From: One Thousand Gnomes <gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>
To: Matthew Garrett <matthew.garrett@nebula.com>
Cc: "tytso@mit.edu" <tytso@mit.edu>,
"linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
"jmorris@namei.org" <jmorris@namei.org>,
"keescook@chromium.org" <keescook@chromium.org>,
"linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org"
<linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>,
"akpm@linux-foundation.org" <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
"hpa@zytor.com" <hpa@zytor.com>,
"jwboyer@fedoraproject.org" <jwboyer@fedoraproject.org>,
"linux-efi@vger.kernel.org" <linux-efi@vger.kernel.org>,
"gregkh@linuxfoundation.org" <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Subject: Re: Trusted kernel patchset for Secure Boot lockdown
Date: Thu, 20 Mar 2014 18:13:21 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20140320181321.6b86a30c@alan.etchedpixels.co.uk> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1395335525.16016.3.camel@x230>
> Whether Microsoft would actually follow through on blacklisting their
> own signatures is obviously an unknown - they've told us they would, but
> commercial concerns etc who knows. They *will* blacklist our signatures.
I think that becomes an irrelevant debate. It's going to end up being
argued in a court by lawyers some day and its not software problem. One
day some bright spark from MS will decide to do things like enforce
patent disputes this way or commercial pressures will lead them to
try and find some other excuse to do it.
It's never going to be "secure", so they'll always be able to find an
excuse.
The functionality you have to disable is for the most part quite boring
for desktop users. Server may see it differently because you cripple a
lot of debugging work. OTOH many of them probably want to turn it on for
production boxes.
The main thing you lose are lots of module options, the ability to force
addresses for things like the serial port console (otherwise I can force
an address and root the kernel that way), mem=, custom ACPI tables and so
on.
It's the stuff that lets you get a box with crapware as firmware working
that's really hit.
Alan
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2014-03-20 18:13 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 73+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2014-02-26 20:11 Trusted kernel patchset for Secure Boot lockdown Matthew Garrett
2014-02-26 20:11 ` [PATCH 01/12] Add support for indicating that the booted kernel is externally trusted Matthew Garrett
[not found] ` <1393445473-15068-2-git-send-email-matthew.garrett-05XSO3Yj/JvQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>
2014-02-27 19:02 ` Kees Cook
2014-03-31 14:49 ` Pavel Machek
2014-02-26 20:11 ` [PATCH 03/12] PCI: Lock down BAR access when trusted_kernel is true Matthew Garrett
2014-02-26 20:11 ` [PATCH 04/12] x86: Lock down IO port " Matthew Garrett
2014-02-26 20:11 ` [PATCH 05/12] Restrict /dev/mem and /dev/kmem " Matthew Garrett
2014-02-26 20:11 ` [PATCH 06/12] acpi: Limit access to custom_method if " Matthew Garrett
2014-02-26 20:11 ` [PATCH 07/12] acpi: Ignore acpi_rsdp kernel parameter when " Matthew Garrett
2014-02-26 20:11 ` [PATCH 08/12] kexec: Disable at runtime if " Matthew Garrett
2014-02-26 20:11 ` [PATCH 10/12] x86: Restrict MSR access when " Matthew Garrett
2014-02-26 20:11 ` [PATCH 11/12] asus-wmi: Restrict debugfs interface " Matthew Garrett
2014-02-26 21:11 ` Trusted kernel patchset for Secure Boot lockdown Kees Cook
[not found] ` <CAGXu5j+b49grru-=DTRC0wx5LTOHN_jKL0Q++uW0Mzy+BxDf4w-JsoAwUIsXosN+BqQ9rBEUg@public.gmane.org>
2014-02-26 22:21 ` One Thousand Gnomes
2014-02-27 9:54 ` Alon Ziv
2014-03-19 17:42 ` Florian Weimer
[not found] ` <1393445473-15068-1-git-send-email-matthew.garrett-05XSO3Yj/JvQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>
2014-02-26 20:11 ` [PATCH 02/12] Enforce module signatures when trusted kernel is enabled Matthew Garrett
