secure boot mode David Howells
[not found] ` <149142332458.5101.14654616837280513947.stgit-S6HVgzuS8uM4Awkfq6JHfwNdhmdF6hFW@public.gmane.org>
2017-04-14 18:05 ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-04-14 18:15 ` Ard Biesheuvel
[not found] ` <CAKv+Gu-FDzdqACyr_z6Zsgb51mg8Lc0YgfLs4oGURWnX4WewSw-JsoAwUIsXosN+BqQ9rBEUg@public.gmane.org>
2017-04-14 23:16 ` David Howells
2017-04-16 20:46 ` Matt Fleming
2017-04-05 20:15 ` [PATCH 07/24] kexec: Disable at runtime if the kernel is locked down David Howells
[not found] ` <149142333752.5101.12956279967668146884.stgit-S6HVgzuS8uM4Awkfq6JHfwNdhmdF6hFW@public.gmane.org>
2017-04-07 3:07 ` Dave Young
2017-04-05 20:15 ` [PATCH 08/24] Copy secure_boot flag in boot params across kexec reboot David Howells
2017-04-05 20:16 ` [PATCH 10/24] hibernate: Disable when the kernel is locked down David Howells
2017-04-05 20:16 ` [PATCH 11/24] uswsusp: " David Howells
[not found] ` <149142336965.5101.2946578135980499557.stgit-S6HVgzuS8uM4Awkfq6JHfwNdhmdF6hFW@public.gmane.org>
2017-04-05 23:38 ` Rafael J. Wysocki
2017-04-06 6:39 ` Oliver Neukum
2017-04-06 8:41 ` David Howells
[not found] ` <14980.1491468060-S6HVgzuS8uM4Awkfq6JHfwNdhmdF6hFW@public.gmane.org>
2017-04-06 20:09 ` Rafael J. Wysocki
2017-04-06 20:12 ` Rafael J. Wysocki
2017-04-06 20:25 ` Jiri Kosina
2017-04-08 3:28 ` poma
2017-04-12 13:44 ` joeyli
2017-04-06 6:55 ` David Howells
2017-04-06 20:07 ` Rafael J. Wysocki
2017-04-05 20:16 ` [PATCH 12/24] PCI: Lock down BAR access " David Howells
[not found] ` <149142337836.5101.13971561682218232219.stgit-S6HVgzuS8uM4Awkfq6JHfwNdhmdF6hFW@public.gmane.org>
2017-04-18 17:50 ` Bjorn Helgaas
2017-04-05 20:16 ` [PATCH 14/24] x86: Restrict MSR " David Howells
2017-04-14 18:30 ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-04-05 20:16 ` [PATCH 15/24] asus-wmi: Restrict debugfs interface " David Howells
2017-04-07 10:25 ` Andy Shevchenko
2017-04-07 12:50 ` David Howells
2017-04-09 11:10 ` Andy Shevchenko
2017-04-10 13:16 ` David Howells
[not found] ` <13615.1491830208-S6HVgzuS8uM4Awkfq6JHfwNdhmdF6hFW@public.gmane.org>
2017-04-18 6:06 ` Andy Shevchenko
2017-04-18 14:34 ` Ben Hutchings
[not found] ` <1492526075.2409.140.camel-/+tVBieCtBitmTQ+vhA3Yw@public.gmane.org>
2017-04-18 14:55 ` David Howells
2017-04-18 15:19 ` Ben Hutchings
[not found] ` <1492528799.2409.145.camel-/+tVBieCtBitmTQ+vhA3Yw@public.gmane.org>
2017-04-18 15:34 ` David Howells
2017-04-18 15:30 ` David Howells
[not found] ` <16503.1492529434-S6HVgzuS8uM4Awkfq6JHfwNdhmdF6hFW@public.gmane.org>
2017-04-18 17:39 ` Ben Hutchings
2017-04-05 20:16 ` [PATCH 16/24] ACPI: Limit access to custom_method " David Howells
2017-04-05 20:16 ` [PATCH 17/24] acpi: Ignore acpi_rsdp kernel param when the kernel has been " David Howells
2017-04-06 19:43 ` Rafael J. Wysocki
2017-04-07 6:31 ` Dave Young
[not found] ` <20170407063107.GA10451-0VdLhd/A9Pl+NNSt+8eSiB/sF2h8X+2i0E9HWUfgJXw@public.gmane.org>
2017-04-07 7:05 ` David Howells
2017-04-07 7:39 ` Dave Young
