From: Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@oracle.com>
To: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>
Cc: "Ard Biesheuvel" <ardb@kernel.org>,
"Daniel P. Berrangé" <berrange@redhat.com>,
"Emanuele Giuseppe Esposito" <eesposit@redhat.com>,
"x86@kernel.org" <x86@kernel.org>,
"Thomas Gleixner" <tglx@linutronix.de>,
"bluca@debian.org" <bluca@debian.org>,
"lennart@poettering.net" <lennart@poettering.net>,
"Ingo Molnar" <mingo@redhat.com>,
"Borislav Petkov" <bp@alien8.de>,
"Dave Hansen" <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
"Andrew Morton" <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
"Masahiro Yamada" <masahiroy@kernel.org>,
"Alexander Potapenko" <glider@google.com>,
"Nick Desaulniers" <ndesaulniers@google.com>,
"Vitaly Kuznetsov" <vkuznets@redhat.com>,
"open list" <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
"linux-efi@vger.kernel.org" <linux-efi@vger.kernel.org>,
"keyrings@vger.kernel.org" <keyrings@vger.kernel.org>,
"Jarkko Sakkinen" <jarkko@kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v2] x86/boot: add .sbat section to the bzImage
Date: Thu, 20 Jul 2023 18:10:36 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <186450BA-9C7F-41C7-9F97-BA1277AEC9FD@oracle.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <d67ac07c71097a4c97c8792c7c1fac9f4d5850dd.camel@HansenPartnership.com>
> On Jul 20, 2023, at 11:07 AM, James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com> wrote:
>
> On Thu, 2023-07-20 at 16:46 +0000, Eric Snowberg wrote:
>> If a distro adds a SBAT section to either their UKI, or if kernel
>> SBAT enforcement is turned on from GRUB2 by default, there is one
>> piece missing that would need to be handled by the mainline kernel
>> which is SBAT enforcement for kexec. This would mean the revocations
>> SBAT protect against would need to be referenced before doing the
>> signature validation in kexec. If this is not added, any distro that
>> allows kexec really doesn’t have a SBAT protected kernel.
>
> Um, actually, this is actually one of the misunderstandings of the
> whole thread: sbat is a revocation mechanism for protecting EFI boot
> security. It's design is to prevent malicious actors exploiting buggy
> code to get into the EFI boot system before ExitBootServices is called
> and nothing more. The kernel's intrusion into EFI boot security is
> tiny: it's basically the EFI stub up to ExitBootServices, so even if
> the kernel were to have an sbat number it would obviously be under the
> control of the maintainers of only that code (i.e. Ard) and it would
> only rev if we actually found a usable exploit in the efi stub.
>
> As far as kexec is concerned, ExitBootServices is long gone and nothing
> a future kexec'd kernel can do can alter that, so there's no EFI
> security benefit to making kexec sbat aware, and thus it seems there's
> no need to do anything about it for kexec. Now if we're interested in
> sbat as a more general revocation mechanism, that might change, but I
> think sbat is too tightly designed for the problems of EFI variables to
> be more generally useful.
If the line of protection SBAT provides ends at EBS then I agree, kexec
support would not be needed. While reading the SBAT spec, I got the
impression the revocation mechanism it provides would go beyond the
EBS line. I guess that needs to be clarified.
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2023-07-20 18:11 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 25+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
[not found] <20230711154449.1378385-1-eesposit@redhat.com>
[not found] ` <ZK/9MlTh435FP5Ji@gambale.home>
2023-07-13 13:52 ` [RFC PATCH v2] x86/boot: add .sbat section to the bzImage Ard Biesheuvel
2023-07-13 20:39 ` Emanuele Giuseppe Esposito
2023-07-13 22:31 ` Luca Boccassi
2023-07-14 8:52 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2023-07-14 9:13 ` Matthew Garrett
2023-07-14 9:14 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2023-07-14 9:25 ` Luca Boccassi
2023-07-17 16:08 ` James Bottomley
2023-07-17 16:56 ` Daniel P. Berrangé
2023-07-17 17:15 ` James Bottomley
2023-07-17 18:16 ` Daniel P. Berrangé
2023-07-20 16:46 ` Eric Snowberg
2023-07-20 17:07 ` James Bottomley
2023-07-20 18:10 ` Eric Snowberg [this message]
2023-07-20 19:16 ` Luca Boccassi
2023-07-21 0:02 ` Eric Snowberg
2023-07-21 8:55 ` Luca Boccassi
2023-07-21 11:24 ` James Bottomley
2023-07-21 12:40 ` Luca Boccassi
2023-07-21 13:01 ` James Bottomley
2023-07-21 13:10 ` Luca Boccassi
2023-07-21 13:33 ` James Bottomley
2023-07-21 15:14 ` Luca Boccassi
2023-07-21 15:22 ` Luca Boccassi
2023-07-21 15:27 ` James Bottomley
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