Re: [PATCH 3/3] x86/efi: Use efi_switch_mm() rather than manually twiddling with cr3

Andy Lutomirski
2017-08-21T15:23:10Z

> On Aug 21, 2017, at 7:08 AM, Peter Zijlstra <peterz-wEGCiKHe2LqWVfeAwA7xHQ@public.gmane.org> wrote:
>
>> On Mon, Aug 21, 2017 at 06:56:01AM -0700, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
>>
>>
>>> On Aug 21, 2017, at 3:33 AM, Peter Zijlstra <peterz-wEGCiKHe2LqWVfeAwA7xHQ@public.gmane.org> wrote:
>
>>>>
>>>> Using a kernel thread solves the problem for real. Anything that
>>>> blindly accesses user memory in kernel thread context is terminally
>>>> broken no matter what.
>>>
>>> So perf-callchain doesn't do it 'blindly', it wants either:
>>>
>>> - user_mode(regs) true, or
>>> - task_pt_regs() set.
>>>
>>> However I'm thinking that if the kernel thread has ->mm == &efi_mm, the
>>> EFI code running could very well have user_mode(regs) being true.
>>>
>>> intel_pmu_pebs_fixup() OTOH 'blindly' assumes that the LBR addresses are
>>> accessible. It bails on error though. So while its careful, it does
>>> attempt to access the 'user' mapping directly. Which should also trigger
>>> with the EFI code.
>>>
>>> And I'm not seeing anything particularly broken with either. The PEBS
>>> fixup relies on the CPU having just executed the code, and if it could
>>> fetch and execute the code, why shouldn't it be able to fetch and read?
>>
>> There are two ways this could be a problem. One is that u privileged
>> user apps shouldn't be able to read from EFI memory.
>
> Ah, but only root can create per-cpu events or attach events to kernel
> threads (with sensible paranoia levels).

But this may not need to be percpu. If a non root user can trigger, say, an EFI variable read in their own thread context, boom.

>
>> The other is that, if EFI were to have IO memory mapped at a "user"
>> address, perf could end up reading it.
>
> Ah, but in neither mode does perf assume much, the LBR follows branches
> the CPU took and thus we _know_ there was code there, not MMIO. And the
> stack unwind simply follows the stack up, although I suppose it could be
> 'tricked' into probing MMIO. We can certainly add an "->mm !=
> ->active_mm" escape clause to the unwind code.
>
> Although I don't see how we're currently avoiding the same problem with
> existing userspace unwinds, userspace can equally have MMIO mapped.

But user space at least only has IO mapped to which the user program in question has rights.

>
> But neither will use pre-existing user addresses in the efi_mm I think.