2014-02-26 20:11 ` [PATCH 09/12] uswsusp: Disable when trusted_kernel is true Matthew Garrett
2014-03-31 14:49 ` Pavel Machek
2014-02-26 20:11 ` [PATCH 12/12] Add option to automatically set trusted_kernel when in Secure Boot mode Matthew Garrett
[not found] ` <1393445473-15068-13-git-send-email-matthew.garrett-05XSO3Yj/JvQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>
2014-02-26 22:41 ` One Thousand Gnomes
2014-02-26 22:47 ` H. Peter Anvin
2014-02-26 22:48 ` Matthew Garrett
2014-02-27 18:48 ` Kees Cook
2014-02-27 18:04 ` Trusted kernel patchset for Secure Boot lockdown Josh Boyer
2014-02-27 19:07 ` Greg KH
[not found] ` <20140227190710.GA4755-U8xfFu+wG4EAvxtiuMwx3w@public.gmane.org>
2014-02-27 19:11 ` Josh Boyer
2014-02-28 12:50 ` Josh Boyer
2014-02-28 3:03 ` James Morris
[not found] ` <alpine.LRH.2.02.1402281402090.26521-CK9fWmtY32x9JUWOpEiw7w@public.gmane.org>
2014-02-28 4:52 ` Matthew Garrett
2014-03-13 5:01 ` Matthew Garrett
2014-03-13 6:22 ` Kees Cook
2014-03-13 9:33 ` James Morris
2014-03-13 10:12 ` One Thousand Gnomes
[not found] ` <20140313101235.753c3ec0-mUKnrFFms3BCCTY1wZZT65JpZx93mCW/@public.gmane.org>
2014-03-13 15:54 ` H. Peter Anvin
2014-03-13 15:59 ` Matthew Garrett
2014-03-13 21:24 ` One Thousand Gnomes
2014-03-13 21:28 ` H. Peter Anvin
[not found] ` <532222E1.2020405-YMNOUZJC4hwAvxtiuMwx3w@public.gmane.org>
2014-03-13 21:32 ` Matthew Garrett
[not found] ` <20140313212450.67f1de8e-mUKnrFFms3BCCTY1wZZT65JpZx93mCW/@public.gmane.org>
2014-03-13 21:30 ` Matthew Garrett
2014-03-13 23:21 ` One Thousand Gnomes
[not found] ` <20140313232140.03bdaac3-mUKnrFFms3BCCTY1wZZT65JpZx93mCW/@public.gmane.org>
2014-03-14 1:57 ` Matthew Garrett
[not found] ` <1394762250.6416.24.camel-+5W/JHIUVxg@public.gmane.org>
2014-03-14 12:22 ` One Thousand Gnomes
[not found] ` <20140314122231.17b9ca8a-mUKnrFFms3BCCTY1wZZT65JpZx93mCW/@public.gmane.org>
2014-03-14 12:51 ` Matthew Garrett
2014-03-14 15:23 ` Kees Cook
2014-03-14 15:46 ` Matthew Garrett
2014-03-14 15:54 ` Kees Cook
[not found] ` <CAGXu5j+3vVKhFPOsArYddA+QqhvVUunj8eYOF799rDv=3MGtyg-JsoAwUIsXosN+BqQ9rBEUg@public.gmane.org>
2014-03-14 15:58 ` Matthew Garrett
[not found] ` <CAGXu5jLZcWh5WD0L8s3Q-GXdXCMnA57qtjfdFfQbv0fxYcuCTQ-JsoAwUIsXosN+BqQ9rBEUg@public.gmane.org>
2014-03-14 16:28 ` One Thousand Gnomes
2014-03-14 17:06 ` One Thousand Gnomes
2014-03-14 18:11 ` Matthew Garrett
[not found] ` <1394820664.26846.18.camel-OCPKQ0O/skbnpfJQjCtNlyaZ0x2G8ZQoAL8bYrjMMd8@public.gmane.org>
2014-03-14 19:24 ` Matthew Garrett
2014-03-14 20:37 ` David Lang
2014-03-14 20:43 ` Matthew Garrett
2014-03-14 21:58 ` One Thousand Gnomes
[not found] ` <20140314215854.50ec186a-mUKnrFFms3BCCTY1wZZT65JpZx93mCW/@public.gmane.org>
2014-03-14 22:04 ` Matthew Garrett
2014-03-14 21:48 ` One Thousand Gnomes
2014-03-14 21:56 ` Matthew Garrett
2014-03-14 22:08 ` One Thousand Gnomes
[not found] ` <20140314220840.29a12171-mUKnrFFms3BCCTY1wZZT65JpZx93mCW/@public.gmane.org>
2014-03-14 22:15 ` Matthew Garrett
2014-03-14 22:31 ` One Thousand Gnomes
2014-03-14 22:52 ` Matthew Garrett
[not found] ` <20140314223150.0b49723e-mUKnrFFms3BCCTY1wZZT65JpZx93mCW/@public.gmane.org>
2014-03-19 19:50 ` Kees Cook
2014-03-14 23:18 ` Theodore Ts'o
2014-03-15 0:15 ` One Thousand Gnomes
[not found] ` <20140314231832.GA653-AKGzg7BKzIDYtjvyW6yDsg@public.gmane.org>
2014-03-19 17:49 ` Florian Weimer
2014-03-19 20:16 ` Kees Cook
[not found] ` <CAGXu5j+JXy4EbHxu+8twWo=3gqyLJ6hZGPbgsdf3t8YhUA-bWw-JsoAwUIsXosN+BqQ9rBEUg@public.gmane.org>
2014-03-20 14:47 ` One Thousand Gnomes
2014-03-20 14:55 ` tytso
[not found] ` <20140320145507.GB20618-AKGzg7BKzIDYtjvyW6yDsg@public.gmane.org>
2014-03-20 17:12 ` Matthew Garrett
2014-03-20 18:13 ` One Thousand Gnomes [this message]
2014-03-13 21:26 ` One Thousand Gnomes
[not found] ` <20140313212647.7412aadf-mUKnrFFms3BCCTY1wZZT65JpZx93mCW/@public.gmane.org>
2014-03-13 21:31 ` Matthew Garrett
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