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From: Lukas Wunner <lukas@wunner.de>
To: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
	Josh Boyer <jwboyer@fedoraproject.org>,
	keyrings@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 5/6] efi: Disable secure boot if shim is in insecure mode
Date: Tue, 22 Nov 2016 14:03:31 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20161122130331.GA1657@wunner.de> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <147977472850.6360.6174897435078432354.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk>

On Tue, Nov 22, 2016 at 12:32:08AM +0000, David Howells wrote:
> From: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@fedoraproject.org>
> 
> A user can manually tell the shim boot loader to disable validation of
> images it loads.  When a user does this, it creates a UEFI variable called
> MokSBState that does not have the runtime attribute set.  Given that the
> user explicitly disabled validation, we can honor that and not enable
> secure boot mode if that variable is set.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@fedoraproject.org>
> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
> ---
> 
>  drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/secureboot.c |   22 +++++++++++++++++++++-
>  1 file changed, 21 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
> 
> diff --git a/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/secureboot.c b/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/secureboot.c
> index e44d8c9ee150..d928398a3a52 100644
> --- a/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/secureboot.c
> +++ b/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/secureboot.c
> @@ -23,10 +23,14 @@ int efi_get_secureboot(void)
>  		'S', 'e', 'c', 'u', 'r', 'e', 'B', 'o', 'o', 't', 0 };
>  	static const efi_char16_t const sm_var_name[] = {
>  		'S', 'e', 't', 'u', 'p', 'M', 'o', 'd', 'e', 0 };
> +	static efi_char16_t const MokSBState_var_name[] = {
> +		'M', 'o', 'k', 'S', 'B', 'S', 't', 'a', 't', 'e', 0 };
>  
>  	static const efi_guid_t var_guid = EFI_GLOBAL_VARIABLE_GUID;
> +	static const efi_guid_t shim_guid = EFI_SHIM_LOCK_GUID;
>  
> -	u8 val;
> +	u32 attr;
> +	u8 val, moksbstate;
>  	unsigned long size = sizeof(val);
>  	efi_status_t status;
>  
> @@ -50,6 +54,22 @@ int efi_get_secureboot(void)
>  	if (val == 1)
>  		return 0;
>  
> +	/* See if a user has put shim into insecure mode.  If so, and if the
> +	 * variable doesn't have the runtime attribute set, we might as well
> +	 * honor that.
> +	 */
> +	size = sizeof(moksbstate);
> +	status = f_getvar((efi_char16_t *)MokSBState_var_name, &shim_guid,
> +			  &attr, &size, &moksbstate);

Please use efi_call_runtime() instead of f_getvar().

> +
> +	/* If it fails, we don't care why.  Default to secure */
> +	if (status != EFI_SUCCESS)
> +		return 1;
> +
> +	if (!(attr & EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS) &&
> +	    moksbstate == 1)

This would fit on a single line.

