From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 From: Matthew Garrett Subject: Re: [RFC] Second attempt at kernel secure boot support Date: Wed, 31 Oct 2012 15:09:11 +0000 Message-ID: <20121031150911.GA12799@srcf.ucam.org> References: <1348152065-31353-1-git-send-email-mjg@redhat.com> <20121029174131.GC7580@srcf.ucam.org> <20121031150201.GA12394@srcf.ucam.org> <50913E24.1010009@shealevy.com> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Return-path: Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <50913E24.1010009-yfkUTty7RcRWk0Htik3J/w@public.gmane.org> Sender: linux-efi-owner-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org To: Shea Levy Cc: Jiri Kosina , linux-kernel-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org, linux-security-module-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org, linux-efi-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org List-Id: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org On Wed, Oct 31, 2012 at 11:05:08AM -0400, Shea Levy wrote: > Or the boot variable where you stored the key, but in that case I'd > say the attacker has won too. Right, in that case they can compromise MOK. -- Matthew Garrett | mjg59-1xO5oi07KQx4cg9Nei1l7Q@public.gmane.org