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From: Matthew Garrett <mjg59-1xO5oi07KQx4cg9Nei1l7Q@public.gmane.org>
To: Thomas Renninger <trenn-l3A5Bk7waGM@public.gmane.org>
Cc: linux-efi-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org,
	matt.fleming-ral2JQCrhuEAvxtiuMwx3w@public.gmane.org,
	jlee-IBi9RG/b67k@public.gmane.org
Subject: Re: Do not allow MSR or Embedded Controller writes from userspace in secure boot case
Date: Thu, 8 Nov 2012 14:39:19 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20121108143919.GB24094@srcf.ucam.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <201211081040.33981.trenn-l3A5Bk7waGM@public.gmane.org>

On Thu, Nov 08, 2012 at 10:40:33AM +0100, Thomas Renninger wrote:
> On Wednesday, November 07, 2012 09:54:03 PM Matthew Garrett wrote:
> > Is there a case where modifying MSRs or EC registers can cause arbitrary
> > code execution?
> 
> Ok, I am not familiar enough with this secure stuff.
> Theoretically writing EC registers could be used to trick ACPI
> code and change the way it is processed by inspecting ACPI
> code for bad EC register return values.

I'd prefer to see an actual example before worrying too much about this.

> Similar for MSR, the kernel could be (not directly) influenced
> by setting MSR registers in a way it does not expect them to be.

Again, I'd like to see an example of arbitrary code execution.

> I expect it's easy to get the system totally stalled/hang/rebooted
> with bad MSR writes which I thought should be forbidden for
> userspace (even for root...) in secure boot mode.

root can call halt, which is a trivial DoS. It's not worth worrying 
about people wedging the system.

-- 
Matthew Garrett | mjg59-1xO5oi07KQx4cg9Nei1l7Q@public.gmane.org

  parent reply	other threads:[~2012-11-08 14:39 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 18+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2012-11-07 21:28 Do not allow MSR or Embedded Controller writes from userspace in secure boot case Thomas Renninger
     [not found] ` <1352323699-52400-1-git-send-email-trenn-l3A5Bk7waGM@public.gmane.org>
2012-11-07 21:28   ` [PATCH 1/2] ACPI ec_sys: Do not allow write access to EC in secure boot mode Thomas Renninger
2012-11-07 21:28   ` [PATCH 2/2] X86 msr: Do not allow MSR writes " Thomas Renninger
2012-11-07 21:54   ` Do not allow MSR or Embedded Controller writes from userspace in secure boot case Matthew Garrett
     [not found]     ` <20121107215403.GA7277-1xO5oi07KQx4cg9Nei1l7Q@public.gmane.org>
2012-11-07 22:50       ` H. Peter Anvin
2012-11-07 22:51       ` H. Peter Anvin
     [not found]         ` <509AE5DA.1030508-YMNOUZJC4hwAvxtiuMwx3w@public.gmane.org>
2012-11-07 23:21           ` Alan Cox
2012-11-08 14:38           ` Thomas Renninger
     [not found]             ` <201211081538.34091.trenn-l3A5Bk7waGM@public.gmane.org>
2012-11-08 14:41               ` Matthew Garrett
     [not found]                 ` <20121108144125.GC24094-1xO5oi07KQx4cg9Nei1l7Q@public.gmane.org>
2012-11-08 14:44                   ` Shea Levy
     [not found]                     ` <509BC53B.5070304-yfkUTty7RcRWk0Htik3J/w@public.gmane.org>
2012-11-08 14:47                       ` Matthew Garrett
2012-11-09 12:35               ` H. Peter Anvin
2012-11-08  9:40       ` Thomas Renninger
     [not found]         ` <201211081040.33981.trenn-l3A5Bk7waGM@public.gmane.org>
2012-11-08 14:39           ` Matthew Garrett [this message]
     [not found]             ` <20121108143919.GB24094-1xO5oi07KQx4cg9Nei1l7Q@public.gmane.org>
2012-11-08 16:43               ` Alan Cox
2012-11-07 23:27   ` Alan Cox
     [not found]     ` <20121107232722.67589868-38n7/U1jhRXW96NNrWNlrekiAK3p4hvP@public.gmane.org>
2012-11-08 14:19       ` [RFC] [PATCH] X86 MSR read whitelist Thomas Renninger
     [not found]         ` <201211081519.23364.trenn-l3A5Bk7waGM@public.gmane.org>
2012-11-08 15:36           ` Alan Cox

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