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From: Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@oracle.com>
To: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>
Cc: "Ard Biesheuvel" <ardb@kernel.org>,
	"Daniel P. Berrangé" <berrange@redhat.com>,
	"Emanuele Giuseppe Esposito" <eesposit@redhat.com>,
	"x86@kernel.org" <x86@kernel.org>,
	"Thomas Gleixner" <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	"bluca@debian.org" <bluca@debian.org>,
	"lennart@poettering.net" <lennart@poettering.net>,
	"Ingo Molnar" <mingo@redhat.com>,
	"Borislav Petkov" <bp@alien8.de>,
	"Dave Hansen" <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
	"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	"Andrew Morton" <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	"Masahiro Yamada" <masahiroy@kernel.org>,
	"Alexander Potapenko" <glider@google.com>,
	"Nick Desaulniers" <ndesaulniers@google.com>,
	"Vitaly Kuznetsov" <vkuznets@redhat.com>,
	"open list" <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	"linux-efi@vger.kernel.org" <linux-efi@vger.kernel.org>,
	"keyrings@vger.kernel.org" <keyrings@vger.kernel.org>,
	"Jarkko Sakkinen" <jarkko@kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v2] x86/boot: add .sbat section to the bzImage
Date: Thu, 20 Jul 2023 18:10:36 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <186450BA-9C7F-41C7-9F97-BA1277AEC9FD@oracle.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <d67ac07c71097a4c97c8792c7c1fac9f4d5850dd.camel@HansenPartnership.com>



> On Jul 20, 2023, at 11:07 AM, James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com> wrote:
> 
> On Thu, 2023-07-20 at 16:46 +0000, Eric Snowberg wrote:
>> If a distro adds a SBAT section to either their UKI, or if kernel
>> SBAT enforcement is turned on from GRUB2 by default, there is one
>> piece missing that would need  to be handled by the mainline kernel
>> which is SBAT enforcement for kexec. This  would mean the revocations
>> SBAT protect against would need to be referenced  before doing the
>> signature validation in kexec. If this is not added, any distro that 
>> allows kexec really doesn’t have a SBAT protected kernel.
> 
> Um, actually, this is actually one of the misunderstandings of the
> whole thread: sbat is a revocation mechanism for protecting EFI boot
> security.  It's design is to prevent malicious actors exploiting buggy
> code to get into the EFI boot system before ExitBootServices is called
> and nothing more.  The kernel's intrusion into EFI boot security is
> tiny: it's basically the EFI stub up to ExitBootServices, so even if
> the kernel were to have an sbat number it would obviously be under the
> control of the maintainers of only that code (i.e. Ard) and it would
> only rev if we actually found a usable exploit in the efi stub.
> 
> As far as kexec is concerned, ExitBootServices is long gone and nothing
> a future kexec'd kernel can do can alter that, so there's no EFI
> security benefit to making kexec sbat aware, and thus it seems there's
> no need to do anything about it for kexec.  Now if we're interested in
> sbat as a more general revocation mechanism, that might change, but I
> think sbat is too tightly designed for the problems of EFI variables to
> be more generally useful.

If the line of protection SBAT provides ends at EBS then I agree, kexec 
support would not be needed.  While reading the SBAT spec, I got the 
impression the revocation mechanism it provides would go beyond the 
EBS line.  I guess that needs to be clarified.


  reply	other threads:[~2023-07-20 18:11 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 25+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
     [not found] <20230711154449.1378385-1-eesposit@redhat.com>
     [not found] ` <ZK/9MlTh435FP5Ji@gambale.home>
2023-07-13 13:52   ` [RFC PATCH v2] x86/boot: add .sbat section to the bzImage Ard Biesheuvel
2023-07-13 20:39     ` Emanuele Giuseppe Esposito
2023-07-13 22:31     ` Luca Boccassi
2023-07-14  8:52       ` Ard Biesheuvel
2023-07-14  9:13         ` Matthew Garrett
2023-07-14  9:14           ` Ard Biesheuvel
2023-07-14  9:25         ` Luca Boccassi
2023-07-17 16:08     ` James Bottomley
2023-07-17 16:56       ` Daniel P. Berrangé
2023-07-17 17:15         ` James Bottomley
2023-07-17 18:16           ` Daniel P. Berrangé
2023-07-20 16:46           ` Eric Snowberg
2023-07-20 17:07             ` James Bottomley
2023-07-20 18:10               ` Eric Snowberg [this message]
2023-07-20 19:16             ` Luca Boccassi
2023-07-21  0:02               ` Eric Snowberg
2023-07-21  8:55                 ` Luca Boccassi
2023-07-21 11:24                   ` James Bottomley
2023-07-21 12:40                     ` Luca Boccassi
2023-07-21 13:01                       ` James Bottomley
2023-07-21 13:10                         ` Luca Boccassi
2023-07-21 13:33                           ` James Bottomley
2023-07-21 15:14                             ` Luca Boccassi
2023-07-21 15:22                               ` Luca Boccassi
2023-07-21 15:27                                 ` James Bottomley

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