2017-04-05 20:17 ` [PATCH 18/24] acpi: Disable ACPI table override if the kernel is " David Howells
2017-04-05 20:17 ` [PATCH 19/24] acpi: Disable APEI error injection " David Howells
2017-04-05 20:17 ` [PATCH 20/24] bpf: Restrict kernel image access functions when " David Howells
2017-04-06 12:29 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2017-04-06 12:40 ` Ard Biesheuvel
[not found] ` <149142344547.5101.4518618716303032193.stgit-S6HVgzuS8uM4Awkfq6JHfwNdhmdF6hFW@public.gmane.org>
2017-04-12 14:57 ` joeyli
2017-04-13 8:46 ` David Howells
2017-04-05 20:17 ` [PATCH 21/24] scsi: Lock down the eata driver David Howells
[not found] ` <149142326734.5101.4596394505987813763.stgit-S6HVgzuS8uM4Awkfq6JHfwNdhmdF6hFW@public.gmane.org>
2017-04-05 20:14 ` [PATCH 02/24] Add the ability to lock down access to the running kernel image David Howells
2017-04-05 20:15 ` [PATCH 09/24] kexec_file: Disable at runtime if securelevel has been set David Howells
[not found] ` <149142335441.5101.2294976563846442575.stgit-S6HVgzuS8uM4Awkfq6JHfwNdhmdF6hFW@public.gmane.org>
2017-04-07 3:05 ` Dave Young
2017-04-07 3:49 ` Mimi Zohar
[not found] ` <1491536950.4184.10.camel-23VcF4HTsmIX0ybBhKVfKdBPR1lH4CV8@public.gmane.org>
2017-04-07 6:19 ` Dave Young
2017-04-07 7:45 ` Mimi Zohar
2017-04-07 8:01 ` Dave Young
2017-04-07 7:07 ` David Howells
[not found] ` <21418.1491548875-S6HVgzuS8uM4Awkfq6JHfwNdhmdF6hFW@public.gmane.org>
2017-04-07 7:41 ` Dave Young
[not found] ` <20170407074159.GB10737-0VdLhd/A9Pl+NNSt+8eSiB/sF2h8X+2i0E9HWUfgJXw@public.gmane.org>
2017-04-07 8:28 ` Mimi Zohar
[not found] ` <1491553688.4184.73.camel-23VcF4HTsmIX0ybBhKVfKdBPR1lH4CV8@public.gmane.org>
2017-04-07 8:42 ` Dave Young
2017-04-07 7:09 ` David Howells
2017-04-07 7:46 ` Mimi Zohar [this message]
2017-04-07 9:17 ` David Howells
2017-04-07 12:36 ` Mimi Zohar
2017-04-10 13:19 ` David Howells
[not found] ` <13679.1491830392-S6HVgzuS8uM4Awkfq6JHfwNdhmdF6hFW@public.gmane.org>
2017-05-02 19:01 ` Mimi Zohar
2017-04-05 20:16 ` [PATCH 13/24] x86: Lock down IO port access when the kernel is locked down David Howells
[not found] ` <149142338597.5101.14728426552744019377.stgit-S6HVgzuS8uM4Awkfq6JHfwNdhmdF6hFW@public.gmane.org>
2017-04-14 18:28 ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-04-05 20:17 ` [PATCH 22/24] Prohibit PCMCIA CIS storage " David Howells
2017-04-05 20:17 ` [PATCH 23/24] Lock down TIOCSSERIAL David Howells
2017-04-05 20:18 ` [PATCH 24/24] Lock down module params that specify hardware parameters (eg. ioport) David Howells
2017-04-07 15:59 ` [PATCH 00/24] Kernel lockdown Austin S. Hemmelgarn
[not found] ` <25acabf2-ac99-3c2b-ee9a-53d71b5c77f2-Re5JQEeQqe8AvxtiuMwx3w@public.gmane.org>
2017-04-07 16:29 ` Justin Forbes
2017-04-10 23:15 ` Why kernel lockdown? David Howells
-- strict thread matches above, loose matches on Subject: below --
2017-04-05 17:09 [PATCH 00/24] Kernel lockdown David Howells
2017-04-05 17:11 ` [PATCH 09/24] kexec_file: Disable at runtime if securelevel has been set David Howells
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