From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
To: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>
Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
dhowells@redhat.com, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
lukas@wunner.de, keyrings@vger.kernel.org,
linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 5/7] efi: Get the secure boot status [ver #3]
Date: Fri, 25 Nov 2016 09:30:20 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <15173.1480066220@warthog.procyon.org.uk> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1480016487.2444.18.camel@HansenPartnership.com>
James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com> wrote:
> Since you seem to be using this to mean "is the platform locked down?",
> this looks to be no longer complete in the UEFI 2.6 world. If
> DeployedMode == 0, even if SecureBoot == 1 and SetupMode == 0, you can
> remove the platform key by writing 1 to AuditMode and gain control of
> the secure variables. The lock down state becomes DeployedMode == 1,
> SecureBoot == 1 and SetupMode == 0
>
> See the diagram on page 1817
>
> http://www.uefi.org/sites/default/files/resources/UEFI%20Spec%202_6.pdf
How many pages?!
Does the DeployedMode variable not exist in older versions of the UEFI spec?
David
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2016-11-25 9:30 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 23+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2016-11-23 12:53 [PATCH 0/7] efi: Pass secure boot mode to kernel [ver #3] David Howells
[not found] ` <147990561294.7576.6464430479448167484.stgit-S6HVgzuS8uM4Awkfq6JHfwNdhmdF6hFW@public.gmane.org>
2016-11-23 12:53 ` [PATCH 1/7] efi: use typed function pointers for runtime services table " David Howells
2016-11-23 12:54 ` [PATCH 4/7] efi: Add SHIM and image security database GUID definitions " David Howells
2016-11-23 12:53 ` [PATCH 2/7] x86/efi: Allow invocation of arbitrary runtime services " David Howells
2016-11-23 12:53 ` [PATCH 3/7] arm/efi: " David Howells
2016-11-23 12:54 ` [PATCH 5/7] efi: Get the secure boot status " David Howells
[not found] ` <147990565051.7576.9673287945782426886.stgit-S6HVgzuS8uM4Awkfq6JHfwNdhmdF6hFW@public.gmane.org>
2016-11-24 19:41 ` James Bottomley
2016-11-25 9:30 ` David Howells [this message]
[not found] ` <15173.1480066220-S6HVgzuS8uM4Awkfq6JHfwNdhmdF6hFW@public.gmane.org>
2016-11-25 9:52 ` Ard Biesheuvel
[not found] ` <CAKv+Gu_JxNLDjaK5jGbX9ACzM0uHJYMOFx7XDo4t7DtBMtFRGA-JsoAwUIsXosN+BqQ9rBEUg@public.gmane.org>
2016-11-25 12:03 ` David Howells
[not found] ` <16661.1480075392-S6HVgzuS8uM4Awkfq6JHfwNdhmdF6hFW@public.gmane.org>
2016-11-25 12:24 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2016-11-25 12:35 ` David Howells
2016-11-25 12:43 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2016-11-25 12:51 ` David Howells
2016-11-25 12:52 ` Ard Biesheuvel
[not found] ` <CAKv+Gu9c-C2uXZ0fVatCM8ffXJZDgjBcDb_T0nsFecGqgrF11Q-JsoAwUIsXosN+BqQ9rBEUg@public.gmane.org>
2016-11-25 13:00 ` David Howells
[not found] ` <31374.1480078855-S6HVgzuS8uM4Awkfq6JHfwNdhmdF6hFW@public.gmane.org>
2016-11-25 13:50 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2016-11-25 15:59 ` David Howells
2016-11-25 16:50 ` David Howells
2016-11-25 16:51 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2016-11-25 16:57 ` David Howells
2016-11-23 12:54 ` [PATCH 6/7] efi: Disable secure boot if shim is in insecure mode " David Howells
2016-11-23 12:54 ` [PATCH 7/7] efi: Add EFI_SECURE_BOOT bit " David Howells
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