Thanks,

Lukas

> +		return 0;
> +
>  	return 1;
>  
>  out_efi_err:
> 

  reply	other threads:[~2016-11-22 13:03 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 76+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2016-11-16 21:47 [PATCH 00/16] Kernel lockdown David Howells
2016-11-16 21:47 ` [PATCH 01/16] Add the ability to lock down access to the running kernel image David Howells
     [not found]   ` <147933284407.19316.17886320817060158597.stgit-S6HVgzuS8uM4Awkfq6JHfwNdhmdF6hFW@public.gmane.org>
2016-11-16 22:20     ` Borislav Petkov
2016-11-16 22:40   ` David Howells
2016-12-25 21:20   ` Pavel Machek
2016-12-25 21:44   ` David Howells
2016-11-16 21:47 ` [PATCH 02/16] efi: Get the secure boot status David Howells
2016-11-17 12:37   ` Lukas Wunner
2016-11-22  0:31     ` [PATCH 2/6] arm/efi: Allow invocation of arbitrary runtime services David Howells
2016-11-22  0:31     ` [PATCH 3/6] efi: Add SHIM and image security database GUID definitions David Howells
2016-11-22  0:32     ` [PATCH 4/6] efi: Get the secure boot status David Howells
2016-11-22 10:44       ` Lukas Wunner
     [not found]         ` <20161122104401.GC1552-JFq808J9C/izQB+pC5nmwQ@public.gmane.org>
2016-11-22 10:49           ` Ard Biesheuvel
2016-11-22 14:52           ` David Howells
     [not found]             ` <25371.1479826321-S6HVgzuS8uM4Awkfq6JHfwNdhmdF6hFW@public.gmane.org>
2016-11-22 20:36               ` Lukas Wunner
2016-11-22 14:47       ` David Howells
2016-11-22 20:30         ` Lukas Wunner
2016-11-23  0:02         ` David Howells
     [not found]       ` <7199.1479826047-S6HVgzuS8uM4Awkfq6JHfwNdhmdF6hFW@public.gmane.org>
2016-11-22 14:57         ` David Howells
2016-11-22  0:32     ` [PATCH 5/6] efi: Disable secure boot if shim is in insecure mode David Howells
2016-11-22 13:03       ` Lukas Wunner [this message]
2016-11-22  0:32     ` [PATCH 6/6] efi: Add EFI_SECURE_BOOT bit David Howells
2016-11-22 13:04       ` Lukas Wunner
     [not found]   ` <20161117123731.GA11573-JFq808J9C/izQB+pC5nmwQ@public.gmane.org>
2016-11-21 11:42     ` [PATCH 02/16] efi: Get the secure boot status David Howells
     [not found]       ` <29779.1479728545-S6HVgzuS8uM4Awkfq6JHfwNdhmdF6hFW@public.gmane.org>
2016-11-21 11:52         ` Ard Biesheuvel
     [not found]       ` <CAKv+Gu-frVDhzORDRZ6XT+FxewsTgrxhXmM=DqaS6Ns4mJhQ9g-JsoAwUIsXosN+BqQ9rBEUg@public.gmane.org>
2016-11-21 12:41         ` David Howells
2016-11-21 13:14           ` Ard Biesheuvel
     [not found]             ` <CAKv+Gu8Lhm=u97hY1y+Y+Ladk=y7pSVNrow8ML1hQUJ9+74B-w-JsoAwUIsXosN+BqQ9rBEUg@public.gmane.org>
2016-11-21 15:17               ` Lukas Wunner
2016-11-21 15:25                 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2016-11-22  0:31     ` [PATCH 1/6] x86/efi: Allow invocation of arbitrary runtime services David Howells
     [not found]       ` <147977469914.6360.17194649697208113702.stgit-S6HVgzuS8uM4Awkfq6JHfwNdhmdF6hFW@public.gmane.org>
2016-11-22 10:20         ` Lukas Wunner
2016-11-22 14:17       ` David Howells
2016-11-22 14:58         ` Joe Perches
     [not found]         ` <1479826691.1942.11.camel-6d6DIl74uiNBDgjK7y7TUQ@public.gmane.org>
2016-11-22 15:52           ` David Howells
     [not found]             ` <24973.1479829961-S6HVgzuS8uM4Awkfq6JHfwNdhmdF6hFW@public.gmane.org>
2016-11-22 16:25               ` Joe Perches
