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From: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland-5wv7dgnIgG8@public.gmane.org>
To: David Howells <dhowells-H+wXaHxf7aLQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>
Cc: lukas-JFq808J9C/izQB+pC5nmwQ@public.gmane.org,
	linux-efi-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org,
	linux-security-module-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org,
	keyrings-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org,
	linux-kernel-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 4/6] efi: Get the secure boot status [ver #2]
Date: Wed, 23 Nov 2016 10:47:58 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20161123104757.GE24624@leverpostej> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <147986057768.13790.3027173260868896792.stgit-S6HVgzuS8uM4Awkfq6JHfwNdhmdF6hFW@public.gmane.org>

On Wed, Nov 23, 2016 at 12:22:57AM +0000, David Howells wrote:
> @@ -1158,6 +1158,8 @@ struct boot_params *efi_main(struct efi_config *c,
>  	else
>  		setup_boot_services32(efi_early);
>  
> +	boot_params->secure_boot = (efi_get_secureboot(sys_table) == 1);

In the arm stub's efi_entry(), we fail-safe, and assume secure boot for any
non-zero status (including errors). e.g. 

	secure_boot = efi_get_secureboot(sys_table);
	if (secure_boot > 0)
		pr_efi(sys_table, "UEFI Secure Boot is enabled.\n");

	if (secure_boot < 0) {
		pr_efi_err(sys_table,
			"could not determine UEFI Secure Boot status.\n");
	}

	/*
	 * Unauthenticated device tree data is a security hazard, so
	 * ignore 'dtb=' unless UEFI Secure Boot is disabled.
	 */
	if (secure_boot != 0 && strstr(cmdline_ptr, "dtb=")) {
		pr_efi(sys_table, "Ignoring DTB from command line.\n");

... should we not do likewise here, e.g.

	int secure_boot = efi_get_secureboot(sys_table);

	if (secure_boot > 0)
		pr_efi(sys_table, "UEFI Secure Boot is enabled.\n");
	if (secure_boot < 0)
		pr_efi_err(sys_table,
			"could not determine UEFI Secure Boot status.\n");

	/*
	 * Fail-safe in the case of an error determining the secure boot
	 * status.
	 */
	boot_params->secure_boot = (secure_boot != 0);

... ?

Thanks,
Mark.

  parent reply	other threads:[~2016-11-23 10:47 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 28+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2016-11-23  0:22 [PATCH 0/6] efi: Pass secure boot mode to kernel [ver #2] David Howells
2016-11-23  0:22 ` [PATCH 1/6] x86/efi: Allow invocation of arbitrary runtime services " David Howells
     [not found] ` <147986054870.13790.8640536414645705863.stgit-S6HVgzuS8uM4Awkfq6JHfwNdhmdF6hFW@public.gmane.org>
2016-11-23  0:22   ` [PATCH 2/6] arm/efi: " David Howells
2016-11-23  9:34     ` David Howells
2016-11-23 10:35       ` Ard Biesheuvel
2016-11-23 11:51         ` David Howells
2016-11-23 10:27     ` Mark Rutland
2016-11-23 11:46       ` David Howells
     [not found]         ` <6125.1479901598-S6HVgzuS8uM4Awkfq6JHfwNdhmdF6hFW@public.gmane.org>
2016-11-23 13:38           ` Mark Rutland
2016-11-23  0:22   ` [PATCH 3/6] efi: Add SHIM and image security database GUID definitions " David Howells
2016-11-23  0:22 ` [PATCH 4/6] efi: Get the secure boot status " David Howells
2016-11-23  9:31   ` Lukas Wunner
2016-11-23  9:53     ` David Howells
2016-11-23 10:10       ` Lukas Wunner
     [not found]   ` <147986057768.13790.3027173260868896792.stgit-S6HVgzuS8uM4Awkfq6JHfwNdhmdF6hFW@public.gmane.org>
2016-11-23 10:47     ` Mark Rutland [this message]
2016-11-23 11:25       ` David Howells
2016-11-23 13:42         ` Mark Rutland
2016-11-23 14:13           ` David Howells
2016-11-23 14:24             ` Mark Rutland
2016-11-23 14:55               ` David Howells
     [not found]                 ` <2794.1479912933-S6HVgzuS8uM4Awkfq6JHfwNdhmdF6hFW@public.gmane.org>
2016-11-29 18:11                   ` Matthew Garrett
2016-11-30 16:51       ` David Howells
2016-11-23  0:23 ` [PATCH 5/6] efi: Disable secure boot if shim is in insecure mode " David Howells
     [not found]   ` <147986058486.13790.8455439853105793460.stgit-S6HVgzuS8uM4Awkfq6JHfwNdhmdF6hFW@public.gmane.org>
2016-11-23 13:38     ` Mark Rutland
2016-11-23  0:23 ` [PATCH 6/6] efi: Add EFI_SECURE_BOOT bit " David Howells
2016-11-23  9:27   ` Lukas Wunner
2016-11-23 10:07     ` David Howells
2016-11-23 10:09       ` David Howells

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