2016-11-22 16:40             ` David Howells
2016-11-22 16:51               ` Joe Perches
2016-11-21 11:46   ` [PATCH 02/16] efi: Get the secure boot status David Howells
2016-11-21 19:58     ` Lukas Wunner
2016-11-16 21:47 ` [PATCH 03/16] efi: Disable secure boot if shim is in insecure mode David Howells
2016-11-16 21:47 ` [PATCH 04/16] efi: Lock down the kernel if booted in secure boot mode David Howells
2016-11-16 21:47 ` [PATCH 05/16] efi: Add EFI_SECURE_BOOT bit David Howells
2016-11-17 21:58   ` Ard Biesheuvel
2016-11-18 11:58     ` Josh Boyer
     [not found]       ` <CA+5PVA6F5qEnuL2UaXS9_fJ217J93cEZDDsz9Y2BPwHXcMdX-A-JsoAwUIsXosN+BqQ9rBEUg@public.gmane.org>
2016-11-18 12:10         ` Ard Biesheuvel
     [not found]   ` <CAKv+Gu_8r3oM-jvvuSiXTzxp0YMEVgc5KkScJ2UhGTaXm28L6w-JsoAwUIsXosN+BqQ9rBEUg@public.gmane.org>
2016-11-18 17:28     ` David Howells
2016-11-16 21:48 ` [PATCH 06/16] Add a sysrq option to exit secure boot mode David Howells
2016-11-16 21:48 ` [PATCH 07/16] kexec: Disable at runtime if the kernel is locked down David Howells
2016-11-16 21:48 ` [PATCH 08/16] Copy secure_boot flag in boot params across kexec reboot David Howells
2016-11-16 21:48 ` [PATCH 09/16] hibernate: Disable when the kernel is locked down David Howells
2016-11-16 21:48 ` [PATCH 10/16] PCI: Lock down BAR access " David Howells
     [not found] ` <147933283664.19316.12454053022687659937.stgit-S6HVgzuS8uM4Awkfq6JHfwNdhmdF6hFW@public.gmane.org>
2016-11-16 21:48   ` [PATCH 11/16] x86: Lock down IO port " David Howells
2016-11-16 21:49   ` [PATCH 16/16] x86: Restrict MSR " David Howells
2016-11-16 22:27   ` [PATCH 00/16] Kernel lockdown One Thousand Gnomes
2016-11-21 19:53     ` Ard Biesheuvel
2016-11-30 14:27       ` One Thousand Gnomes
2016-11-16 21:48 ` [PATCH 12/16] ACPI: Limit access to custom_method when the kernel is locked down David Howells
2016-11-16 21:48 ` [PATCH 13/16] asus-wmi: Restrict debugfs interface " David Howells
2016-11-16 21:48 ` [PATCH 14/16] Restrict /dev/mem and /dev/kmem " David Howells
2016-11-16 21:49 ` [PATCH 15/16] acpi: Ignore acpi_rsdp kernel param when the kernel has been " David Howells
2016-11-16 22:28 ` [PATCH 00/16] Kernel lockdown Justin Forbes
2016-11-21 23:10 ` [PATCH] Lock down drivers that can have io ports, io mem, irqs and dma changed David Howells
2016-11-22  6:12   ` Dominik Brodowski
2016-11-23 12:58   ` David Howells
2016-11-23 19:21     ` Dominik Brodowski
     [not found]     ` <20161123192143.GA482-SGhQLRGLuNwb6pqDj42GsMgv3T4z79SOrE5yTffgRl4@public.gmane.org>
2016-11-24 17:34       ` David Howells
2016-11-24 20:19         ` Dominik Brodowski
2016-11-25 14:49         ` David Howells
     [not found]   ` <26173.1479769852-S6HVgzuS8uM4Awkfq6JHfwNdhmdF6hFW@public.gmane.org>
2016-11-28 22:32     ` Corey Minyard
2016-11-29  0:11   ` David Howells
2016-11-29  0:23     ` Corey Minyard
2016-11-29 14:03     ` David Howells
     [not found]       ` <6973.1480428211-S6HVgzuS8uM4Awkfq6JHfwNdhmdF6hFW@public.gmane.org>
2016-11-29 14:35         ` Corey Minyard
2016-11-30 14:41         ` One Thousand Gnomes
     [not found]       ` <20161130144105.2b6be4fe-qBU/x9rampVanCEyBjwyrvXRex20P6io@public.gmane.org>
2016-11-30 16:25         ` David Howells
2016-11-29 10:40   ` David Howells

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